

# MORAL TRAINING





PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF  
MORAL TRAINING.

**LIBRARY**

OCT 21 1982

THE ONTARIO INSTITUTE  
FOR STUDIES IN EDUCATION

TO ONE GOOD MOTHER  
AND TO THE SACRED MEMORY OF ANOTHER.  
THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED  
BY THEIR SONS.



ucan.  
each.

# PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF MORAL TRAINING

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO  
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE

BY

J. WELTON, M.A.,

PROFESSOR OF EDUCATION IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS;

AUTHOR OF "PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF TEACHING," "THE LOGICAL BASES OF  
EDUCATION," "A MANUAL OF LOGIC," ETC.;

AND

F. G. BLANDFORD, M.A.,

LECTURER IN EDUCATION IN THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY TRAINING COLLEGE.



LONDON: W. B. CLIVE,  
University Tutorial Press Ltd.

DRURY LANE, W.C.

1909

W  
10454  
318/10



## PREFACE.

---

THIS book is intended as a companion to the *Principles and Methods of Teaching*, and, like that work, is both theoretical and practical. In the suggestions as to practice, however, it is felt that there is no need, in this case, to limit the outlook to one type of school. Schools differ widely in their curricula and in the age at which their pupils leave, and consequently a book on teaching should confine itself to one type of school or it would become unwieldy and at the same time would lose in definiteness of application. But in a treatment of the disciplinary aspect of school life this is much less the case. It is true that differences in the age of the pupils and differences in the type of school lead to wide differences in disciplinary organization. But it is much easier to see the common principles which underlie such differences than it is to trace common principles in the methods of teaching very different subjects. Consequently we have applied our theory to schools of all types, and our work is intended to cover all institutions in which the young are trained.

But such applications are intended only as illustrations of the theory. In discipline even more than in teaching "it is the spirit that quickeneth, the flesh profiteth nothing." Discipline is, therefore, treated primarily from the point of view of its effect on the child; secondarily, and by way of illustration, from the point of view of its exercise by the teacher. The personality and temperament of



the teacher count for so much, and the success of the work is so dependent on the personal relation between him and his pupils, that the adoption by one teacher of the detailed plans and methods of another is fraught with considerable danger. There is no royal road to discipline, there can be no cut-and-dried rules even for maintaining order, and we do not offer a *vade mecum* to teachers who are incompetent in these matters.

We have, however, indicated modes of dealing with boys which we ourselves have found to be effective, but each of our readers must work out for himself or herself his or her own lines of treatment. Our joint experience has covered, we believe, day schools and boarding schools of almost every type for boys, but it has of necessity been much smaller in the sphere of girls' schools. What we have said about boys may require some modification, therefore, when applied to girls. But the modification is only of detail: the general principles are unaffected by the difference of sex.

We must ask our lady readers to be tolerant of our arrogant use of the masculine pronoun. The fault is not entirely our own. We have at our disposal a reasonable supply of nouns. 'Teacher' is a fair compromise between 'master' and 'mistress', 'child' or 'pupil' may be used at times to include 'boy' and 'girl'; but we have no corresponding pronoun of common gender, and the most that we can claim is that we have generally avoided the tempting discourtesy of 'it.'

We owe a debt of gratitude to Mr. W. P. Welpton, Master of Method in the University of Leeds, for his kindness in reading the more theoretical chapters and in aiding us with suggestion and criticism.

It is with a grave sense of responsibility that we have

undertaken and carried out our task. The subject is the one fundamental matter in education, compared with which questions of curriculum and of teaching sink into insignificance. It is, moreover, one on which teachers are specially sensitive. Yet we feel that it is one in which mere routine is too often followed; and mere routine can never produce the results which the country needs of earnest-minded, upright and honourable citizens. It is only by an examination into first principles and by the application of them to current practice that the disciplinary influence of our schools can be made effective and productive.

In the humble hope of aiding some at least to dig beneath the surface of custom and to find the gold of reasoned conviction we present our work to teachers and to parents.

J. W.

F. G. B.

*June 1909.*





# CONTENTS.

## CHAPTER I.

### NATURE OF MORAL TRAINING.

	PAGE
1. Education and Morality ... ..	1
Morality and Capacity ... ..	2
Teaching and Morality ... ..	3
2. Influence of the Home ... ..	7
3. Relation between Home and School ... ..	10
4. Influence of the School ... ..	10
5. Aim of Moral Training ... ..	12
6. Relations between Child and World ... ..	14
7. Education and Individuality ... ..	17
8. Order of Treatment ... ..	20

## CHAPTER II.

### HABIT.

1. Origin of Habits ... ..	21
2. Place of Habit in Life ... ..	22
Habits and Character ... ..	23
Habits and Habitudes ... ..	24
Strength of Habitudes ... ..	25
3. Change of Habitudes ... ..	28
4. Habitudes and School Life ... ..	30
Extension and readjustment of Home Habitudes ... ..	31
Chief School Habitudes ... ..	32
Negation of Habitudes ... ..	35
School Training as Formative of Purpose ... ..	36

## CHAPTER III.

## DUTY.

	PAGE
1. Habitude and Duty ... ..	38
2. Origin of Idea of Duty ... ..	39
3. Duty as Constraint ... ..	41
Forms of Constraint ... ..	41
Constraint in Home and in School ... ..	43
Justification of Authoritative Constraint ... ..	44
Constraint and Freedom ... ..	48
in the Physical World ... ..	49
in the Human World ... ..	50
The Individual and Society ... ..	52
4. Duty as an Inward Force ... ..	54
5. Duty and Life ... ..	56
Positive and Negative Constraint ... ..	58
6. The Standard of Duty ... ..	59
7. Decision of Duty ... ..	61
Choice of Means ... ..	61
Conflict of Ends ... ..	61
Conflict of Moral Maxims ... ..	64

## CHAPTER IV.

## VIRTUE.

1. Nature of Virtue ... ..	67
2. Virtue and Duty ... ..	68
3. Virtue and Habitudes ... ..	69
4. Virtue and Purpose ... ..	71
Materialism ... ..	71
Sensationalism ... ..	72
Material and Spiritual Aims ... ..	73
Embodiment of Purpose ... ..	74
5. Analysis of Virtue ... ..	77
6. Wisdom ... ..	79
Cultivation of Wisdom ... ..	83
Morality and Religion ... ..	87
Reverence ... ..	88

	PAGE
7. Courage ... ..	91
8. Temperance ... ..	92
9. Justice ... ..	95
Justice and Charity ... ..	96
10. Virtue and Childhood ... ..	97

## CHAPTER V.

### CONSCIENCE.

1. Conscience and Conduct ... ..	99
Repentance and Remorse ... ..	101
2. Nature of Conscience ... ..	103
3. Validity of Conscience ... ..	105
Variations in apprehension of Moral Law ... ..	107
4. Education of Conscience ... ..	110
Sensitiveness of Conscience... ..	110
Conscience and Will ... ..	111
Order of development of Conscience ... ..	111
Moral Thoughtfulness ... ..	113
Moral Insight... ..	114
Conscience and Religion ... ..	115
Moral Guidance ... ..	115

## CHAPTER VI.

### THE SCHOOL COMMUNITY.

1. Disciplinary Function of the School ... ..	119
Importance of Common Life ... ..	119
Self-assertion and Group-consciousness ... ..	122
Effects of Discipline ... ..	123
2. Rights and Obligations... ..	123
3. Nature of a Community ... ..	124
4. Laws in a Community ... ..	126
Illustration: A Factory ... ..	127
5. Organization of the School Community ... ..	129
Effects of Bureaucracy ... ..	130
Functions of Head-teacher ... ..	132
Recognition of Law ... ..	132



	PAGE
6. Characteristics of School Laws ... ..	133
Grounded in Authority and Sympathy ... ..	134
Reasonableness ... ..	135
Justice ... ..	137
Publicity ... ..	138
Breadth ... ..	138
7. Enforcement of Law ... ..	138
Government ... ..	139
Punishment ... ..	140
8. Discipline ... ..	142
School Tone ... ..	143
Tone and Individuals ... ..	146
Differences between Individuals ... ..	149
Discipline and Supervision ... ..	151
Summary ... ..	152

## CHAPTER VII.

## EXERCISE OF DISCIPLINE.

1. Relation between Discipline, Government, and Influence	153
Discipline and Government ... ..	153
Discipline and Influence ... ..	155
2. Aims of School Government ... ..	157
Convenience in Teaching ... ..	158
Formation of Habits ... ..	158
* { Training of Pupils' Characters ... ..	159
Training of Teachers' Characters ... ..	159
3. Disciplinary Government ... ..	159
* { It depends on the Teacher ... ..	159
and on the Pupils ... ..	160
The Teacher's Standard of Order ... ..	162
Examination of Extreme Cases ... ..	163
Laxity ... ..	163
Rigidity ... ..	164
Relations involved in Discipline ... ..	168
Difficulties of Government ... ..	169
Fear as a Factor of Discipline ... ..	171
Punishment as a Factor of Discipline ... ..	173

	PAGE
4. Disciplinary Influence ... ..	174
Personal Relations ... ..	175
Personality of the Teacher ... ..	176

## CHAPTER VIII.

## DISCIPLINARY ORGANIZATION OF THE SCHOOL.

1. Organization as an Instrument of Discipline ... ..	180
2. Differences of Organization ... ..	180
3. Disciplinary Officers ... ..	181
Teaching Staff ... ..	181
Appeals to Head-master ... ..	182
Power of Corporal Punishment ... ..	184
Prefects ... ..	186
in Day Schools ... ..	186
in Preparatory Boarding Schools ... ..	188
in Secondary Boarding Schools ... ..	188
4. Organization of Non-personal Influences ... ..	191
Games ... ..	191
in Day Schools ... ..	192
in Boarding Schools ... ..	193
Use of Leisure in Boarding Schools ... ..	193
Material Comfort ... ..	196
5. Tone of the School ... ..	197
School-feeling and House-feeling ... ..	200

## CHAPTER IX.

## THE RELATION BETWEEN THE SCHOOL AND THE HOME.

1. Failure of the Relation. ....	202
through Neglect ....	203
through Interference ....	204
through Incompatibility ....	205
2. Duties of the School ... ..	206
Intercourse with Parents ... ..	207

	PAGE
Letters to Parents ... ..	209
Reports ... ..	209
Text-Books ... ..	212
Occupation of Leisure ... ..	213
Employment on leaving School ... ..	215
3. Duties of Parents ... ..	217
in Supporting Authority of School ... ..	217
in not Interfering with Organization ... ..	218
in Corresponding with Teachers ... ..	219
in Loyalty to their Fellow-workers ... ..	219
in Physical Care of the Children ... ..	220
4. Boarding Schools and the Home ... ..	221
Reports ... ..	221
Visits of Parents ... ..	221
Material Conditions ... ..	222

## CHAPTER X.

## STIMULUS AND RESTRAINT.

1. Desired Identification of Duty and Pleasure ... ..	224
2. Stimulus ... ..	226
Marks for Achievement ... ..	226
Marks for Oral Work ... ..	226
The Labour of Marking ... ..	228
Marks not a wholesome Stimulus ... ..	228
‘Stars and Stripes’ ... ..	229
‘Romans and Carthaginians’ ... ..	232
3. Reward ... ..	233
Prizes ... ..	233
Promotion ... ..	234
Offices and Duties .. ..	234
4. Restraint and Punishment ... ..	234
Functions of Punishment ... ..	235
Punishment and the Offence ... ..	236
Idleness ... ..	236
Minor Offences ... ..	239
Copying ... ..	240
Bullying ... ..	243



# CONTENTS.

XV

	PAGE.
Kinds of Punishment ... ..	245
Punishment and the Offender ... ..	247
Motive... ..	248
Law and Personality ... ..	248
Remorse and Repentance ... ..	249
Expiation ... ..	249
Coercive Punishment ... ..	251
Abolition of Punishment in Schools ... ..	252
INDEX ... ..	253



## CHAPTER I.

---

### NATURE OF MORAL TRAINING.

1. No statement in writings on education is more common, or meets with more general acceptance, than that the aim of education is wholly moral, and consequently that all its means have a direct moral reference. Thus, Herbart writes: "The one and whole work of education may be summed up in the concept—Morality."<sup>1</sup>

Unless an unusually extended sense be given to 'Morality,' this would seem to limit unduly the scope of education. Certainly it is true that an education which had no ultimate moral aim would be unworthy the name; but the ultimate aim need not be the immediate aim in each piece of the educative process. When we look at the real life each one of us has to live we see that, though a moral quality runs through it all, yet many of its aspects and activities are not primarily moral; and that even in actions which are primarily moral something besides morality is needed. As Plato long ago pointed out both will and capacity are necessary if one would perform well any of the functions of life.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Aesthetische Darstellung der Welt*, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Rep. I.* 332-334.

Now, capacity is largely a matter of knowledge and skill, and, as such, has no moral quality : it may be exercised with either a good or a bad motive, with a desire to bring about a good or an evil result. No doubt, as knowledge and skill can be acquired, he who would do well his duty in the world should set himself, so far as his powers and opportunities permit, to develop capacity in any form of activity he proposes to undertake. Still, this moral obligation is as independent of the nature of the knowledge and skill acquired as is the motive with which the capacity is exercised.

**Morality and Capacity.**

If the capacity has not been acquired the work done cannot be good, no matter how excellent may be the intention. A carpenter, for instance, must have knowledge and skill in carpentry as well as a praiseworthy desire to do his work well, or his dealings with wood will not be satisfactory to those who employ him. Nor should we be satisfied to be treated in illness by a physician whom we knew to be professionally incompetent, no matter how sure we might be of his single-hearted devotion to the task of curing us. Rather, indeed, would we call in a more skilful, even if less saintly, practitioner, who would care nothing, it may be, for us or for our recovery except as means of increasing his personal fame or wealth. And we ourselves must recognise that, simply from want of capacity, there are many things which we do badly, and many more which we cannot do at all, though it would be well if we could do them. / It is a teacher's function to train his pupils well: he may earnestly desire to fulfil that duty, and yet from want of knowledge and skill may fail in doing it. A person may be an excellent man but a very bad teacher, yea, even a bad moral educator; for through want of capacity he may simply succeed in boring his



pupils and disgusting them with morality as embodied in his worthy but ineffective self. ✓

The activities of life have, then, aspects other than moral, and education must not neglect those aspects. Facts do not square with the theory that education is wholly concerned with morality; and this is only another way of saying that the theory is imperfect.

Its too limited nature is especially obvious when we regard that instrument of education which is known as teaching. Teaching means the imparting of various forms of knowledge and skill. Of course, if these capacities are to be exercised in life with a moral purpose, such a purpose must also enter into the learning: there must be the determined effort of each pupil to do the best that in him lies, an effort not likely to be present unless the teaching makes it evident that the teacher has done his best in preparation, and is doing his best in developing the capacity. (In other words, all teaching should proceed in a moral atmosphere, just as all the capacities of life should be exercised in a moral atmosphere; but not all teaching deals directly with morality or explicitly trains moral judgment. And certainly, in not all teaching should the attention of either teacher or learner be concentrated on a moral result.) In a lesson on arithmetic or geography the teacher's aim is, through teaching certain arithmetical or geographical facts, to increase his pupils' interest in arithmetic or geography, and so to develop their capacity for dealing with arithmetical or geographical questions. The aim of the pupils should be to understand and to learn those facts. The direct result of the teaching should be to establish certain arithmetical or geographical relations between the pupils and the world around them. X

That this may be secured the pupils must put forth

effort, and the teacher must call on them to do so; and, if persuasion fail, even constrain them "with the intimation of some fear, if need be."<sup>1</sup> This putting forth of effort is moral. But it is virtuous just as far as the teacher has not so to constrain it; consequently, even he has his attention fixed on the learning as learning and not as moral effort, except when that effort is partially wanting. The attention of the pupil must obviously be fixed on the arithmetic or geography to be learnt: it is most undesirable for his moral development, as well as for the arithmetical or geographical success of the lesson, that he should think of his learning as an effort to perform a virtuous act.

Some people, however, are not satisfied with this. Thus, Mr. Gustav Spiller, in a paper read before the First International Moral Education Congress,<sup>2</sup> said: "I should like to . . . plead that every lesson should be primarily an ethical lesson. . . . The mathematics lesson should be in many ways an ethical lesson." And that, not merely indirectly by the training it gives in exact and cautious thought, but directly: "We suggest . . . as a perfectly reasonable course, that the more particularly arithmetical or mathematical aspects of the good life should be plentifully illustrated in the lesson."

But no matter how definitely one may learn to gauge the height of the saint's aspirations, or to plumb the depth of the sinner's iniquities; how exactly one may number and weigh and measure the motives which prompt conduct; or how precisely one may express habits as recurring decimals—and the possibility of these things is not particularly obvious—yet when the expressions are found, they belong to the domain of mathematics, not to that of ethics; the relations into which they can enter with each other are

<sup>1</sup> Milton: *Tractate on Education*.

<sup>2</sup> *Report*, pp. 141-143.

mathematical relations, and the lesson, if truly given, is primarily a mathematical lesson after all. It does not become essentially ethical because its symbols are supposed to represent moral values. (And this, besides the well known fact that no surer way of boring children with morality could be found than an attempt to force moral questions into the subject-matter of every lesson. )

From such an obvious exaggeration the much more frequently accepted doctrine that history and literature should be taught mainly with a view to the inculcation of moral lessons differs not in kind but only in degree. It is true that in history and literature may be found "examples of life and instruction in manners," but these are incidental, and their moral influence is great in proportion as they are not torn from their context and exposed to ethical dissection. To select, falsify, or colour history for the sake of certain moral lessons is to attempt to teach morality immorally; for the great moral lesson which the study of history should inculcate is that truth is to be sought and received, in despite of prejudices and preferences. Similarly, to teach literature mainly as a vehicle for the conveyance of moral ideas is to lead one's pupils to set up an erroneous standard of literary excellence; and this, too, is immoral. For it is of the essence of morality in teaching that the right and fit relation be established between the mind that learns and the matter that is learnt. It is true that the topic of some literature is essentially moral, and in that case the teaching has an obvious moral aim as well as a literary one. But the two are still distinct; it is simply that the same subject-matter enters into two kinds of relations with the mind. In much literature no such moral quality is prominent, or even present; it is pure art, appealing wholly to the aesthetic judgment. To teach children to regard such literature as

necessarily inferior to that with an obvious moral lesson is to hinder the development of their literary capacity. It may even induce them to prefer Martin Tupper to Shelley.

The same line of thought applies to all teaching. In all, the direct aim is the establishment of some relation of intelligence, skill, and purpose between the child and his world. That these relations should be as noble, true, good, and full as possible follows from the conception that the whole process of education should aim at making the most and the best of each individual child. And this is, in the widest sense, an ethical conception.

It appears, then, that a moral purpose underlies the whole of teaching, and, further, that no teaching process can operate successfully except in a moral atmosphere of honest and strenuous effort, yet that the immediate aim of much teaching is not moral. On many of the results of teaching we do not commonly pass an ethical judgment. We do not say that an arithmetical process is morally good or bad, but that it is arithmetically right or wrong. And we acknowledge that arithmetical rightness is compatible with a state of sin as readily as with a state of grace. The accurate division of spoil between successful burglars may be both arithmetically blameless and morally culpable.

Now, teaching is the specific work of the school. Thus it follows that the relations which a school gives most of its time and energy to establishing are those which are primarily relations of capacity. In establishing them, indeed, it aims also at establishing those of moral purpose and honest effort, but it does this indirectly through its influence much more than directly through its teaching. The purpose and the zeal are placed in the actual acts by which the various capacities are acquired. This underlying purpose, indeed, is ultimate: it would be a sorry education



which trained the young only to a greater capacity in wickedness—to be clever cheats and plausible rogues. On the contrary, the school tries to develop intelligence, skill, and power, essentially that these may be worthily used. Thus, above all things, it aims at forming purpose. It is in this sense that all education, whether given in school or elsewhere, may be said to be moral. For morality is that which shapes life's ideals and which regulates conduct with reference to the more or less adequate realisation of those ideals.

It must, however, be insisted on that this moral purpose, if it is to be effective, must generally remain an *underlying* purpose. Nothing is more fatal than to be continually bringing it to the light of day, and calling on children to admire it: the immature prig is not in the direct line of development towards an admirable maturity. Just as in life, so in school, effective work is done only when effort is concentrated on the doing of just that work; and the essence of morality for each one who has a general purpose to do what is right is summed up in the injunction: "Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might."

2. It follows that the formation of a good and effective moral atmosphere, saturated with high and noble aims to be strenuously pursued even at the cost of much self-denial and even self-sacrifice, is essential to a moral education. From such an environment children will inhale moral health and strength as surely as they will inhale physical health and strength from a pure and stimulating physical atmosphere. The most characteristic feature of the child mind is its assimilative power, so that, insensibly, it grows like its surroundings. It is born into a certain religion, a certain conception of morality, a certain set of thought, a certain

**Influence of  
the Home.**

evaluation of life and of the elements of life, a certain general attitude towards other classes in the community, as surely as it is born into this or that country, town, or village. We do not mean that it inherits all these things ready made, but that it is born into a social tradition, not necessarily all formulated in law, or creed, or maxim, but largely an unwritten code, yet one more difficult to escape from, because of its very vagueness, than if it were embodied in definite enactments. So long as the child remains in the social environment into which it is born, that tradition will surely do much to determine the general set of its spiritual and intellectual life.

No observer can deny this, and to grant it is to imply that the most essential and influential organ of education is the family; for in that the religious, moral, and social environment is most intimate in its relations to the child, and is most persistently exercised. The family is a natural society, in which all are held together in the bonds of relationship and love, of dependence of children on parents, and of care of parents for children, of mutual help and common interests. In it most of the relations of real life play their part, directly or indirectly. The child joins in a very considerable number of activities, and he hears others discussed in the family circle. The influence of the family is, therefore, enormous, and this whether the parents will it or do not will it. The irreligious or immoral home, even the careless home, is not simply negative in education: its influence is just as real, and just as persistent, as is that of the good home. But it is a vastly different influence. It just as surely determines the set of the child's life, but it determines it falsely. In this respect, indeed, the careless home is, in some ways, worse than the positively immoral home. The latter may, and often does, develop strength of purpose, though it sets up a wrong

ideal as the goal to be attained. But if afterwards the child be converted, and change the unworthy into a worthy aim, he has acquired strength of will to follow out his new path. But the simply careless home sets no purpose; it forms in the child the habit of undisciplined living—of slouching hither and thither as the whim of the moment leads him, and so becoming increasingly unfitted to act consistently and persistently for any end whatever.

The educative influence of the home being thus strong and inevitable, it is of the utmost importance that parents should recognise their responsibilities and not allow themselves to drift into supposing that they can delegate their duty to the school. The unhappy custom of speaking of education as synonymous with schooling has much to answer for in this respect. Compared with the home the school is an extremely artificial society. In it there is no bond of family relationship and family affection with all that that bond implies. At the best there is the bond of friendliness, tinctured by emulation and rivalry. In it each child is valued simply for his power to make himself useful and agreeable; his faults are not estimated by the partiality of a parent but are met by the calm justice and authority of a teacher. Moreover, its relations are fewer and more regulated than are those of the home. Thus the school is limited in its influence by its own character as well as by the fact that it is only one among many societies outside the family which the child may enter. Religious guilds, Cadet corps, Scouts' patrols, Boys' brigades, and other modes of formal association with his fellows may call him, and each influences him. There is, moreover, the very real though unsystematic and often unintended influence of his companions in the playground and in the street. But, underlying all is the continued influence of the home tone and the home life, more powerful than all. The school,

therefore, cannot do more than supplement the family : it can never take its place.

3. It is evident that the best educational results can be secured only when family and school work in harmony. This does not imply formal discussions between teachers and parents, though free and friendly intercourse is desirable, but only that both accept and act on the same general conceptions of life, duty, and happiness. The children who live in homes ruled by high ideals of life are the moral backbone of a school. When the home is careless, or even positively immoral, the school has to attempt not only to supplement its influence but in some ways to negate it. And in every class in every school are to be found some children who have the misfortune to be members of such homes. In these cases it is evident that the most effective way of counteracting the home influence is not by a direct and open antagonism to the opinions current in the home, but by a gradual habituation of the child to other ways of looking at life, to other estimates of its pleasures and pains, to other conceptions of what is worth doing and worth taking trouble to attain.

4. The school, then, as truly as the home, must regard itself as an instrument of moral training. though its means may be, as a whole, less direct and intimate than those which a good home can adopt. Yet they differ in degree and mode of application rather than in kind. In both home and school, example and precept play their part, but in both the most potent instrument is that all-pervading disciplinary influence of the moral atmosphere which tends to form the lives of those who are immersed in it long enough for it to effect an appreciable result. Thus, from an educative point of view the tone of a school is more important than

Relation  
between Home  
and School.

Influence of  
the School.



its teaching. The latter may be good and the former bad ; and, conversely, a good tone may coexist with poor teaching. In neither case have we a really good school ; for in neither case are the children fitted for life as efficiently as possible. In the latter case they will be wanting in skill and cultivated capacity ; in the former in that underlying morality without which no skill or capacity is of real and sterling worth. Thus, the two defects are of very different moment. The latter is a failure in the accidentals of life ; the former in its essence. Consider the following extracts from an old Report on Workhouse Schools by the late Mr. Tufnell :

“The most remarkable instance that I know of the inefficiency of workhouse education is the case of the Eton union, which deserves to be mentioned in detail. I do not think I ever visited a school which passed a more satisfactory examination, or more calculated to please the critical eye of an inspector. Their reading, writing, and arithmetic were nearly faultless. It seemed impossible to puzzle them by any fair question upon the Bible, English history, geography, grammar. They could write from dictation or memory in copper-plate hand, and without a fault in grammar or spelling. They could sing with good effect a variety of songs and national airs in three parts. . . .

“Any one reading the above account might possibly conclude that the school was perfection, and it may excite some surprise when I state that, on close examination, the school appeared in so unsatisfactory a condition that it was determined to break it up, and send all the children to the Central London district school, where they now are ; and I fully concurred in this decision of the guardians. . . .

“It is a remarkable circumstance that, while I am writing this report, the Windsor union, which adjoins the Eton, should have suddenly presented an instance even

still more lamentable than at Eton, of the combination of great intellectual excellence with great moral depravity. It had only been lately placed under my inspection, and consequently I had only examined it once, when it passed an examination in every subject, more especially scriptural knowledge, that few schools could equal. It has been proved that the grossest possible immorality had been going on in it for years, on the discovery of which the master instantly committed suicide. A gentleman, perfectly well acquainted with it, and who had been in the habit of frequently visiting and examining it for several years, writes thus:—‘I never remember to have been in a school which came nearer to my idea of perfection. The manners of the boys, their bright intelligence, their wonderfully accurate scriptural knowledge, surprised and delighted me; then comes the crushing blow, to bid me distrust the fairest outward show.’”<sup>1</sup>

Such a record of fact, now so long past that its recall can touch no susceptibilities, brings home to us as no theoretical considerations can do that, though the school should not be always preaching morality in so many words, yet, if it do not exercise a strong moral influence, no matter how excellent its intellectual results may be, it becomes a positive instrument of evil. It still trains its pupils, indeed, but it trains them not for weal but for woe.

5. We see, then, that the influence of a school, like that

of a home, may be good or bad, and of course it may be of any intermediate character. It is good only when it seeks a right end by right means. In order that it may have a right end, consideration must be given to the kind of product it should aim at forming. And in order that the means may be right they must be planned with direct reference

✓ **Aim of Moral Training.**

<sup>1</sup> *Report of the Committee of Council on Education, 1862-3, p. 338.*

both to that end and to the nature of the child in whom it is to be realised.

The end is commonly said to be the development of the good character, or, simply, of character. Of course, if we use 'character' widely enough this is satisfactory, but it lies open to misapprehensions similar to those which beset the statement that the sum of all education is morality. Moreover, character is essentially an individual matter, and to fix the attention on that is apt to lead to neglect of the essential fact that a character in action is a life, and that every piece of life is a relation between an individual and some part of his surroundings. The conception of education is narrowed when the process is thought to be concerned with only one of the two terms of these relations. And an under-estimation of the importance of the effects of an act, as distinct from the motives which prompted it, is likely to follow. We are apt to say not only that there is no morality apart from a good will, but that a right intention makes an act good, no matter how disastrous may be its consequences.

To avoid this narrow individualistic implication it has been suggested that the aim of education should be stated as the true development of personality. For, it is urged, personality means the whole of an individual, and not simply the directly moral part of him, to which 'character' is often restricted. Further, the development of personality implies the development of the individual's relations to the world around him, for only in such relations can his innate tendencies and impulses find vent, and only as they find vent do they weave themselves into the texture of the growing personality. This is all true, and the only objection to this form of stating the general educative aim is that it departs somewhat from the conventional use of the word 'personality.' For that term is usually held to imply

something not only distinctive but impressive in an individual ; so that of a commonplace person we feel at liberty to say that he is wanting in, or even devoid of, personality.

But if it is difficult to find a single word which, without violent treatment, expresses the educative aim unambiguously and completely, yet it is easy enough to see that the desired term, if found, would imply that education aims at leading each individual to live the best and fullest life possible to him, with his inborn limitations of nature and his actual and potential limitations of circumstances. That he may do this he must learn to select his forms of activity—that is, the possible relations with his world which he will make actual—and to harmonize these according to a definite purpose or main end in life, which must itself be full and true and good.

Much of this organization of life grows up unconsciously, and is determined by the very surroundings on which it works. The whole of life is a never-interrupted reaction between the individual as he is and the world in which he lives, without which he could not even exist, and which is to him what it is because of the workings upon it of his own consciousness and activity. By such reaction he grows from what he is to what he becomes. So his world—using the term to denote all that influences him—helps to form him ; and the school is no unimportant part of the child's world. Thus, the character of the school, by determining the form of that important part of his surroundings, is a powerful influence in determining his development.

6. In every relation into which an individual enters with

**Relations  
between Child  
and World.**

his surroundings there are present three factors, though in very various degrees of prominence—those of will, feeling, and intelligence. It is to the establishment of the

last of these that most school teaching obviously directs



its energies; but it fails unless at the same time it brings out relations of volition and of emotion, at least in the forms of interest and desire. School discipline, on the other hand, aims primarily at establishing relations of will, but it also fails in direct proportion as it omits to form relations of feeling and of intelligence. A dead mechanism of conduct is not the aim of discipline, even were it an end which could, in any fullness, be realised. Similarly, the social life of the school makes for the establishment of relations of feeling—of affection, antipathy, emulation, and the like. But these also are worthless except so far as they are steadied by will and guided by intelligence.

Moral training is, then, effected through the establishment of relations with the world, in which each of these factors plays its appropriate part.

In thus analysing the nature of the relations we have restricted attention to the personal or subjective side: we were dealing with the mode of reaction evoked in the individual entering into the relation. But in every relation there is also the other—the objective—term. It is sufficient to analyse this into the human and the non-human. Under the former we include the whole world of humanity and of human products; not only men, women and children, but books, pictures, laws, institutions; everything, indeed, in which human activity has found expression. But such expression is obviously often in material form: for example, a statue is marble or bronze, or some other non-human substance. It is possible to enter into relations with such things merely as material: to estimate the worth of a statue by its weight, and of a picture by its size. On the other hand, one may pierce through the material veil to the indwelling spirit, and so, through the medium of the non-human, enter into living and life-giving relation

with another human soul. The innate power to do this varies—we call it the divine gift of imagination—but it is always capable of cultivation, and one great aim of school teaching should be to help the pupils to pierce the material embodiment and thus to enter into relations warmed and vivified by feeling and vitalised by volition; and not simply those of cold intellectual understanding, with volition and feeling limited to its outlook and exercised only in the attempt to understand.

In some degree, indeed, as has already been said, the three subjective factors are present in every relation, but they may be not only differently emphasized but differently grouped. Thus, intelligence may dominate, and volition and feeling be its handmaidens, and simply further the act of understanding. But, on the other hand, volition and feeling may be evoked with the understanding and reach forth to that which is the object of the understanding, so that it in itself, and not the mere understanding of it, becomes the object of desire and pursuit. For example, in teaching the passage from Tennyson's *Idylls of the King* which describes how Sir Bedivere threw away the sword Excalibur, one teacher may concentrate attention on the grammatical and metrical aspects of the poem, discuss such questions as alliteration and consonance of sound with sense, but fail utterly to evoke a feeling of reverence for duty and of sympathy with one struggling with temptation and at last overcoming. Another teacher may succeed in this more important aim of the lesson, and that all the more surely in that he makes no explicit mention of these things, demands no formulation by the class of the ethical lesson to be gathered from the incident, but simply by the contagion of his own moral enthusiasm inspires a like enthusiasm in his pupils.<sup>1</sup> Whenever the objective

<sup>1</sup> Cf. pp. 5-6.

term of the relation is of moral worth this is evidently the result at which to aim. Generally, it is only when the spiritual is found behind the material that the objective side of the relation has educative value. And only when teaching moves in an atmosphere of vital influence can it at all succeed in thus raising the pupils' souls from earth to heaven.

7. Individuals differ both in their original temperaments—whether their relations with the world are **Education and Individuality.** predominantly marked by volition, feeling, or understanding—and also in the objects with which they are most prone to enter into relations. When we add to these complications all those due to the special circumstances in which each life is lived it is plain that each individual will differ from every other in many ways. It is, then, a fundamental necessity for education to decide its attitude towards this fact of difference.

When it is said that education should develop the good character, it seems rather to be implied that there is one definite and fixed form of human excellence to which education should try to make each child approximate. And, no doubt, the dealing with children together in classes, often too large, tends to stamp on them, with more or less success, the same intellectual hall-mark. It is true that an attempt to make all alike in what they feel, wish, and think can never wholly succeed; yet it may easily be pushed too far, and to too great a degree aim at adapting the child to his environment rather than at enabling him to adapt his environment to his own needs, so far as such adaptation is consistent with recognition of the right of others to do likewise.

On the other hand, those who fix their gaze too exclusively on the subjective side of the relations between the child and his world are apt to neglect the truth that

the young child is swayed only by impulses and instincts. He has not entered into enough relations, nor made those relations into which he has entered sufficiently thorough, to have the power of purposive selection. Unaided he cannot yet "develop on his own lines," because he has no real lines on which to develop, but is at the mercy of his surroundings, carried this way and that from moment to moment. If he develop on those lines, indeed, he will remain throughout life a child in instability of mind, no matter how fully he may attain the bodily stature of a man.

Each of these extreme positions is, indeed, a half-truth; and, like other half-truths, when put forward as the whole truth becomes a most deadly form of lie. Neither by insisting exclusively on the one nor on the other term in the relation between child and world is the secret of education to be found, but in a harmony of both. To what extent such harmony is established in a school is the fundamental test of its work.

We see, then, that while we cannot have a fixed mould of good character into which to run the fluid spiritual life of every child, yet, on the other hand, goodness is not a vague indeterminate thing, appearing perchance in violently contrasted and incompatible forms in different individuals. The general term 'good character' is no more devoid of meaning than is any other general term, such as 'man' or 'dog.' It implies a common nature. But this common nature exists in individuals who differ from each other spiritually as they do bodily. We have, therefore, to enquire into what our general concept of a good man involves, and into the kind and degree of variation within that general concept we may expect and accept.

These variations will, necessarily, be as many as there are individual good people. But they will group more or



less definitely round types, according as relations of will, of feeling, or of intelligence predominate, and according as the external circumstances of life are generally similar. They may, therefore, be considered theoretically, though these theoretical considerations will be of no avail in education unless they be filled in, and made actual, by the study of individual children. And each child must be studied in his actions. So far as these depart from the normal standard there is an obvious call for special enquiry by the educator into the cause of the variation. So far as they conform to the normal no exceptional treatment is demanded.

To understand the child the first great question is as to *why* he did this or that. This is commonly called the question of motive. But it must be remembered that with children, even more than with adults, there is often behind an act no motive at all in that strict sense of the word which implies a clearly conceived and desired end prompting the action. The child frequently acts upon impulse, wholly or half blind. One essential task of education, and a task only to be accomplished through discipline, is to chain such impulse to the car of purpose; to secure that the child's will is aroused and fixed on something which makes for righteousness. This it must do by so arranging the other terms of the relations which make up the child's life that each appeals in the desired way to the subjective term. In a word, the aim of discipline is to evoke and direct will and desire, and this implies encouragement as well as restraint. If this be forgotten, and if discipline proceed only by compulsion from without, then there may be regulation of so much of the outward conduct as is open to observation, but there is no harmonizing of outer conduct and inner desire. Often, indeed, an opposition is set up between the

two. The child does what he must, but he hates doing it, and on the first opportunity he will do the exact opposite. There is being formed in him a double personality: the real 'he' is hidden; the apparent 'he' is a more or less successfully organized hypocrisy. But when the pressure of this mechanical discipline is withdrawn the real 'he' comes to the surface, and the well conducted and obedient school-boy blossoms, with a rapidity which amazes the thoughtless, into the mischievous, if not positively dangerous, hooligan. Thus, it is evident that unless school discipline affect the real 'he' it fails of its purpose, and then the school is not only not a place of true education, but even, in its own despite, is a powerful influence in forming a bad character—bad in its weakness if not in its positive iniquity.

8. We have, then, to examine the two sides of life-relations as seen in school. We shall do this most conveniently by looking at them first mainly from the subjective side as making up the spiritual life of the child, considering how that life is organized into habits and how such organization may be influenced, and enquiring what is involved in the great moral concepts of duty, virtue, and conscience. We shall then turn to the objective side, as shown in that organized school community in which the individual spiritual life of each child, so far as he or she is a school-boy or school-girl, develops, and ask how that community should be ordered so that it may play its appointed part, and the means by which it may make its stimulating and restrictive influence most effective.

**Order of  
Treatment.**

## CHAPTER II.

---

### HABIT.

1. The influences which surround a child are operative in the formation of his character because of that inborn plasticity of nature which leads him to assimilate his desires, feelings, and thoughts to those of the people with whom he is brought into constant contact. But such assimilation is never abject copying, for each child has an inborn nature of its own, and it is this, and not a mere piece of passive plasticity, which assimilates itself in its own way to the life around it. The imitativeness of humanity is the receiving and carrying out of suggestions, and that carrying out always departs more or less widely, and it may be very widely indeed, from the copy from which the suggestion was derived. Further, there is no indiscriminate imitation by a child of all that surrounds him, but only of that which appeals to his innate nature. Nor is the imitation repeated unless it gives pleasure, or, in other words, evokes desire for its repetition. Surroundings, then, are effective in proportion as they enter into nascent purposes.

But of all the acts, thoughts, and feelings which make up the experience of a child those of most interest to him are his own. A similar instinct to that which leads him to reproduce in his own life and in his own way the acts,

thoughts, and feelings of others leads him to reproduce his own, so far as the former experience of them proved grateful to him, and to inhibit their recurrence so far as they proved unsatisfying.

Thus, from the first his acts begin to determine his future acts; his vague desires to form his more definite desires; his inchoate thoughts to shape his growing knowledge. Were this determination absolute there would be no progress; for it would mean that the soul repeated again and again a tread-mill round of embryonic spiritual experiences with no power to reach out into fuller and wider relations with the world than those of earliest babyhood. On the other hand, were there no such determination then also there could be no soul-growth; for the soul would always have to be beginning, over and over again, its first experiences, never knowing that they had been experienced before.

2. We have, thus, as the two indispensable factors of growth <sup>(1)</sup> the building up of a core of life by the organization of experience, so that the present is taken up into the past; and <sup>(2)</sup> the remoulding of the present by this very process, so that what I am now is not a mere product of what I have been up to the present moment, but it is that product infused by a present purpose which looks towards the future, and which may be in essence the re-moulding—the entire change of direction even—of the general trend of life. Man is never the absolute slave of his dead past, though its tyranny may be galling and may be found increasingly difficult to escape.

It is the influence of the past in determining the present — which is known by the general name of habit. No fact of life is more generally recognised than its power. “Habit is second nature” and “Habit is ten times nature” testify to



its force, while "Character is a bundle of habits" expresses its results. On the other hand, a vivid realisation of the stagnation which the exclusive dominance of habit induces has led such revolutionary reformers of education as Rousseau to insist that "the only habit a child should be allowed to form is to form no habits."<sup>1</sup>

The last is a paradox not to be taken literally, for that would be both physically and mentally impossible, but it serves as a warning—never needless, and never more needed than in the artificial age in which it was uttered—against allowing life to be set in too cast-iron a mould, as if the highest goodness and wisdom of which any one of us is capable had already been attained, and nothing were now left us save to repeat in fresh circumstances the same general forms of activity which had served us, more or less well, in the past.

We cannot accept, then, the dictum that character is a bundle of habits without the very important qualification that this must not imply a fixity and unchangeableness of character: in other words, unless in the bundle of habits are included the important habits of examining our habits and of modifying or changing them whenever they are found unsatisfactory.

Further, when we regard habits as constituents of character we are obviously not including under the term many things which are commonly known as habits. We speak of our customary modes of physical activity as habits; we say a person has a habit of eliminating the letter 'h' from his spoken discourse, or of speaking with an ultra-refinement which amounts to affectation, another has a habit of doing this or that with his hands while talking, one does everything quickly, another slowly, and

<sup>1</sup> *Emile*, Book I,

so on. Again, all forms of bodily skill are physical habits pushed to a considerable degree of automatism. It is evidently not habits such as these which enter into the texture of character. They are merely results of a training of the body as an executive instrument to carry out the purposes of the mind.

The habits we have in mind are rather tendencies, resulting from the past life, to will, to feel, to think, and, therefore, to act, in certain ways in certain circumstances. Thus, we say one child has a habit of lying, another of truth-telling; one has formed the habit of smoking cigarettes, another that of reading blood-curdling fiction, another that of collecting butterflies and moths; one that of falling into a state of intellectual coma immediately we begin to try to teach him mathematics, another that of mental alertness whenever the lesson is of a mathematical character. All such habitual tendencies of thought, feeling, and will, are manifested in a series of acts, each member of any one series differing from every other member, yet all agreeing in general nature. Thus, a boy with the habit of lying will "swerve from the truth in his tale" in many and various ways, more or less ingenious, but all agreeing in the general characteristic that they *do* knowingly and intentionally depart from the truth. When we speak of 'a habit' such a series is apt to come into the mind rather than the general tendency of which it is the expression and symptom. But it is on the latter we wish to fix attention. It may be of help in avoiding ambiguity if we speak of these general tendencies as 'habitudes,' and leave 'habit' to denote the series of acts in which the habitude shows its existence.

The circumstances call into activity a certain habitude which determines the kind of relation with them into which

the individual shall enter, and, this determination once made, the actual form of the relation is decided by the exact nature of the circumstances. The boy whose habitude it is to find a lie "an abomination before the Lord, but a very present help in trouble" is apt when in difficulties to begin at once to cast about for a lie, and only to use deliberation to compare the respective merits of alternative forms of false statement. And even the boy with the habitude of telling the truth has yet, every time he tells the truth, so to choose his words and form of expression that they convey the true impression to the mind of his hearer. This, too, is a work of skill: for words to a child often have a meaning very different from that which the same words convey to an adult. We are apt to recognise this when thinking of the difficulty a teacher often experiences in giving his pupils accurate ideas by means of language, but to ignore it when the question at issue is the converse one of a child's difficulty in getting an adult to see exactly what he means. Yet it is as true in the one case as in the other.

Habitudes, then, result from doing, lead to doing, and by doing are always growing, for the forms of doing are indefinitely varied. Obviously, then, the more exercise a habitude has the stronger it grows and the greater share it has in determining the general trend of the life. One-sidedness of development means that certain cognate habitudes dominate. Such dominance when carried to an extreme becomes a kind of madness, like the mania of the miser for hoarding money of which he makes no use, and which is, therefore, to him but the empty simulacrum of money.

A habitude is a great propulsive force, so that it tends to hurry us on to meet certain more or less familiar circumstances in the old familiar way in which we have met them before, without giving us time to deliberate on

whether we shall so act. In this is both the safety and the danger of habit as a factor in life, and of habitude as a constituent of character. So long as the habitude makes for righteousness, and the circumstances to be met are not unusual in their moral requirements, it is quite to the good that we act at once, without loss of time and energy, and in a way which practice has rendered skilful. The habitually kind and sympathetic man will avoid wounding feelings and giving offence as automatically as a good bicycle rider will avoid obstacles in his road; but the man trying to be sympathetic for the first time cuts as sorry a figure for executive skill as does the individual trying for the first time to ride a bicycle: his attempts are neither more graceful nor more successful in attaining their end. Or again, the boy with a strong habitude for attending to his lessons will achieve a greater result with less stress and with more satisfaction to himself and to his teachers than he in whose mind that helpful habitude is in its weakly infancy.

It is only, indeed, when a mode of action has become habitual that it has attained ease and skill, and this is as true of feeling, thinking, and willing as it is of bodily activities. But, unless our actions are well done our lives are more or less ineffective. Life as a whole is as truly a work of art and of skill as is any one of the special forms in which it manifests itself, and to which we are more accustomed to apply such terms as 'art' and 'skill.' And skill comes only with practice, while art is skill employed in the service of the imagination. Without as many habitudes, therefore, as the circumstances of life demand, our lives must show themselves awkward and ineffective: we are moral and intellectual bunglers.

We see, then, what is meant by saying that habitudes form the safety of character. But they also form its



danger. For not all habitudes are good ; and bad habitudes have as much propulsive force as those which are good. As they generally appeal to the lower and more animal sides of our nature they have, indeed, except when held in check by other and opposed habitudes, a greater and more immediate strength ; for bodily appetites cry aloud for immediate gratification, and one who has formed the habitude of following their lead finds himself in the midst of the act before he has realised what he is doing.

Again, habitudes only fit us to deal with customary conditions. When the circumstances are unusual, therefore, it may be altogether to the bad to be hurried by a habitude into a form of action which the event proves to have been inappropriate and even hurtful. This latter tendency is much more felt by people who are naturally impulsive than by those who are by nature cautious and deliberative. The remedy is to cultivate, first, the habitude of moral thoughtfulness—that is, of consideration and deliberation when such is needed—and, secondly, the power of judging when it is needed, or that habitude itself may become a most serious hindrance to life, showing itself in continual hesitancy and indecision.

It is clear that for perfection of life a nice balance must be maintained between excess and defect of habituation. No life can be devoid of habits, yet there may be such a want of constancy in habit—that is, such a lack of breadth and range in habitudes—that the life is vacillating and ineffective. On the other hand, there may be too large a number of stereotyped modes of thinking and acting, so that the life may become narrow and wanting in flexibility, unable to meet adequately new situations, impervious to new ideas. In short, a mean has to be found between superficial dilettantism and hide-bound pedantry.

3. The remedy for bad habitudes is evidently to substitute for them their opposites, for, as a habitude is a trend of life it cannot be simply negated; it is impossible to excise a piece of life. All that can be done is to alter the trend; that is, to replace the undesirable habitude by one which is incompatible with it. And this is no light task. The original habitude may have grown up in secret, as it were, unintended and uncriticized by the soul it is deforming; it may have sprung from unconscious assimilation of the ways of some of those around, and it may have been indulged till it has attained a giant's strength before its true character is realised. For such realisation never takes place till the light of a new and holier purpose is turned upon the habitude. That is to say, the light which shows it up in its true colours comes from within, not from without. Its kindling may have been suggested by another, but unless it is lighted by the soul itself no true revelation of the nature of the bad habitude is possible. The new purpose, then, which exhibits the old tendency in all its naked deformity is a part of the present life; a life which condemns the past and therefore sets itself to follow a new direction in the future.

But condemnation is not annihilation. Overthrown, perchance, for a moment by the joy of the new enthusiasm, the evil habitude will later on spring up again full armed and ready for the battle. For war there must be between the old tendency and the new purpose which would destroy it and turn the energy it pollutes into another channel. Now it is evident that the stronger the new purpose the more likely it is to prevail. And such strength is not mere emotionalism. That is only a flash in the pan, and when the fire among the thorns it has kindled is burnt out the old tendency renews its sway with unabated force. Often,

indeed, it seems that its strength is greater than ever, for the soul is discouraged by the failure of its attempt at resistance, and in the dullness of the reaction from the febrile emotional excitement it throws itself into the old and familiar way of escape. The true strength of a new purpose is found in a will moved less by emotion than by intellectual conviction, though the impulsive force of emotion is valuable as an auxiliary. This may make a less imposing display of energy at first, but it has much greater power of endurance. In overthrowing an evil habit, as in meeting any other form of temptation, one may say to the soul: "In quietness and in confidence shall be your strength."

But the final victory is only assured when acting on the new purpose has itself become habitual. Then, indeed, the old tendency has vanished. For, as a habitude grows by activity, so when it is permitted to find no expression it dies of inanition. From this follows directly the practical rule that when we would replace an evil habitude by a good one we should find as early and as frequent opportunities as possible of acting on the latter and negating the former. "Strike while the iron is hot" is emphatically applicable to such cases. Act while the fire of enthusiasm for the new purpose yet burns clearly; and act frequently, lest that fire prove but ephemeral. For while the purpose is new it dominates the mind, and so it is easy to keep attention fixed on it and withdrawn from the sollicitations of the old habitude. And in this fight of new with old the same sympathy of others which made the old strong strengthens the new. So, if we would follow out our new resolutions we should seek the companionship of those whose lives are set according to such habitudes, and avoid that of those whose influence would drag us back into the old rut.

Similarly, as habitudes find expression only in certain

circumstances which call forth the habitual response, so the new life should avoid such circumstances in its environment until the new habit has been firmly established.

4. As habit is the influence of the past in shaping the present it is evident that the formation of habits begins with life itself. The first smile of recognition is a sign that a habitude of both intelligence and feeling is already operative: the earliest mark of preference or dislike proves that a habitude at once of feeling, of willing, and of intelligence exists. Habits and habitudes, then, of necessity begin in the home, and the earliest habitudes help to determine those formed later. Throughout childhood the home remains the most intimate, the most constant, and, consequently, the most powerful influence in determining both the general nature and the particular form of a child's habits and habitudes. He lives the family life; that is to say, the likings, aversions, desires, modes of thinking and subjects of thought and discussion of the family as a whole become more and more markedly his own. The first trend thus given to life by the family is rarely altogether lost, no matter what may be the after experiences.

When, then, a child first enters school he brings with him nascent habitudes relating to every side of his young life. Moreover, the home habitudes are being continually fostered by the home life, lived more or less concurrently with the school life. Even in a boarding school the home life reasserts its influence fully during holidays, and to some extent maintains it during term both by home memories and by letters to and from home. Thus, the school has to deal with each child as a living force expending itself in directions and ways already pre-determined in part, yet susceptible of change. The child is neither "clay in the hands of the potter" to be moulded into



this or that form as the teacher may will, nor a piece of fatalistic process on which surroundings can have no effect.

Each child has, moreover, his own preformation: each brings habits and habitudes more or less different from those of his companions. For the outlook of the young child is very narrow: his habitudes have been formed in the family circle, and his hopes, desires, feelings, and thoughts cluster round those persons and things that have been familiar to him. Consequently, the school society demands an extension and a readjustment of even those habitudes which in their general nature are appropriate to school life, as well as a suppression of those which are incompatible with it. The difficulty sometimes found in making this necessary readjustment is largely the cause of that feeling of shyness and strangeness which is often so painful a feature of a child's first adventure into the wider world of school.

The child has to enlarge his human world and at the same time to grow accustomed to the relations which will bind him to his new companions—relations founded in a mutual assertion and recognition of rights and obligations, but often in deed requiring a rough and ready determination of where obligation ends and right begins. Of such needs the child had felt but little in the home: the habitudes relating to his dealings with others had been essentially those of affection; often of fond indulgence. In the school these have to be replaced by relations at once of cooperation and of competition. All are pursuing the same general ends, yet doing so always in more or less friendly rivalry. All, for example, desire to be good at cricket, yet each is emulous of each, and each wishes to excel all competitors. So with lessons. Emulative cooperation

**Extension and  
readjustment  
of Home Hab-  
itudes.**

is, thus, an inevitable mark of the life of a school whenever a school has a real life.

This involves the development of several habitudes which have a value far beyond school life, such as persistent and strenuous exertion directed towards desired ends; regularity and punctuality in times of work; good-tempered rivalry with competitors; the merging of narrow self-interests in the wider interests of team, or class, or school, so that a boy plays for his side, not for his average—in a word the spirit of sportsmanship. The relative importance attached by the school to the various forms of school life—to lessons or to games; to this or to that kind of lesson or game—goes far to establish in the school general habitudes of preference.

Such habitudes as have just been glanced at are cultivated by every good school in every aspect of its life, and they can be developed nowhere else to the same extent or with the same ease. The school is regular in all its operations, and this is favourable to the rapid and firm establishment of habits and habitudes. In its social character it is intermediate between the warmth of the home and the coldness of the great world. In it competition exists in an atmosphere of friendly cooperation, so that we may speak with Vergerius of school emulation as “rivalry without malice.” In the world the friendly cooperation is frequently absent, and the competition is often fierce and unrestrained. Such competition is bad both for those who engage in it and for the community in which it is a marked feature; it destroys national and social unity and it engenders bad blood between fellow-citizens. The more successfully, then, the schools can form the habitude of friendly competition the more hope there is for the social and economic future of the nation.

The departments of school life most efficacious in the formation of habitudes among its pupils are its lessons and its games, for in these the regularity of the school organization is most distinctly felt. In the latter are more particularly developed such habitudes as those of working in cooperation with others, of willing submission to the authority of those who in other spheres of school activity may be only equals or even inferiors, of bearing discomfort uncomplainingly, of sacrificing private inclination to public need; in short, the habitudes of social cooperation, self-control, and physical endurance. Of course, such habitudes as these could, theoretically, be cultivated elsewhere—in athletic clubs and associations; but, as a matter of fact, the only practicable association for games for the majority of children is the school. Consequently, a school which neglects to make games an integral part of its life fails in its duty; for it neglects to do all that in it lies to develop habitudes which are universally needed in life, and which cannot practically be well developed elsewhere.

On the side of lessons schools have generally recognised their duty. The specific work of the school is teaching: unfortunately that is in practice too often taken to mean that the school gives the whole of its education through, or in connexion with, teaching. From our present point of view we must consider teaching as the formation of intellectual habitudes. Now, a habitude is a propulsive tendency to act in a certain way in appropriate circumstances; consequently, an intellectual habitude is such a tendency to engage in a definite form of intellectual activity. The formation of such habitudes is the task teaching should aim at accomplishing. Its means are regular lessons on certain subjects more or less skilfully adapted to the needs and capacities of the children. The very regularity of the recurrence of these lessons goes to form the outward habit

of study. But unless there is being formed at the same time the inward set of thought, feeling, and desire towards the increase of knowledge in that particular line, no habitude is being developed. A mental habitude as a propulsive intellectual force always involves a purpose in the sense that it is an activity directed towards a recognised end. When the purpose itself is recognised as such, and the end becomes a distinct object of desire, the habitude takes on a higher form: it is conscious of itself and of its meaning, and the whole of its propulsive force is exerted with more intelligence and more effect.

Thus the distinction between those inner trends of the spiritual life which we have called habitudes and the outward regularity of acts known as habits is fundamental. The existence of a habit is evidence of the existence of a habitude only when the habitual acts are purely voluntary: a forced uniformity of conduct is no proof whatever of that moulding of the mental and spiritual life which alone is of educational worth. So, when the pupils of a school discontinue all their studies immediately the compulsion of school is removed, that school stands condemned. It has evidently failed to form mental habitudes from which are evolved intellectual purposes. Such a failure is generally irremediable: for unless a child contracts intellectual habitudes in school, in the great majority of cases he will go through life intellectually blind and halt and maimed.

We saw in the first chapter that no relation of an individual with his world can be entirely intellectual. In other words, an intellectual habitude—which is a propensity to enter into certain relations with particular parts of the world—is also a habitude of feeling and willing. Without this the transformation of a habitude into a conscious purpose would be impossible; for such transformation involves the emphasis of just those relations of interest and desire.



We adopt as a definite purpose only that which we consider worth pursuit, and the very meaning of purpose is that it is an ideal end set up by the will to be realised by our efforts.

In acquiring a real intellectual habitude, then, a child develops at the same time the moral habitude of working with a will for that which he thinks worth while. And it must be noted that this habitude is wider than any of the special habitudes with which it is connected. That would be a poor and meagre life which held but one interest. It is also a habitude which is cultivated by the school games, and is, indeed, one of the most valuable which a school can develop in its pupils. Further, it should be noted that while the narrower specific habitudes grow into conscious purposes this should remain a force to which attention need not be specifically directed: its function in life is essentially executive.

In the next place we must recognise that, in addition to these positive functions in the formation and development of worthy habitudes, every school must essay the yet harder task of negating bad habitudes. In every class in every school are to be found children in whom bad habitudes have taken a firm root. Many of these yield, slowly it may be but surely, to the general disciplinary influence of the school. When, indeed, the acts in which the evil habitudes find expression are both forbidden by the school law and discouraged and condemned by the public opinion of the school, the individual soon discontinues them. It is wonderful how quickly in such cases children adapt their views as well as their acts to those of their school companions in matters on which they have no strong prepossessions, especially when there is no positive cultivation of the old habitude at home. When school law and school opinion are not agreed the case is more difficult, and must be considered later.

#### **Negation of Habitudes.**

But, though the school discipline may be general in its exercise, it cannot but be particular in its application. Each child presents to the teacher a new problem to be solved. It may largely be solved by general rules: in discipline as in teaching it is usually possible to deal with many minds at once, each receiving and profiting by just that which it is fitted to receive and to find profitable. All the effect of discipline, as of teaching, is thus found in individual minds, and is an individual effect. Though working mainly by general means, therefore, the teacher must keep his eye on individual results, and this means that discipline must sometimes be brought to bear in a special way on special cases. Such special treatment is usually called for in the treatment of bad habits and evil habitudes when the general discipline has not succeeded in evoking the purpose of amendment.

It has been seen that the order of spiritual development is from habit, through habitude, into purpose. What are usually called 'good habits,' that is, approved modes of outward conduct, are of no value unless they indicate the growing power of a disposition to act well—a disposition which reflexion may convert into definite purpose. The ambiguity with which the word 'habit' is used has led to much confusion on this subject, and has had the disastrous result of an over-emphasis of the regulation of outward conduct and a tendency to satisfaction when that is not known to be blameworthy—a satisfaction often rudely destroyed by the conduct of the boy or girl but recently freed from school. In the school, as in life, good outward conduct is of worth just so far as it is the manifestation of a healthy spiritual life. The whole matter was well put by Castiglione nearly four hundred years ago: "For as the virtue of the mind is

**School  
Training as  
Formative  
of Purpose.**

made perfect with learning, so is the civil with custom. Therefore ought there to be a ground made first with custom, which may govern the appetites not yet apt to conceive reason : and with that good use lead them to goodness : afterwards settle them with understanding, the which although she be last to show her light, yet doth she the more perfectly make the virtues to be enjoyed of whoso hath his mind well instructed with manners, wherein (in mine opinion) consisteth the whole.”<sup>1</sup>

It is evident that if school training forms habitudes and if habitudes develop into purposes, those purposes will be reflexes of the principles on which the school training is based. But the purposes the school wishes to inspire are those generally accepted by civilised mankind as good and worthy. Thus, it follows that the principles which regulate school training should be those of general morality. Each pupil can accept these only in a way adapted to his own needs and to his own powers. Hence, the moral principles should find expression in the school discipline in a way sufficiently general to admit of such varied application. In other words, the discipline itself should be as general in its operation as is consistent with efficiency. These are the general results reached by a consideration of habitudes and purposes in relation with training. They will be developed at length in the later chapters.

<sup>1</sup> *Il Cortegiano*, Bk. IV. (Hoby's Translation).

## CHAPTER III.

---

### DUTY.

1. The moral aim of education is to train the young so that moral truths may become to them principles of action. This goes beyond habitude, for it implies that regulative canons of conduct are accepted as authoritative, and that this is done independently of the impulses or desires of the moment. It is a recognition that life involves obligations: that there are things which ought to be done, and others that ought to be shunned, regardless of personal feelings. Such an attitude must, obviously, be relative to the kind of life led and to the amount of knowledge and insight attained. Obligation can be felt only when we see what is required of us and believe the fulfilment of the claim to be within our power: duty is always relative to insight and to capacity. Thus, the range of duty enlarges as life becomes fuller and richer, and the recognition of its claims should grow clearer and more explicit as knowledge and power develop.

The normal starting-point is, as we have seen, the formation of habits and habitudes in which the claims of duty are, more or less blindly, taken up into actual conduct; but the conduct becomes consciously moral only when these regulative principles are recognised as such and are accepted as the guides of life. As Castiglione put it:



"First we practise virtue or vice, after that we are virtuous or vicious."<sup>1</sup> We train a child in good habitudes in order that, when the time for reflexion comes, he may find wrought into the texture of his being the general lines of conduct which we desire that he should recognise as duties, so that, ultimately, duty itself may become his highest and most general habitude.

Moreover, the existence of such habitudes makes obedience to the dictates of duty much easier, and renders it much more uniform. "For the highest morality we must be conscious of our motives, but for a working morality we have to depend largely upon our paid-up moral capital. By cultivating good moral habits in our pupils, we enable them to be so moral without consciousness of morality that they have leisure to become conscious of moral issues when these require special attention."<sup>2</sup> The formation of good habitudes, therefore, is not the whole of moral training: it is rather preparatory and auxiliary to that recognition of right as something independent of ourselves and binding upon us of which we speak as the acceptance of duty as the guiding principle of life.

2. Such acceptance is a gradual growth. The child begins life without morality, just as he begins it without knowledge. He has the undeveloped capacity to learn to distinguish between right and wrong, just as he has the nascent power to acquire other kinds of knowledge; but he has no more ready-made ideas as to his relations to his fellow-men than as to his relations to his physical surroundings. He has, however, innate tendencies to certain emotional and active

Origin of Idea  
of Duty.

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, Bk. IV.

<sup>2</sup> Adams: *Essay on Precept versus Example in Moral Instruction and Training in Schools*, Vol. I., p. 41.

modes of such relations: to fear and trust; to love and hate; to anger, pity and sympathy; to hard-heartedness and benevolence; and the like; each of which he experiences according as he is affected by his fellows. He has, for instance, the instinct to help one in distress, but this may conflict with the instinct to take revenge for real or imagined personal injury. He has to learn that the former is right, the latter wrong. In his inborn tendencies to sympathize with others and to help them, and, consequently, to respond to demands made by them on him as well as to make demands on them, lies the germ of goodness. In short, the child enters life with moral and spiritual possibilities just as surely as with intellectual and physical possibilities. But in the one case as in the other these can become actualised only in life itself, and in such actualisation they receive specific forms, and become organized into habitudes.

Thus, the child's ideas as to what is right and what is wrong spring from his relations to those around him. He finds his conduct directed by others, especially by his parents. He learns that certain actions bring on him their displeasure and condemnation, that other deeds win their approval and commendation. Thus, there gradually grows up in his mind a distinction between conduct which those to him all-powerful arbiters of his fate enforce, encourage, or allow, and conduct which they discountenance and forbid, and indulgence in which entails consequences more or less unpleasant to himself. His instinctive love for his parents and his equally instinctive tendency to act on suggestion and to imitate are thus strengthened by an incipient self-interest—a self-interest which has something of fear, yet of a fear tempered by love. For these same parents who manifest displeasure when he does what they tell him is 'wrong' are at all

other times complaisant and encouraging to his efforts to expend his growing powers. This love inspires in him a similar reaction of affection, and an affection which is strengthened by the familiarity of constant intercourse. Moreover, he soon learns that even when they forbid or show displeasure, the prohibition and even the punishment are imbedded in love. The step from this to a recognition that these things, distasteful to him at the time, spring from love and are the expression of love seeking his welfare is but a short one. This recognition is hastened when there are brothers and sisters older than himself whom he is emulous of imitating, whom he sees observant of the parents' wishes, and who also encourage him when he does well and discourage him when he does ill.

3. The earliest distinction between right and wrong recognised by a child is, then, the distinction between what is encouraged or approved, and what is discouraged or forbidden, by parents whom he is learning to love and in whose love for him he is continually feeling a more perfect trust. This regulation of his conduct is constraint, even though the constraint be mainly that of love. He is forbidden to do things to which his impulses prompt him, and desired to do others to which he is not inwardly impelled, nay which may be inwardly repugnant to him. He learns that outbreaks of temper and other capricious modes of conducting himself must be restrained, and that mannerly and considerate conduct must be his rule of life if he would continue to bask in the sunshine of parental favour.

Of course, this regulation of his conduct does not operate in him chiefly through fear of punishment. Rather it is that the constraining force is love to his parents, fear of displeasing them, and the instinctive desire to be at one

**Duty as  
Constraint.**

**Forms of  
Constraint.**

with those around him. In the good life "the love of Christ constraineth us" much more effectively and much more worthily than fear of what will happen to ourselves if we do wrong. "The goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance" states the experience of every religious man. Similarly, the young child wishes to please his parents and is repentant when he has displeased them. So he moulds his conduct on their wishes; he accepts both the positive and the negative constraint which they put on his impulses. The recognition that he is thus sacrificing his immediate personal wishes to an external law of right which he accepts as binding on him is of the vaguest. He knows clearly enough in the particular instance that he is restrained and hindered. "You're always telling me I mustn't do what I want to do" is a not infrequent baby remonstrance. But the hindrance is felt as personal, and in meeting it self-will and affection are curiously blended. The true function of fear is to strengthen the latter; if it goes beyond this it is mischievous, for it makes the obedience slavish rather than willing. It is from such a particular and personal root that the full-grown tree of dutiful habitude must spring.

In other cases no opposition is felt, for the constraint takes the form of simple direction or even of suggestion. "Poor little birdies, see how hungry they are in the snow; you should give them some crumbs" says a mother, and the little child hastens with pleasure to do a deed of kindness which, once suggested, has met with a ready response within her. She feels no compulsion, and out of such simple seed may spring a habitude of kindness to the weak which is essentially good. But the various forms in which this habitude shows itself meet with approval from those whom the child loves and respects, and, even if her own behaviour do not call forth disapproval for the opposite kind



of conduct, yet she hears it expressed on the acts of others : nay, she feels it herself. So, even though the habitude did not begin in felt compulsion, yet, as it constantly meets with the sanction of approval, it is gradually transformed from a mere impulse into the acting on a kind of half-conscious rule which is felt to be binding on the conscience. Later, of course, this rule may be made definite and explicit by reflexion, and so recognised clearly for what it is—a fundamental principle of universal morality binding upon all men.

Constraint obviously begins with conscious life, and the home is the first school of duty. When  
**Constraint in Home and in School.** the child comes to school he has already formed habitudes of obedience or of disobedience. Further, in so far as he has learnt to obey, he has learnt either mainly through love or mainly through fear. In the former case he has started well on the road to a virtuous life: in the latter his inner life is already in opposition to his externally controlled outer conduct; his innate tendencies to sympathy, love, benevolence, desire for service, have been starved, and his evil impulses to hatred, anger, opposition to others, have been developed.

In the school, as a rule, external constraint takes a more definite and regular form than it did in the home. It thus runs the risk of awakening the antagonism of the former class of children as well as of receiving that of the latter. For, while the latter come with a predisposition to opposition, the former may feel the difference of atmosphere so strongly, if the authoritative rule be not suffused with affectionate sympathy, that the very contrast of outward relation may evoke a similar contrast in inward reaction. In every case, then, the authority of the school and its control over conduct should be grounded in love, with fear

playing its auxiliary, but not unimportant, part of helping the child to restrain and govern himself.

However and wherever it arises, felt constraint is essentially the recognition of obligation—the acceptance of a rule of conduct external to ourselves, independent of our impulses and transient wishes. So long as the rule is external it must clash at times with our inclinations, and this is unpleasant and distasteful to us. The question whether duty must always wear this external and more or less forbidding aspect, whether throughout life it will appear in frequent, if not in general, opposition to inclination, is obviously of the utmost importance, for on the answer to it depends the possibility of the coincidence of duty and happiness.

**Justification  
of Authori-  
tative Con-  
straint.**

Before turning to this question, however, some consideration must be given to the view that all constraint by compulsion is, in itself, an evil influence in life, and, consequently, should be excluded as far as possible from education.

This doctrine has become fashionable during the last hundred and fifty years, owing, in the first place, to the influence of Rousseau. It appeals to the natural sentiment of kindness to children, to the delight in seeing them happy, and to the general and increasing inclination of parents to take the line of least resistance at the moment, which is, obviously, to let the child have its own way.

We all agree with Rousseau when he exhorts us to “love childhood, encourage its sports, its pleasures, its engaging instincts.”<sup>1</sup> The question is whether true love means absence of regulation and prescription. Rousseau saw around him a most artificial state of society, and an education which, in his own words, did not “wish to make a child a child but a learned man.”<sup>2</sup> He recognised clearly

<sup>1</sup> *Emile*, Bk. II.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

that human life is a development, and that "each age, each state of life, has its hour of perfection, the kind of maturity natural to it."<sup>1</sup> His desire was to bring education into truer relation to life. Unhappily he saw the perfection of man's nature in that from which it starts, not in that to which it is capable of attaining. So he found its good in the things of sense rather than in those of the spirit. "Happiness is the end and aim of every sensitive being."<sup>2</sup> But "the happiest man is he who suffers the fewest pains; the most miserable he who enjoys the fewest pleasures. . . . Man's happiness here below is but a negative state: it should be measured by the least quantity of ills it endures."<sup>3</sup>

Quite consistently, he urges the uncertainty of life as a reason why an educator should not inflict pain on a child with the hope of "correcting the evil inclinations of the human heart." "Fathers, do you know the moment when death awaits your children? Lay not up for yourselves regrets by snatching from them the few moments nature has given them. . . . Unhappy foresight, which makes a being actually miserable, in the hope, well or ill founded, of making him happy some day."<sup>4</sup>

Moral discipline through human authority should, therefore, be excluded from education: the child should follow the guidance of his instincts and impulses. These will lead him right, for we must "accept as an incontestable maxim that the first impulses of nature are always right."<sup>5</sup> So, when Rousseau paints for us the portrait of his ideal pupil at the age of twelve, he tells us: "Speak to him of duty, of obedience, he knows not what you say; give him a command, he will not understand you."<sup>6</sup>

Of course, the physical world is less complaisant. The

<sup>1</sup> *Lettre à C. de Beaumont.*

<sup>2</sup> *Emile*, Bk. V.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Bk. II.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

child must conform to its rules or perish. Therefore the educator should so arrange his bodily experiences that they teach him prudence without danger to life. "Keep the child in sole dependence on things. . . . Oppose to his imprudent wishes only physical obstacles, or the punishments which are born from the actions themselves, and which he will recall in due season."<sup>1</sup> But the world of men is to be kept as far as possible from the child, for "before the age of reason he can have no idea of moral beings nor of social relations."<sup>2</sup> It must be granted that all knowledge of such relations cannot be excluded from his life, so "it is enough if we put off as long as possible the need for these ideas."<sup>3</sup> Thus, when we are shown Emile at the end of his boyhood the characteristic note of the picture is its moral isolation. "He considers himself without regard to others, and is content that others do not concern themselves with him. He exacts nothing from anyone, and acknowledges no duty to anyone. . . . He is alone in human society; he relies solely on himself."<sup>4</sup>

It is true that Rousseau assumes that in the years of adolescence the social virtues will develop. But here, as elsewhere, he ignores the force of habitude, and fails to recognise that innate powers, if never exercised, become atrophied. He has cultivated in his pupil "all the virtue that concerns himself," that is, the kind of prudence of which R. L. Stevenson wrote: "So soon as prudence has begun to grow up in the brain, like a dismal fungus, it finds its first expression in a paralysis of generous acts."<sup>5</sup> Indeed, at all times social relations are, to the mind of Rousseau, but excrescences on man's real life; bonds of which the necessity is to be regretted, and which should be made as few and feeble 'as possible. "The dependence upon men, being opposed to natural order, engenders

<sup>1</sup> *Emile*, Bk. II.    <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*    <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*    <sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Bk. III.    <sup>5</sup> *Æs Triplex*.



all manner of vices,"<sup>1</sup> and with the increase of such dependence comes decrease of liberty to live one's own life. "He who does what he wills is happy, if he be self-sufficing. This is the case with men living in the state of nature. . . . Each of us, being no longer able to do without others, has become to that extent feeble and miserable."<sup>2</sup> Thus it is that, because of society, though "man is born free, yet everywhere he is in chains."<sup>3</sup> For, with Rousseau, freedom is essentially independence of one's fellows. "He alone carries out his will who has no need, in order to accomplish it, to use the arms of another to lengthen his own."<sup>4</sup>

Rousseau's ideal of life is, then, a quiet existence, seeking as little as possible from others, doing as little as possible for them; looking not ahead; inspired by no lofty purposes; finding its satisfaction in making the best of the present; abhorrent of all service which involves self-sacrifice; avoiding ill, yet not seeking good, for "by working to increase our happiness we render ourselves miserable."<sup>5</sup> In a word, it is an existence most ignobly selfish, wanting in that endeavour after something better which makes even aggressive self-seeking not utterly contemptible. It is the glorification of the flabby invertebrate sentimentalist, to whom we may well apply the words of R. L. Stevenson: "To be quite honest, the weak brother is the worst of mankind."<sup>6</sup> In such a philosophy of inertia, no real conception of duty or of the seriousness of life can arise.

If this view of life be rejected, Rousseau's exclusion of authority and prescription from education must also be rejected; for it is incontestable that the latter is consistent with the former, and with no other conception of life.

We have dealt with this matter at some length because

<sup>1</sup> *Emile*, Bk. II.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Contrat social*, Bk. I., Ch. I.

<sup>4</sup> *Emile*, Bk. II.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *Crabbed Age and Youth*.

it is of fundamental importance. No doubt the cult of the spoilt child arose in part as a reaction against the exaggerated severity traditionally associated, with what truth it is difficult to say, with the bringing up of children by our forefathers. In part it seems due to a growing dislike of parents to take trouble and to give themselves the pain of causing their children even momentary sorrow; in part it is to be feared that it springs from the idea that the parent can transfer to the school his duty of educating his children, and from his general willingness to yield his parental charge to the State or to any other body which will undertake it. But at the bottom of it all lies just this tendency to encourage individual liberty at all costs which has, since the time of Rousseau, become more and more operative in human life.

Whatever be the cause, it is certain that every school has to deal with children who have learnt little or no self-control at home. Indeed, it is to be feared that the number is on the increase. The school must, in its own defence, impose restraints, and, in such cases, these are resented by the parents as much as by the children. Thus, disunion and even opposition arise between home and school. The problem is so to exercise the necessary constraint that it may be effective and, at the same time, as little provocative as possible. Only so will it win the assent of the child. To control his actions while his heart is perverse is to pay a heavy price in the future even if, as is far from likely, peace be secured in the present.

We must, however, face the question raised by Rousseau :

Is constraint of necessity opposed to freedom; and, if not, how can the two be harmonized? Now, 'free' implies actual or possible action: it means 'free to do something one wishes to do.' The more fully, then, one can accomplish one's

**Constraint and Freedom:**

wishes the greater is one's freedom. But wishes vary in their scope and importance in life. The wishes and desires of the moment count for little; those which count for much have reference to far-reaching purposes which dominate great portions of life. It follows that the freedom of attaining these is greater and of higher worth than the freedom of satisfying transitory desires, because the end sought is greater and more of life is involved. Now, to attain a wide and, it may be, distant purpose demands power of persistence, and this carries with it power of resistance to whatever would turn us aside from our way. But nothing draws us aside unless in some way it appeals to a part of our nature. The pursuit of purpose, therefore, implies the power to negate narrower impulses which may be excited by circumstances through which our pursuit takes us. In other words, freedom in this wider sense is opposed to freedom in the narrower sense. For, to satisfy each momentary impulse is to make impossible all persistent following out of purpose. This we recognise when we speak of a man as the slave of his passions; for this means that his true freedom is destroyed by the unbridled license which he has allowed to his smaller and narrower impulses. It is evident that the way to true freedom does not lie through the cultivation of that which destroys freedom.

But the carrying out of purpose is not dependent simply on inward conditions. For purpose has to be realised both in the physical world and in the world of men, and each of these exercises its own kind of constraint. Can these restraints also be harmonized with freedom?

Let us examine first man's power of dealing with the physical world. In nothing has he made greater  
**in the Physical** advance during the last century. The sea  
**World;** that once restricted his intercourse with his  
 fellows has become one of the most potent bonds of union.

Steam and electricity have gone far to annihilate both space and time, so far as space and time were obstacles to communication between man and man. Other modern discoveries have made it possible to feed and clothe numbers that could not have been fed and clothed a century ago. Man has in many ways conquered nature and bent her to his will. He has undoubtedly increased his freedom, for now he is much less hindered by the opposition of physical nature in carrying out his purposes. But when we enquire how this reduction of physical opposition has been secured we find that man has conquered nature by obeying her. As science lays bare the modes of nature's operations man so adapts his inventions as to utilise those discoveries. But he utilises them by accepting them: the forms of his inventions are determined by the modes of the operation of the physical forces he wishes to bend to his purposes. In a word, in relation to the physical world man gains freedom through acceptance of constraint. By adapting his operations to those of nature he makes those very modes of physical action which he cannot change subserve his purposes.

Nor is it different with the human world. Rousseau evidently regarded social duty as a limitation of freedom. "Outside society an isolated man, owing nothing to others, has a right to live as he pleases. But in society, where necessarily each man lives at the expense of others, every one owes in work for the community the cost of his subsistence."<sup>1</sup> But as true freedom is not found in living as one pleases, that is, as the sentiments of the moment dictate, but in following out life-purposes, it must be maintained that everything which makes life more effective increases freedom. Now, every one is born into a society; and a society in which

**in the Human  
World.**

<sup>1</sup> *Emile*, Bk. III.



each should be solely occupied with himself is a contradiction in terms. In such an anarchic state there would be continued opposition of individuals: the selfishness of each would demand the sacrifice of others. Certainly we have selfish people among us; even some who attain that sublime height of selfishness which is involved in being unconscious that they are selfish, who are so self-centred that the effect of their actions on others never enters into their consideration at all. Yet even these have to fit their lives into the life of society, and in doing so they act at times on kindly impulses which are as innate as are those which are merely self-seeking, though through desuetude they have become less operative in life. Even the most selfish find that they can attain their selfish ends only by observing certain restraints imposed by law. If these are disregarded society has a praiseworthy habit of very effectively limiting further freedom of action by the walls of a prison or even by the gallows. Nor can the self-seeker be altogether disregarding of public opinion; for, if he were, he would soon find his operations hindered by a more or less active boycott.

Even the selfish man, therefore, has to look at the relations between himself and others from both sides, though he may place all the emphasis of his interest on the personal side. For very few purposes can be achieved without the active assistance, or at least the passive acquiescence, of others, and the wider and more far-reaching the purpose the greater the need of social co-operation in and for its realisation.

Of course, the normal man or woman is not a mass of selfishness: still less is the normal child. The altruistic impulses vary in strength in different persons, but they are innate in all, and seldom indeed are they entirely crushed. The cooperation with others, which even in the

case of extreme selfishness we have seen to be unavoidable, is, in the case of the normal human being, itself a delight; for by it alone can he find satisfaction for that part of himself which reaches out "in love and charity with all men."

It is seen, then, that society is an organization of such a kind that no member "liveth to himself alone." Of course, society leaves the individual free when his purposes and acts are not in opposition to its laws and rules. So that the closer the harmony between an individual and the society around him as to acts and purposes, the greater power he has to carry out those purposes; for the more surely may he count on the active or passive cooperation of his fellows. This is recognised in the readiness men show to form associations to carry out wide ends. Such associations frequently have rules which restrict the freedom of the members in matters of small moment, and which are accepted because they are seen to be the means to the attainment of freedom in a matter of much greater moment. Freedom, in a word, is realised in proportion as the individual acts in harmony with social laws, just as it is increased by his practical recognition of physical laws.

With every development, indeed, in the complexity of life due to the conquest of the physical world, there arises more and more imperatively the need for human cooperation. The mighty ocean liner requires many more men, and those of more varied and more specialised skill, to cooperate in its conduct across the ocean than did the simple dug-out canoe of the savage. The modern factory demands the cooperation of many workers, each skilled to do a special part of the work, so that the final product embodies the skill and the labour of many brains and many hands. Different, indeed, is it from the days when the

**The Individual  
and Society.**

conversion of wool to cloth was but one of the numerous occupations of members of the same family.

Even the conquest of nature's secrets, then, would do little to add to man's freedom did he not cooperate with his fellows and receive their cooperation in return. The more complex the civilisation the more is this apparent. Thus, power of cooperation is more and more essential to each individual: he is more and more dependent, directly or indirectly, upon others to achieve his purposes.

But cooperation implies that all act together in a determinate way for a desired end, and this means that all accept the constraint implied in this determination. Cooperation is the negation of the freedom of individual caprice: each has to adapt his activity so that it takes its place in an organized whole. Effectiveness in action is, therefore, increased by acceptance of social and economic, as well as of physical, constraint.

Lastly, as we have already seen, just as freedom is limited by the clashing of individual wills in a society, so it is limited, or, indeed, negated, by the clashing of wills in oneself. So long as one holds to contradictory purposes one cannot live an effective life: what one does to-day destroys what one did yesterday, and will be, in turn, negated by what one does to-morrow.

Thus, freedom is attained only when life-purposes are harmonized among themselves as well as with the wider purposes of society. But such harmony implies that what is held by the best minds in our society to be highest and of most worth is so esteemed by ourselves. We are always conscious that the average moral opinion of our age and country is but an inadequate representation of the highest point of view attained. This, indeed, is inseparable from an average. But we also know that no condemnation is to be feared from society by those who follow that highest,

while the attempt to keep to the average may well bring us into collision with others, and must make us discontented with ourselves, and therefore limit our freedom.

4. This leads to our next important topic—that the idea of duty, though suggested from without, yet is itself an inward growth in the soul. “Man would still have duties,” wrote Victor Cousin, “even though he ceased to be in any relation with other men. As long as he has any intelligence and liberty left, the idea of right remains in him, and with that idea, duty.”<sup>1</sup> Immediately we recognise that this or that is right to do, and is within our power to do, there emerges the feeling that we ought to do it. Every capacity is a felt need. The recognition that one could be better than one is, or could do better than one does, is itself an impulsive force towards improvement. Outward constraint could effect no educative result had it not this inward spring of conduct to respond to it. “The soul of the child can be interested in a moral rule only to the extent to which he finds it, in some sort, in himself, in which he perceives in it the end at once reasonable and natural of his activity.”<sup>2</sup>

It is just in the distinction between constraint which evokes this inner impulse through love and sympathy, and that which does not, but relies solely on fear, that is found the difference between government through influence and government by force. When discipline operates truly as influence, the various forms of duty will gradually appear to the child as imposed by his own will and regulated by his own thought. This is the only way in which self-control can be generated—by giving clear and fruitful

<sup>1</sup> *Le Vrai, le Beau, et le Bien*, Lect. xxi., Ch. 22.

<sup>2</sup> M. Séailles: *Paper on L'éducation intellectuelle et l'éducation morale*, read at First International Moral Education Congress. Report, p. 293.



ideas in relation to the self and to others, and by showing the expectation that these will be acted upon. "The pupil should always be treated as one who is called to the high task of a good life and to the bearing of responsibility."<sup>1</sup> When once the child has recognised that the rules he is called upon to obey help him, even against himself, to attain the purposes his soul approves, then even hindrance of some forms of activity will be accepted and recognised as making ultimately for greater freedom.

It is because the school as an ordered community with specialised functions lays down certain simple and clearly defined duties, and can give easily understood reasons for their fulfilment, that it is so unique an instrument of moral training. By making the child "faithful over a few things" it sets him on the way to become "master over many things."

It is evident that when necessity arises duty must be enforced even by punishment. Even then, the teacher's aim should be rather to lead the offender to see that such enforcement is not a mere arbitrary act, but is rendered necessary by the very nature of the school life. The essential work of the school is hindered by the offence, and against such hindrance it must react or perish. To the extent to which this is recognised the necessity for constraint becomes apparent, and so the constraint becomes operative in the formation of character. This would be impossible had the child no innate impulses to acknowledge the rights of others, and in such acknowledgment to inhibit those of his impulses which are antagonistic to those rights. The child more and more identifies himself with the community and finds his own development through social service.

<sup>1</sup> Eucken: *Essay on The Problem of Moral Instruction in Moral Training and Instruction in Schools*, Vol. I., p. 5.

. Let us consider a simple instance. A child neglects his lessons. The teacher may compel him to do them by detention after school hours. So far, good. The violated rule of the school has been vindicated. But much more is effected if the teacher can lead the culprit to see that his idleness is an injustice to the class, in that it retards the general progress; that he is thus hindering the freedom of others to do that for which they specially come to school, and, as he has no definite purpose behind his neglect, he is not in any sense increasing his own freedom or power of doing.

It is, then, because the line of conduct indicated by the outer constraint is seen to be the means towards improvement, and because improvement draws us to itself, that the rule of constraint is accepted as the principle of life. Thus, more and more the aspect of compulsion is lost in that of interest and attraction. The acceptance of the prescribed course as the way towards a desired end means the absorption of interest in that course. So the end set up by duty becomes itself the object of desire, and the fulfilment of duty becomes more and more habitual.

This is the general form of moral training. But the content is equally essential. The educative end is not attained unless the objects of desire which fill the concept of duty are sufficiently high and wide. The ideals of life which a school presents to its pupils, whether in the example of its teachers or in the choice of the subject-matter of its teaching, and the means by which it tries to induce them to accept those ideals are of the most vital importance.

5. Duty is thus seen to be the essence of life. Just as it implies actual freedom—for what is **Duty and Life.** beyond our power is not our duty—so it augments potential freedom; for in its fulfilment we find

ourselves more and more unhindered in seeking our ends both by others, and by our own weaknesses. But the successful putting forth of varied effort is the only road to satisfaction in life. As Aristotle put it: "If we lay down that the function of man is a certain kind of life, and that this life consists of an activity of the soul and of certain rational acts, if we lay down further that the function of a good man is to perform these acts rightly and well, and if every function is well discharged when it is discharged in accordance with its appropriate form of goodness, we get a definition of the Good for Man. It will be: An activity of the soul according to goodness, and, if there are more kinds of goodness than one, in accordance with that which is best and most complete. And we must add further: in a complete life."<sup>1</sup> Thus, duty leads to happiness, and neglect of duty, however pleasant it may be at the time, is destructive of happiness in that it is destructive of the efficiency of life.

Duty is a form of living. It is not merely incidental and occasional in life. Of course, special *forms* of duty are occasional, and, it may be, even transient. Every community imposes on its members duties peculiar to itself: restrictions justifiable by its organization and purpose, but not of universal obligation. But duty in the general sense is an aspect of the whole of life. It "rises with us in the morning, and goes to rest with us at night: it is the shadow that follows us wheresoever we go, and only leaves us when we leave the light of life."<sup>2</sup> Whatever we are doing such fundamental duties as truth, honesty, kindness, industry, obedience to rightful authority, are binding upon us. These are particular forms of the most general law that it

<sup>1</sup> *Ethics*, I. 7 (translated by Burnet).

<sup>2</sup> The late W. E. Gladstone: quoted by Rickaby, *Moral Philosophy*, p. 247.

is our duty always to do the best and most we can in the circumstances in which we are placed. Always, a better and a worse lie before us; sometimes several gradations of good and bad. If we do the best we see, we fulfil duty; if, seeing a better we yet do a worse, we neglect duty, even though the worse we do violates no explicit rule of morality.

Duty cannot, then, be satisfied by a kind of moral passivity, by an avoidance of obvious evil. A **Positive and Negative Constraint.** negative cannot fire the heart. Inspiration to effort must be positive, and morality consists in strenuous doing of the right, not in shivering on the brink of the wrong.

Of course, in guiding child-life we have to warn and forbid as well as to guide and urge onwards. We must say 'Don't do that!' as well as 'Do this!' But whenever it is possible the positive should be preferred to the negative. If a child is actually engaged, or is obviously about to engage, in a piece of wrong-doing, such as throwing stones at birds, or bullying a companion, direct prohibition is called for. Or if a boy has contracted a bad habit—say, that of smoking cigarettes—though if he abstain he will occupy his time in some other way, yet those other ways are numerous and they are not incompatible with occasional indulgence in the habit. The direct negative is again called for, though it will be of little effect unless it arouse the positive desire to be freed from the chains of the evil habit.

In addition to the objection that negative commands, while shutting up one avenue to wrong, give no clue to the form of conduct which should actually be followed, the provocative nature of prohibition must be noted. No one likes to be baulked in what he has set his heart on doing; and a prohibition will often cause a child to set his heart on



what would otherwise have had no special attraction for him. "Stolen fruit is sweet." The prohibition may, indeed, be the first suggestion of a line of action which offers a vent for restless energy, and which imagination paints in attractive colours. To this the mere 'Don't' opposes but a flimsy barrier. Especially is this the case when the 'don't' is addressed to a company full of life and vitality—a point well understood by the stump-orator who, when persistently interrupted by an objector, exhorted his hearers: "Don't put him under the pump!"

In increasing order of educative value, provided that each be effective, the forms of constraint would rank: negative command, positive command, suggestion. The latter is by far the most vitalising; for it at once evokes the will, appeals to both heart and imagination, and stimulates the impulse to "do all I know." And the child of strong will—the most promising material of all with which the educator has to deal—will often resent a command, whether positive or negative, but accept with avidity a suggestion wisely and tactfully offered. Commands are the hedges of the weak: suggestions are the finger-posts of the strong.

6. Duty is, then, as concrete as life itself. It is not an abstract idea, nor a set of formal rules. It is inherent in every conscious act, and its demands can only be determined when all the aspects and conditions of that act—the circumstances in which it is done and the capabilities of the doer—are known. What is duty to A may be beyond the power of B, and at the same time be less than the power of C and so fall short of his duty. This makes it generally impossible for another to decide whether an individual has, in any special case, fully done his duty, and gives meaning and force to the precept: "Judge not, that ye be not judged." No doubt, to some extent we have to judge others: parents,

**The Standard  
of Duty.**

teachers, and others in positions of moral authority have to judge as best they can the conduct of those for whom they are responsible. The rule of charity must then be kept. A kind of standard should be applied which an average person of that age and those general antecedents might reasonably be expected to reach, and the attainment of that standard should be accepted as satisfactory so far as the external authority is concerned. But in judging ourselves we cannot do this. At the bar of conscience there is no exceeding of duty. The duty of each of us is the highest of which individually we are capable. It is a personal matter. What we see to be best, that duty calls us to do, however far it may go beyond the average opinion of the age or the demands we should feel justified in imposing on others. Only let us make sure that it *is* the highest, and that we are not blinded by spiritual pride.

But though we cannot acknowledge that in truth duty can ever be exceeded, yet in our judgments of others we have to recognise such a possibility, just because by 'duty' we then mean only the average standard of conduct which all should reach. We praise as heroism the act of the man who leads a forlorn hope, who plunges into a burning house to save the life of another, or who in any way goes beyond the line of action which we tacitly lay down as binding on all decent folk. We put this line of externally determined duty as it were midway between the conduct of the hero and that of the dastard. But in the heart of the hero, just because he is a hero, duty calls to the act which to us is heroic. Thus it is that the true hero is always modest over his achievements. He has done nothing out of the way *for him*, whatever it may be for the mass of mankind.

We see here the development of duty in the soul. Beginning with an attempt to reach the standard set up

by others, it passes beyond this as the moral life advances. One's own conception of duty should be higher than that fixed by the expectations of others. For each knows what capacity he has, and to what extent and how single-heartedly he puts forth that capacity in any given conditions, while others can only apply the vague general standard of mediocre respectability.

7. But how shall duty be decided when two or more alternative courses of conduct present themselves? These may be either alternative ways of carrying out one and the same purpose or the seeking of two or more incompatible purposes.

**Decision of  
Duty :**

In the former case we should examine the alternative means, and accept that which our analysis indicates as making most directly for the purpose, so long as we adhere to the rule that it is not lawful to do evil that good may come. For example, if our purpose be the regaining of strength after an illness or a prolonged strain of work, no question of morality is involved in our choice of the place in which to spend our holiday. We enquire which will be likely to have the best physical effect upon us, and decide accordingly.

**Choice of  
Means ;**

In the other case we have to decide between ends. We must suppose that each alternative so appeals to us as to evoke desire. Now, desire is an active disturbance of the soul prompting to its own realisation. Hence it involves a certain feeling of discontent and unrest. When there is only one desire, or when the desires are compatible, action follows. But when it is otherwise there is conflict, and the question of duty arises. Usually in life we have no real doubt as to what *is* our duty : the difficulty is not in deciding that question but in acting on the perception of right. It may be that all the antici-

**Conflict of  
Ends ;**

pated pleasure is on one side, and on the other the fitting ourselves by strenuous and distasteful effort for a further and nobler purpose. Then there is conflict between immediate pleasure and ultimate, wider, and truer satisfaction. But there is, in such cases, no difficulty in discerning the path of duty. Generally we may say that duty points to the course which makes for a fuller life and has a wider end. Failure in duty is most often due to insufficient self-command; so that our impulses towards present ease and pleasure, and our instinctive shrinking from the unpleasant, are allowed to decide our conduct even though we know we are rejecting a higher end. Horace and St. Paul were not alone in seeing the better and yet following the worse. The importance of good habitudes and good habits as auxiliaries to the feeble will is obvious.

This brings home to us the importance in life of strength of will, organized and trained by habitude. People are variously endowed by nature with perseverance and what the schoolboy calls 'grit' and 'pluck'; that is, power to act against pleasure or in the teeth of pain. Readiness to do this is involved in the idea of duty. Yet we should be wrong were we to identify duty with the unpleasant. Duty and pleasant inclination are sometimes in opposition, but the opposition lessens both in force and in frequency as the moral life advances. This opposition is, as we have seen, between immediate and remote purposes. A child cannot look far ahead, and, therefore, to call upon him continually to forego immediate pleasure on the ground of a future good, to him vague and problematical, is as futile in moral training as it is to allow him to yield to every impulse as it arises. What is needed is the development of interest in a purpose a little way ahead, so that it is pursued in spite of trouble and even of some unpleasantness, for it is seen to be within reach. As life and intelligence



advance and will power is strengthened, these purposes should grow larger and larger, and consequently, more and more remote. So the wide habitudes of concentration of purpose and of persistent striving are cultivated, involving probably the breaking up of smaller and more immediate habits. Without strength of will a really good character is impossible.

Duty, then, does not mean seeking the painful; but it does involve readiness to undergo pain, or to forego pleasure, if accomplishment of purpose demand it. This may, indeed, often justify some degree of asceticism, for our purpose may be to wean ourselves from self-indulgence, and to cultivate the power to bear hardship and to condemn delights when life calls on us to do so. The moral athlete, like the physical, does well to go at times into training, and always to avoid becoming 'soft.' Of course, this must not be pushed so far as to violate other principles of a good life. No one, for example, is justified in so immersing himself in intellectual labour—worthy a purpose as the acquirement of knowledge may be—to such an extent that he injures his health, or neglects the legitimate calls of others upon him. The question we should ask ourselves when we are planning a course of action is: What will be its total effect? In other words, we should cultivate the habitude of looking at life as a whole, and not as a number of independent pieces of conduct.

It follows from what has been said that the fact that a pleasure is innocent in itself does not prove that it is right to take that pleasure in any one case. A small diamond in one's eye would be beautiful as ever as a diamond, yet we would rather dispense with its presence. We must take the pleasure in its conditions and ask whether the enjoyment of it here and now will or will not hinder the duty here and now calling us.

The educator must try to induce his charges to look for their pleasure in their duty; that is, to be interested in right purposes. It is quite antagonistic to this to hold up duty as an unpleasant task: to say "Do this (disagreeable thing) because it is your duty." Rather should the child be encouraged to look ahead, to see what 'this' is to accomplish, and to feel that it is worth accomplishing. If once this take hold of him he will go through with the means, disagreeable though they may be. To him "the end justifies the means" in the only sense in which that saying is true. No true boy shrinks from learning football because he will receive many hard knocks and painful contusions in the process. Rather does he pine for bruises and is proud of scars as signs that he is becoming a worthy member of his side.

Experience has crystallized the common forms of duty into maxims or rules, such as the rules of **Conflict of Moral Maxims.** veracity, of industry, of helpfulness, of courtesy, of kindness. These rules underlie all sound discipline, so that they may become habitudes before they are explicitly recognised as duties.<sup>1</sup> Now there may arise cases in which two of these rules seem to conflict, and then we have the most frequent cause of real doubt as to what duty demands. It must be remembered that there can never be a real conflict of duty; for duty is always to do the best possible.

We are, however, apt to take these abstract generalisations very absolutely, and to forget that they are abstract—that is, they take no account of circumstances—and further that they are only general directions, and not ultimate laws. For example, a loved mother is dangerously ill and the doctor has warned the family that any shock must be immediately fatal. The news arrives of the death

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 39.

of an absent son. In ordinary circumstances it would be the duty of those at home to break the sad news to the mother. Now it is obviously their duty to conceal it from her, yea, even if she ask after the absent one. Then the mere suppression of the truth must be replaced by a falsehood; for silence would at once by awakening suspicion give the fatal shock. The examination of such a case makes it clear that the abstract generalisations of moral experience cannot be applied unhesitatingly in unusual circumstances. They are most useful guides to ordinary conduct, but they do not absolve us from the necessity of examining circumstances and of judging for ourselves after we have analysed and weighed them to the best of our power. Happily, such cases are exceptional, and our rules do apply in the great majority of cases. Nor should they be violated lightly. Let us always be certain that such violation is really at the call of duty and not at that of inclination or of mere expediency.

Children, however, are not called upon to solve such problems. If they are in doubt they should seek advice from their educators, and their duty consists in following that advice, and generally in acting in conformity with the rules of conduct laid down for them by authority. "As Plato and Aristotle urged long ago, the chief thing in education is that the young soul should learn with all its might to love good and to hate evil."<sup>1</sup> And the continually applied test for them is the approval or disapproval of those who embody for them the moral law. The essential thing is that they be taught to think of duty as the rightness of actual deeds, and, therefore, as abiding in their very lives, not as abstract laws outside them.

The examination of the concept of duty brings home to us that goodness must be found in acts as well as in

<sup>1</sup> Eucken : *op. cit.*, p. 5.

intentions. In other words, a person must consider the consequences of his conduct and how it will affect others as well as the desires or reasons which prompt him so to act. To look only at motive is to take a purely abstract view; for the motive is only one of many factors in an actual piece of life. Duty is found in the actual piece of life itself in all its complexity and concreteness. Indeed, in the ultimate analysis a motive is not thoroughly good unless it take all the circumstances into account. But we are apt to isolate it, and to think we are praiseworthy so long as we mean well in general. Much evil follows from this. For we too often feel ourselves dispensed from the obligation to learn all we can about the matters in which we take a share, or the real wishes and needs of those whom our conduct may affect. It has, indeed, been said that more harm has been wrought in the world by well-intentioned folly than by deliberate villainy. However this may be, it is certain that many worthy people make it very difficult for one to follow the apostle's example and "suffer fools gladly." We are on safe ground only when we accustom ourselves to look at duty and goodness as qualities of all actual pieces of life—as the finding the best course in the actual circumstances in which we are placed and then the energetic following of that course regardless of our own private and varying inclinations.



## CHAPTER IV.

### VIRTUE.

1. In the last chapter we reached the conclusion that duty becomes an inward spring of action prompting us to satisfy claims which we recognise as obligations. Of course, so long as there is conflict between this desire to do what we know to be right and our inclinations, the fulfilment of duty is devoid of joy, even if it be not positively disagreeable. The growth of the habitude of duty, indeed, tends to make it more disagreeable to neglect than to fulfil our moral obligations; for even when the exercise of a habitude is not positively pleasant its inhibition is always to some degree unpleasant. Yet it is only when the conflict is removed, and the following of the habitude of duty gives us true pleasure that we throw ourselves into it with our whole heart and soul, so that it becomes in the fullest sense of the words, a willing service.

So long as there is conflict there is a deflexion of energy from the conduct itself to the conquest of the opposing impulse. Even when actual conflict is absent, activity devoid of joy is never as energetic and effective as that into which we throw our whole being; indeed, in such cases we have to overcome inertia of will if not an opposed tendency of will. So, the fullest excellence of human conduct is reached only when there is an unhindered and

joyous doing of duty. Activity into which the whole self of inclination and will is thrown is attended by a feeling of exaltation of soul and expansion of being which seems to raise one above the limitations of earth and to put one's life on a higher spiritual plane. "Work perfected sheweth man liketh God." It is such perfection of life and conduct which we mean by Virtue.

Virtue, then, we take to be excellence of living—the approximation to human perfection. This is in harmony with the meaning the Greeks attached to *aretē*—a word which became with the Latins *virtus*, from which we derive 'virtue.' The Greek conception of *aretē* was 'characteristic excellence,' and it was applied to many things besides human conduct. The *aretē* of a thing was the excellence with which it fulfilled its appropriate function: the *aretē* of a knife, for example, was to cut well; the *aretē* of a physician, simply as a physician, to prevent or to conquer diseases. Thus every occupation in life had its special *aretē*. The question then arose whether human life in general had its *aretē*; that is, whether there is a characteristic which makes any human life excellent, and in so doing, takes up into itself the subordinate excellencies of occupation and function so far as they are within the control of the individual; that is, are matters of his will and not of his circumstances or of his innate limitations of capacity.

2. The answer to this question carries us at once to

**Virtue and Duty.** the conception of duty as a fulfilment of all the functions of life. Thus virtue is seen

to be not something separable from duty, but merely the best performance of duty. It is the subjective side of duty in its fullness. It is not an abstraction to be dimly admired as something beyond the reach of ordinary mortals, and only attainable by the chosen few in rare moments of spiritual exaltation. Every act of duty well

and heartily done is a virtuous act; so we can be virtuous in all we do.

We do, indeed, often speak of virtue as going beyond duty. We say, for instance, that Howard would have fulfilled his duty had he lived the ordinary honest and self-respecting life of a citizen, but that, in devoting himself to prison reform, he led a life of exceptional virtue. Indeed, as we have seen, in judging the conduct of others such a distinction is not out of place, so long as it is borne in mind that by 'duty' is then meant only that average standard of decency in moral conduct which is all we feel justified in applying to the lives of others. "He did his duty, and nothing more" expresses neither condemnation nor admiration.<sup>1</sup>

When conduct stands out in enthusiastic whole-heartedness above this line we feel the need of a word to express this salience; and 'virtuous' does exactly express it, for it implies that the act of duty has been excellently done. But to the man himself, and to each of us when judging himself, there can be no such distinction. It is always our duty to do our best, and the really willing doing of our best is virtue.

3. Again, we speak of virtuous or of vicious acts. But it must be clearly grasped that an act has moral quality only so far as it really expresses the life of the individual. A mere impulse may lead to an act altogether out of keeping with the general tenour of the life. To such an act either term would be inappropriate. Virtues and vices are, indeed, habitudes, or trends of will and feeling, which find expression in characteristic acts to which the terms 'virtuous' and 'vicious' are applicable in a secondary sense. Thus, dishonesty is a vice which manifests itself

**Virtue and  
Habitudes.**

<sup>1</sup> Cf. pp. 59-61.

in acts of theft and cheating; cruelty a vice showing itself in deeds which give needless pain. But a boy may give pain, say to one of the lower animals, without being cruel; though, undoubtedly, he is on the way to becoming cruel. In dealing with the young it is ever most important to remember that in them virtues and vices, and all other habitudes, are in an early stage of development, and, consequently, that the standards which are applicable to adult conduct are liable to lead us astray in our dealings with the immature. Much harm is often done by the assumption that a wrong act done by a child indicates the same evil trend of spiritual life as it would in an adult life. On the other hand, it must be remembered that such acts, if not checked, will develop the evil tendency. Indeed, the thoughtless impulsiveness of childhood should little by little be modified by the practice of consideration for others, or it will cultivate the habitude of callous disregard of how our acts affect our fellows. In it, that is to say, is a germ of selfishness, only to be kept in check by culture of the opposed impulse to kindness and affection.

That virtues and vices are habitudes, taken up and absorbed in good or evil general purposes, is shown by the fact that the virtuous man is never conscious of his virtues as such. The benevolent man does not deliberately set out to be benevolent: he simply responds freely and gladly to the calls made on his benevolence. His satisfaction is in the doing of the kind act; for in the highest of all senses it is true that "virtue is its own reward." He seeks not the applause of the crowd, which, indeed, distresses him. The virtue which requires to be announced by trumpet and drum is as open to suspicion as is the excellence of other things which escape obscurity only by blatant advertisement. So the vicious man does not deliberately set himself to be vicious. He also responds to circumstances, and acts



in a way from which he anticipates gratification, without troubling himself about the moral quality of what he does.

Like all habitudes, virtues and vices may grow largely unconsciously. A child forms a bad habit and finds pleasure in it. So the habitude grows. But in many cases he does not know that the habit is a bad one till it is firmly established. While he is in ignorance his outer conduct, taken by itself, is bad; but the boy is not vicious, because he is sinning in ignorance. Of course, when once a suspicion of the evil of his acts is aroused the case is changed. But a vicious habit cannot be laid aside in a day. Indeed he knows not its strength till he tries to break it. Then the full grown vice fetters him on every side, and, fight as he will, at times overthrows him. But so long as he struggles manfully against it he is doing his best and is attaining virtue, even, it may be, amid many backslidings. That paradox—the virtuous sinner—is as frequent in our day as in the far off times of David and Saint Peter.

4. If it be objected that the statement that virtue is the whole-hearted and joyous fulfilment of duty, and that it is this which makes human life excellent is purely abstract, yet it must be remembered that duty itself can only be conceived in relation to what are believed to be the great objects of human endeavour, and hence that virtue is as concrete as duty, that is, as life itself.

The great objects of men's pursuit are necessarily two-fold—the material things of life and the spiritual development of life itself.

As man's sustenance has to be won by his labour, and as not only bare sustenance but leisure and comfort are legitimate objects of desire, if, indeed, they be not necessary conditions of some of the

**Virtue and Purpose.**

**Materialism.**

highest forms of spiritual life, so striving for material goods must of necessity take up a large share of man's thoughts and energies. But when it is forgotten that, after all, these things are only means to render life fuller and richer and, therefore, more satisfying, and they themselves are made the essential objects of endeavour, then the spiritual life is more and more dwarfed; for all the habitudes which oppose self-aggrandisement are inhibited. Thus, the life is narrowed, and is made a mere provider of its own trappings. It recedes farther and farther from the ideal of human excellence: in a word, it becomes in essence more and more vicious, though its acts may not be those to which common parlance restricts the term. As R. L. Stevenson warns us: "Perpetual devotion to what a man calls his business is only to be sustained by perpetual neglect of many other things. And it is not by any means certain that a man's business is the most important thing he has to do."<sup>1</sup>

But the pursuit of material good may take a second form—that of seeking for sense enjoyment.

**Sensa-  
tionalism.** Here, again, it must be granted that such pleasures are not only legitimate but beneficent: without them life would be dull and drab. The evil again comes when their pursuit is made the end of life. Then, indeed, there is no real purpose in life at all; for the pleasures of sense are fleeting, and must be sought from moment to moment. Hence the growth of the desire ever for something new—some fresh excitement, some novel spur to the jaded appetite. Yet, with it all, the soul rests empty and unsatisfied. Delude ourselves as we will for a time with the idea that the insensate and breathless pursuit of pleasure will "bring a man peace at the last," yet at the end the wearied soul exclaims with the Preacher: "Vanity of vanities: all is vanity and vexation

<sup>1</sup> *An Apology for Idlers.*

of spirit." No feature of our time is more sadly significant than the growing sensationalism which is the outward sign that this has become the practical rule of life with many of our countrymen and countrywomen.

Nor are these two forms of a materialistic life incompatible: many, indeed, combine them. Certain

**Material and Spiritual Aims.** it is that in one or other form a materialistic evaluation of life is increasingly prevalent.

"Will it pay"—in gain or in pleasure? is too often the only question asked not only with reference to proposed courses of action in which it is a legitimate test, but in reference to all actions. To measure all life by things of earth is the surest way to lose half the good even of those earthly things. Far wiser was the Hebrew preacher when he said "Wisdom is better than rubies; and all the things that may be desired are not to be compared to it."<sup>1</sup> And 'wisdom' meant virtue. Indeed, from our consideration of virtue it is plain that it is the only true wisdom; for the essence of wisdom can only be to get the most and the best out of life. "Therefore may virtue be said to be (as it were) a wisdom and an understanding to choose the good: and vice, a lack of foresight and an ignorance that leadeth to judge falsely. Because men never choose the ill with opinion that it is ill, but they are deceived through a certain likeness of good."<sup>2</sup>

Wisdom, therefore, is concerned with the accumulation of the material goods of life only in so far as they promote the growth of life itself. And Ruskin wisely tells us: "He only is advancing in life, whose heart is getting softer, whose blood warmer, whose brain quicker, whose spirit is entering into Living peace. And the men who have this life in them are the true lords or kings of the earth—they and they only."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Proverbs viii. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Castiglione: *op. cit.*, Bk. IV.

<sup>3</sup> *Sesame and Lilies*, § 42.

Virtue, then, as excellence of living, means spiritual growth and development, and this is not to be gauged by worldly success. But in trying to foster this truth in the minds of children we must carefully guard against an exaggeration which in this materialistic age will appear absurd to them, and so give their minds an impulse in the opposite direction. The things of this world, and the pleasures of existence are good and desirable: it is only when a life has no higher purpose than their pursuit that they become evil to that soul. Life must be largely filled with work having a material aim and its pleasures must always include those of sense; it is only when it finds room for nothing else that spiritual atrophy sets in. Thus the school should show that it values work of all kinds, and that it encourages honest enjoyment. But it should also try to implant ideals of spiritual life, and to water them and tend them, so harmonizing them with the ordinary work and play that these latter are permeated by the former and themselves given a spiritual value. Thus, the purpose to do well whatever one is called on to do, whether in work or in play, whether one enjoy it or not, is a lesson the school is continually called on to teach in the only way in which it can effectively be taught—by practice. To take away all the unpleasant and make school work itself little more than amusement is not only to fail in teaching this lesson, but is to cultivate the vicious habitude of making enjoyment the arbiter of duty, and this leads directly to the setting up of pleasure as the goal of effort.

But we must go further than this. For virtue is not simply habitude: it is joyous habitude related to purpose. The school must, therefore, endeavour to rouse the enthusiasm of its pupils for high and noble purposes; or as it is often put, to give them ideals of life. “The entire object of true education

**Embodiment  
of Purpose.**



is to make people not merely *do* the right things, but *enjoy* the right things:—not merely industrious, but to love industry—not merely learned, but to love knowledge—not merely pure, but to love purity—not merely just, but to hunger and thirst after justice.”<sup>1</sup>

But, as George Eliot beautifully says: “Ideas are often poor ghosts; our sun-filled eyes cannot discern them; they pass athwart us in thin vapour, and cannot make themselves felt. But sometimes they are made flesh; they breathe upon us with warm breath, they touch us with soft responsive hands, they look at us with sad sincere eyes, and speak to us in appealing tones; they are clothed in a living human soul, with all its conflicts, its faith, and its love. Then their presence is a power, then they shake us like a passion, and we are drawn after them with gentle compulsion, as flame is drawn to flame.”<sup>2</sup>

True as this is of adults, it is yet more strikingly applicable to children. Everything for them must be actual and concrete; a disembodied virtue leaves them quite untouched. Vain is it to ask them to discuss, or to write essays on, Truth, Courage, and the like, in the hope that such intellectual exercises will have an effect on conduct. Ideas are directive of energy only when the energy is already there, and to some extent accustomed to flow into a cognate channel. In other words, the beginnings of habitudes first, then ideas taking them up and using them and so making them more effective, is the true order. And well will it be if by the time a child leaves school—especially the primary school—his moral life have made a good beginning; if he have habitudes illumined by such simple and fruitful ideas as transmute them from blind adherence to the customary into intelligent purpose; and

<sup>1</sup> Ruskin: *The Crown of Wild Olive*, § 55.

<sup>2</sup> *Janet's Repentance*, Ch. XIX.

if he be inspired by aspirations, vague it may be but generous, to make his life something beyond the dead treadmill round of a self-absorbed pursuit of wealth or pleasure. "An aspiration is a joy for ever, a possession as solid as a landed estate, a fortune which we can never exhaust and which gives us year by year a revenue of pleasurable activity. To have many of these is to be spiritually rich."<sup>1</sup> But this will be attained just in proportion as the ideas are presented in embodied form, so as to offer a concrete model for imitation. It is round hero or heroine that youthful enthusiasm clings, not round tabulated qualities. Patriotism and bravery as abstractions mean little: embodied in Nelson and Grenville they mean much.

Further, let it be remembered that adolescence is emphatically the age of hero worship; and, therefore, let no discouragement be felt if in earlier childhood but few signs of enthusiasm even for embodied virtues show themselves. Childhood is the age for the cultivation of habits, and that is the only true and sure foundation on which the life of ideals can be built. Without it, enthusiasm for ideals is more apt to run to seed in sentimentality than to bear fruit in good works.

Even the susceptibility of adolescents to the contagion of ideals varies very much. Many are essentially practical, in the sense in which that word is used to indicate an exaltation in estimation of the shell of life above its kernel, and this attitude of mind is fostered by the life around them. A much smaller number are naturally idealists. "The difference between realist and idealist is vital. The realist tends to be content with the idea of life-career and character which is obvious in the facts of life as he sees it around him. His intelligence moves in and round the concrete reality and is slow to reach towards

<sup>1</sup> R. L. Stevenson: *El Dorado*.

the general and abstract. Thus conventional standards and obvious materialistic aims not only appeal to him as to all, but are apt to absorb him—position in society, a balance at the bank, a good name, a respectable record. The idealist, on the other hand, instinctively directs himself, with a movement of intelligence, passionate because whole, to the old enquiry about the highest good of man, the best kind of life, the best kind of person. . . . Probably the born idealist . . . is somewhat rare. . . . But it cannot be doubted that there are many who may be educated to a considerable development of the idealising strain; and indeed I doubt that there are many young persons so crassly realistic in natural bent as to be incapable of idealistic impulses at least occasionally. These impulses it is the business of the school, by means direct and indirect, to foster.”<sup>1</sup>

5. As virtue is co-extensive with duty, and duty with life, it is impossible effectively to classify virtuous acts. No classification could be exhaustive, for it is impossible to enumerate all the possibilities of action; and no determination of classes could be so exact that a certain act could always be placed in one, and only one, class. Is not the timid boy's refusal of a lie as an escape from punishment an act of courage as well as of truth? And may not another boy's telling of a lie to save a comrade from punishment, even at the cost of bringing it on himself, be an act of courage, self-sacrifice, and devotion to another or to an accepted code of honour, and so show virtue embedded, as it were, in vice? May not such a boy be doing the best *he* knows, though the adult may not agree with his estimation of the requirements of the case?

<sup>1</sup> Mrs. Bryant: *Essay on Moral Education in General in Moral Instruction and Training in Schools*, Vol. I., pp. 52-53.

It is not unusual, however, to classify duties into those which refer to ourselves and those which relate to others. But besides the obvious objection that there can be no obligation, that is, no duty, unless there be two terms in the relation, analysis soon shows that no duty can concern ourselves only, and, on the other hand, none can be limited to others. Much wiser is the Church Catechism in including the duties "to keep my body in temperance, soberness, and chastity" as part of "my duty towards my neighbour."

But though the number and variety of the parts of the objective world with which our acts bring us into relation are indefinitely large, yet, as was seen in the first chapter, the subjective aspects are broadly those of willing, feeling, and thinking, each of which enters into every such relation.<sup>1</sup> We may, then, look at the specific excellences of these aspects, and from that examination gather what are the broad features of a virtuous life, each of which will be found in every virtuous act, though in different proportions, so that the predominant one gives a specific character to the act as a whole. So far as an act is one of will it is persistent against obstacles and dangers, and is courageous; so far as it is one of feeling it contemns the solicitations of the appetites, and is temperate; so far as it is one of thinking and understanding it is wise. In a word these forms of virtue are severally opposed to "the world, the flesh, and the devil." Then, when attention is turned from the subjective side to the relation of the whole act, with all its subjective factors harmonized, to our fellow men, we find the quality of justice.

These four are the traditional 'Cardinal Virtues,' which we have inherited both from Hebrew and from Greek thought. In the *Wisdom of Solomon* we read: "If a

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 14-15.



man love righteousness, her labours are virtues: for she teacheth temperance and prudence, justice and fortitude: which are such things, as men can have nothing more profitable in their life."<sup>1</sup> As a basis for analysis the distinction serves better than any of the more elaborate attempts which modern writers have made at a 'classification of the virtues,' which simply darken counsel, not only by separating what should be conjoined, but by encouraging the idea that virtue and duty are particular kinds of acts and not qualities of all acts.

We will, then, briefly consider virtue under each of these four heads, but again begging the reader to bear in mind that we are dealing not with separate classes of acts, but with various aspects under which every virtuous action may be viewed, though one aspect may be more striking than others in this or that deed. In other words, the cardinal virtues are four habitudes which always operate together. Which plays the greatest part on this or that occasion is determined by the nature of the circumstances which call them all into play.

6. Wisdom refers both to the direction of life as a whole and to the planning of means to attain  
**Wisdom.** accepted ends. In the latter case it may be called prudence, a word too often narrowed in its reference to merely material aims and self interests.<sup>2</sup> A man who carefully looks after his health, his ease, his advancement in social position, his safety in danger, is prudent. Such prudence may easily be carried too far when personal ease or even safety is secured at the cost of something higher and nobler.

But the word is equally applicable to working for spiritual ends, and then it shows more nobly. It is, for example, prudent for one struggling to free himself from the yoke

<sup>1</sup> Wisdom viii, 7.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. p. 46,

of an evil habit to avoid occasions of temptation. To him "discretion is the better part of valour." To thrust oneself into a temptation which one more than suspects one is not strong enough to overcome is not courage but recklessness. There is no wisdom in giving oneself every opportunity to fail in that on which one has set one's heart. Yet, even here prudence should not become moral cowardice. To be over anxious in anticipating difficulties and dangers, to think too much of the trouble and wearisome details of reaching a high end, is paralysing. Faith and hope, and a certain amount of dash and daring carry us through many perils, and we are safe out on the other side before we have time to fail. To brood over the strength of the temptations which beset us is to forget that we are never "tempted above that we are able to bear." To recognise that there is danger, and to shrink from all danger, are two very different things. In a word, prudence is but one aspect of virtue: and courage is another. We do well to consider R. L. Stevenson's words: "As courage and intelligence are the two qualities best worth a good man's cultivation, so it is the first part of intelligence to recognise our precarious estate in life, and the first part of courage to be not at all abashed before the fact. A frank and somewhat headlong carriage, not looking too anxiously before, not dallying in maudlin regret over the past, stamps the man who is well armoured for this world."<sup>1</sup>

As has been already seen, duty is found in the common actions of life, and virtue consists in joyfully and wholeheartedly doing our best in our circumstances. But, in order that we may do this, we must understand the circumstances. To mean well is no sufficient guarantee of doing well, though there is no doing well without the good will. But an action does not depend on our intention

<sup>1</sup> *Æs Triplex.*

alone, but on the human and material world with which it brings us into relation. "If wishes were wings, who would walk?" But as a desire to fly helps one not at all to overcome the force of gravitation, so the desire to do good is often quite ineffective—may even, indeed, lead to disastrous results—unless it be combined with insight into the circumstances and with power to apply the lessons of experience and precept in dealing with them. So, if we would be virtuous, we must add to our beneficent sentiments a real attempt to understand the true principles of conduct, and to trace in thought the probable consequences of our actions. This being done, our motive has developed from a mere feeling of attraction into an intelligently conceived result following naturally on a well planned line of conduct.

Virtue, then, is not a mechanical following of precedents and formulas, nor is it merely the bountiful ebullition of sympathy, benevolence, or pity; for both lack intelligence. It always involves a full grasp of the special case, and a power of anticipating and judging results. It is the expression of an emotional tendency directed by our highest intelligence and kept steady by a determined will.

This means that every good act is wise, as well as kindly and earnest. It is wise in that we have weighed our purpose and decided that it is good; it is further wise in that having chosen our end we have considered the various means to its attainment and selected from among them. A virtuous act is, therefore, a well considered act. Nor is this in opposition to the habitual character of virtue; for it is to the act, not to its virtuous character, that attention is given. The purpose is not to be virtuous in this or that way, but to do this or that specific act, or to enter on this or that specific course of conduct. Were it not for the habitual trend of the mind the act would probably not be chosen;

when it is chosen, the same habitude is operative in its accomplishment.

So virtue is seen to be a matter of the head as well as of the heart. At bottom there must, indeed, be the spontaneous warmth of emotion, the heart going forth to the proposed end, but the head must guide and direct, and the will must keep the purpose firm. As this is so, the attainment of such wisdom as he is capable of is the duty of everyone; for everyone is called to be virtuous. This must not be regarded as rendering virtue impossible; for, as Heraclitus of old pointed out, a man does not become wise by accumulation of much information, but by the development of intelligent understanding. The good life is, indeed, no easy thing; for it is a continual solving of problems of conduct. But neither is it a thing of excessive difficulty; for the problems are seldom beyond our power. Virtuous habitudes will do much to carry us cheerily through the ordinary events of the day, so long as those habitudes are not mere blind tendencies, but are under the direction of a wakeful and acute intelligence which when directed towards moral issues we call moral insight. When unusual cases and really difficult problems do arise the chief habitude which will serve us is that of deliberation, combined with a readiness to face the problem and cheerfully to try to find its solution, and a willingness to seek counsel from those wiser than ourselves.

Every separate act of virtue, therefore, demands wisdom in choosing the end and wisdom in planning the means. Much more does the whole set of life demand wisdom. Of this we have already spoken, and it is sufficient here to point out that in this no one is left to his own unaided wisdom. The general trend of his life is given him while he is yet unable to decide for himself, and when he grows old enough to choose his own way he has to enlighten him



not only the results of the collective wisdom of humanity but the testimony of Divine Wisdom itself. If he choose wrongly it is not because he is denied sufficient light to guide his steps.

It is evident that wisdom should grow with years, but  
 Cultivation of Wisdom.      equally evident that it can do so only on the condition that the capacity for moral understanding is exercised. Mere length of days does not bring wisdom. To have thought meanly, desired ignobly, and felt selfishly for three score years and ten is not to have advanced in the true wisdom of life. It is length and depth and fullness of real moral experience which counts. Thus, the man who never reflects on the moral value of his life, but falls into a mechanical round of traditional observances does not grow in nobility and wealth of nature.

There is, then, a twofold duty resting on the educators of children, and, consequently, on the school as an educative organization. While fostering habitudes and habits, they must yet keep the moral intelligence alert, and give enlightenment to the moral understanding. In a word, moral teaching as well as moral training is required. Now, to teach an idea is to make it perfectly clear to the understanding of the learner. But an idea of conduct becomes so realised only through the conduct itself. A boy who has withstood a danger—yea, even though trembling with fear—because he feels that flight would be unworthy of him, realises what courage is in a way which can never be reached through an intellectual analysis of the concept.

Thus, moral instruction is first of all an evoking of the will. As Dr. Adler said in his address on the Scope and Aim of Ethical Education, delivered before the First International Moral Education Congress, "One of the gravest perils connected with ethical education, as all agree, is that

of over-emphasizing the intellectual side of it.”<sup>1</sup> This is emphatically true of such young children as those who attend primary schools. In the older classes of secondary schools there may be scope for some more or less theoretical discussion of moral questions, but in the younger classes and in the primary school all ethical instruction should be practical and directive. Its aim should be conduct enlightened by understanding and inspired with righteous emotion.

Its means will be various, and set lessons on moral duties may find but a small place among them. Aristotle long ago pointed out that though theories of conduct “are potent to guide and to stimulate liberal-minded young men, and though a generous disposition, with a sincere love of what is noble, may by them be opened to the influence of virtue, yet they are powerless to turn the mass of men to goodness. . . . As for theory or instruction, I fear that it cannot avail in all cases, but that the hearer’s soul must be prepared by training it to feel delight and aversion on the right occasions, just as the soil must be prepared if the seed is to thrive.”<sup>2</sup>

The schools are not dealing with the “liberal-minded young men” of whom Aristotle spoke, but are doing that preparatory work which he truly stated to be the right direction of desire and aversion. The aim of all instruction is to inspire and direct desire. In specifically intellectual subjects this inspiration spends itself in further learning. But in morals, as, say, in woodwork, the test of the success of the teaching is increased skill in the application of precept. And this application is found in life itself. The teacher of morals must keep before him this truth, or his teaching will be apt to cultivate the power of talking about good deeds rather than a spiritual hunger and thirst to do them. This is admirably put by Mr. A. Sidgwick: “‘Moral

<sup>1</sup> *Report*, p. 9.

<sup>2</sup> *Ethics*, X. 9 (Peters’ Translation).

instruction,' properly understood, is not a discussion of virtues and of duties, a commentary on the Decalogue or other codes of conduct, or a formal inculcation of principles of any sort. It may incidentally include some or all of these, when occasion offers; but they are not the main things which the boy chiefly needs. What he wants is a standard, an aspiration, an aim for his energies, a high enthusiasm. It is a mistake in dealing with the young to separate too sharply the intellectual from the moral enthusiasm; they are closely connected and react on each other. . . . If a teacher can help or encourage a boy to set a high aim before himself, to be no longer content with indifference and half-excited energy, to care deeply for something requiring pains and persistence, and so to put his whole strength into the daily demands on his industry, then it is idle to say that the teacher's influence on that boy may not properly be called moral instruction."<sup>1</sup>

To inspire is, then, the first aim. "Desire and curiosity are the two eyes through which [man] sees the world in the most enchanted colours."<sup>2</sup> To direct is the second, and direction also takes various forms. All school rules and commands are directive, and, when the reason of them is understood, are enlightening. Advice, when asked, is invaluable; for in no case can moral instruction be so vivifying as when it is sought by the child himself. Similarly, school events furnish occasions—appropriate, because as parts of real living experience they arouse vivid personal feeling—for more general setting forth and explanation of moral precept. Such opportunities should be seized; for unless the children be trained to begin thinking on moral questions within their experience, their moral habitudes will become mere blind prejudices. As

<sup>1</sup> *Report of First International Moral Education Congress*, pp. 144-145.

<sup>2</sup> R. L. Stevenson :} *El Dorado*,

Professor Adams puts it: "‘Example is better than precept’ is a dangerous half truth. Precept is higher than example, though example is more effective in producing immediate practical results. Precept is necessary to the intelligent application of example.”<sup>1</sup>

But the precept must be felt as both real and necessary. If children are continually called upon in school to examine and discuss the moral qualities of commonplace actions they will be likely to form the habit of regarding such consideration as a purely school exercise. In out-of-school life they cannot pause for such consideration in the great majority of cases; so a continual insistence on such topics in school appears to them unreal as well as tedious. Consequently, instead of such exercises in moral judgment tending to induce moral thoughtfulness in general life, they are much more likely to have the opposite effect. But, if such consideration be restricted in school to cases in which the pupils feel real doubt and the need for clearness of moral insight, then the habit of moral thoughtfulness is being formed. For moral thoughtfulness does not mean moral hesitancy and indecision as a regular element in life; but, on the contrary, the restriction of moral deliberation to cases in which it is really needed.

Further, great care is needed to keep a lesson on a point of morals from becoming a mere exercise in intellectual quickness and in memory. "Direct teaching, whenever it is given, should not be given in the form of ethics lessons. The assimilation of it to the ordinary school lesson should most carefully be avoided. . . . It should consist of a series of talks on the wisdom of life, embodying the experience which an older seeker after moral salvation has

<sup>1</sup> *Essay on Precept versus Example in Moral Training and Instruction in Schools*, Vol. I., p. 38.



gathered, and which he passes on to those who are setting out, if perchance he may aid them in their quest.”<sup>1</sup>

Nor can we despise the danger that the spirit developed by lessons on such topics may be that of criticism of the moral maxims themselves. A patronising attitude towards virtue is antithetical to virtue, and the practice of casuistry is quite inappropriate to the immature mind.

Whatever lessons are given in morality, then, it is of the first importance that they should be prescriptive, directive, and explanatory; not leading the children to imagine themselves judges of the validity of the moral maxims of mankind, but directing their intelligence only to understanding what those maxims involve; above all, inspiring them by inspiring examples with enthusiasm and love, so that their hearts may be set on righteousness and the maxims may appear to them as illuminative of actual life.

The ultimate question still remains as to what inducement can be set before children to lead them to “seek good, and not evil.” Such an abstraction as a general law of duty weighs little against the sudden temptations of life either in childhood or in manhood. Nor can the majority of people, nor any children, attain a philosophic insight into the true principles of life. They can do right when inspired by true ideals and strengthened by good training, provided that the training has reached the inner life, and the ideals by firing the imagination have won the adherence of the will. “I wonder,” says R. L. Stevenson, speaking of Grenville’s fight in the *Revenge* against the Spanish fleet, “how many people have been inspired by this mad story, and how many battles have been actually won for England in the spirit thus engendered.”<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Adler: *Report of First International Moral Education Congress*, p. 14.

<sup>2</sup> *The English Admirals*.

But the whole of life does not consist in calls to deeds of heroism. It summons us to commonplace duties. The moral light has to be followed through the deserts of the humdrum as well as over the mountains of spiritual exaltation; the moral law demands obedience even when no vivid and attractive human stimulus and example are present to inspire and help. Yet the relation must be personal. Transgression must be felt as an offence against one who loves, or the warmth of feeling which marks the really virtuous life is absent. In short, the moral law must be shown to the child as the will of a loving Father, who Himself gives the power to fulfil it. As Canon Wilson says: "Religious education . . . supplies the only motive tested by experience which assists human nature to live the life of love and brotherly service, which is the essence of good citizenship."<sup>1</sup> History shows us no instance of any general adherence to a high moral code divorced from religion. And there is certainly nothing in the signs of our own times to warrant the anticipation that the elimination of religion from education would have no deleterious effect on the general morality of the community. It would assuredly be an irreparable loss to childhood.

Ruskin tells us: "I take Wordsworth's single line,

'We live by admiration, hope, and love,'

Reverence.

for my literal guide in all education."<sup>2</sup> And the apostle puts faith, hope, and charity as the great spiritual virtues. Nor are these views lightly to be set aside. The love of individual liberty, on which we have already commented, tends, when unchecked by a recognition of man's limitations, to eliminate reverence from life. Much of present day educational theory makes in the same way. The doctrine that a child should be left free to follow

<sup>1</sup> *Report of First International Moral Education Congress*, p. 188.

<sup>2</sup> *Fors Clavigera*, Letter L.

his impulses combines with the reaction against excessive dogmatism in teaching in all subjects which has marked the last half century to eliminate authority from education both in its moral and in its intellectual aspects. "Children should be led to make their own investigations, and to draw their own inferences. They should be *told* as little as possible, and induced to *discover* as much as possible," wrote Mr. Herbert Spencer;<sup>1</sup> and he enunciated a principle which is both important and true, though it does not express the whole truth. Mr. Spencer found one great advantage in 'science' as a subject of instruction to be that "its truths are not accepted on authority alone; but all are at liberty to test them—nay, in many cases, the pupil is required to think out his own conclusions. Every step in a scientific investigation is submitted to his judgment. He is not asked to admit it without seeing it to be true."<sup>2</sup> Here, if Mr. Spencer is speaking of children, it is doubtful if in the last two sentences the limit is not overpassed. When his later followers practically omit the "alone" from the first sentence, and hold that the principle of individual testing of statements is to be applied in every department of knowledge and by pupils of all ages, it is certain that the half truth has become a very mischievous falsehood. One can but be filled with pity at the picture thus conjured up of the little child set to penetrate the illimitable mysteries of the universe by his own puny efforts, and one stands aghast at the moral and intellectual result of inculcating the belief that his own baby intellect is the only trustworthy measure of the credible. There is no infallibility so certain of itself as the infallibility of ignorance, and no dogmatism so unyielding as that which springs from the absence of comparison of one's own efforts and their results with those of others greater than oneself. The

<sup>1</sup> *Education*, Ch. II.<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Ch. I.

spirit cultivated by an undue appeal to the reason and experience of a small child as a test of truth is one of supercilious self-complacency, and is, in itself, immoral. Far, indeed, is it removed from that *aidōs*, or combination of modesty and reverence for every form of superiority, which the keen insight of the Greeks led them to regard as the characteristic virtue of childhood.

Only when reverence is aroused for the higher and better can ideals be formed ; thus, reverence is of the very essence of moral training. Reverence compares our own weakness of will, our insufficiency in love and wisdom, with greater strength, fuller love, and higher wisdom ; ultimately with the Source of all strength, and love, and wisdom. It thus induces at once humility, by the recognition of how little way we have advanced along the road of righteousness, of knowledge, or of any form of human achievement ; and hope and faith that further advance is possible for us. For when reverence finds its object in the Divine, and faith is assured of the Almighty care and love, the force of the promise "My strength is made perfect in weakness"<sup>1</sup> is realised and holiness is felt to be attainable even by "the chief of sinners."

Without reverence it is impossible for man or child to see himself as he really is, and this is of the very essence of truth. Without this "truth in the inward parts" there is no wisdom and no real virtue. To recognise of what one is capable, what one has achieved and what one may hope to achieve, to understand the meaning of life—that is wisdom, and that is "the truth in the soul" which Plato held to be even more important than veracity in word.

To develop a desire for this clearness of spiritual vision is an essential aim of moral instruction, for it is a necessary element in the fully virtuous life. "The love of truth

<sup>1</sup> 2 Cor. xii. 9.



compels us to see what we would rather ignore, it forbids us to deceive ourselves, to invent subtle arguments to prove that evil is good, and it leads us insensibly to that love of justice which is truth and reason in relation to our fellow men."<sup>1</sup>

7. By wisdom, then, we choose our course. It remains to follow it out. Here we find obstacles both in our circumstances and in ourselves. It is in relation to these that the next two aspects of virtue are exhibited.

Courage, or Manliness, implies the holding on to our purpose in face of external hindrances and even dangers—that power of perseverance without which the best intentions are of no effect, and life is vacillating and ineffective. Without this we cannot trust ourselves to hold firm in the face of unexpected troubles, pains, or dangers, whether they be physical or be due to the opposition or contumely of those around us. When we are called upon to do some specific deed, especially if it seems to us great and heroic, demanding the putting forth of all our powers, our task is easier than when we simply have to hold fast, say to a conviction, amidst some form of persecution. Yet, as R. L. Stevenson reminds us, "Not for any of [the great incentives of life], but for the plain satisfaction of living, of being about their business in some sort or other, do the brave, serviceable men of every nation tread down the nettle danger, and pass flyingly over all the stumbling-blocks of prudence."<sup>2</sup> Here, indeed, the virtue is rather fortitude than courage. But the two are closely akin: fortitude may be called passive courage, and courage active fortitude.

When the doing of what is seen to be right involves the

<sup>1</sup> Séailles: *Report of First International Moral Education Congress*, p. 297.

<sup>2</sup> *Æs Triplex*,

facing of physical dangers, the courage shows itself in bodily acts. But it is always a moral quality. That mere disregard of danger which springs from obtuseness of nervous organization, from inability to imagine the dangers to be faced, or from mere inbred ferocity of disposition, which we often speak of as 'brute courage' is not really courage at all, but, as Dr. Johnson described it, "stark insensibility." In the truly courageous act the perils are recognised and estimated at their true worth, and yet the decision is taken that they must be faced for the sake of the end. This may be accomplished with much instinctive shrinking from the pain involved; indeed, the greater this shrinking the greater is the call upon courage.

When exaggerated, courage becomes recklessness and foolhardiness—an unnecessary disregard of danger for the sake of an end of little or no worth, or even a tempting of danger for its own sake. This fails to be virtuous just because it implies a want of true wisdom—of insight into the relative values of the desired end and the means by which it is to be sought. But a timid prudence is much more antagonistic to true nobility of life. As R. L. Stevenson says, "It is only with a measure of habitual foolhardiness that you can be sure, in the common run of men, of courage on a reasonable occasion."<sup>1</sup>

There is no quality in which boys delight more than 'pluck'; and pluck is of the very essence of courage. The educator's task here is, in most cases, to foster right estimates of value rather than to implant the feeling itself.

8. The obstacles to perseverance are, however, by no means altogether outside us. Indeed, external things would seldom be obstacles at all, except in so far as they hindered physical activity, unless they found something within us to which they

**Temperance.**

<sup>1</sup> *The English Admirals.*

could make appeal. This is generally some form of those bodily appetites and natural tendencies to seek immediate pleasure and to avoid immediate pain, which Plato likened to a "many-headed monster" which reason has to control. Temperance, therefore, in its ethical sense, implies self-control. Indeed, the most unambiguous rendering of the Greek word would be 'sound-mindedness.' But the use of 'Temperance' has become traditional, and, after all, it is easy to disregard its current restricted meaning, and to remember that we are temperate so far as we are moderate in the use of all bodily enjoyments—estimating them at their true worth, as good so far, and so far only, as they do not hinder the spiritual life. So long as they tend to preserve bodily health and energy, add to life the zest of innocent pleasure, furnish needed relaxation to the strained powers, and secure recreation of expended energy, they are indeed indispensable to the highest life. It is only when they cease to be auxiliary, and usurp the place of high endeavour and noble purpose, that they become, at first dangerous, then fatal, to the true life of the soul.

Temperance, then, is power of resisting temptation; for temptation is always the appeal to an impulse or appetite, made by an external opportunity for its gratification, which ought to be resisted. It may be that the prompted act is wrong in itself, now and always; it may be that it is only wrong at the time because it would prevent or hinder us from doing something higher. For a boy to play cricket, in times and places permitted by rightful authority, is wrong only when his playing means neglect of lessons or of some other serious pursuit. Temptation, therefore, must never be regarded as something merely external: no outer occasion is a temptation unless it meet an inner response. Thus the same external circumstances tempt one person and not another, from which follows much

inequality of judgment. For perhaps most people are more or less apt to

“Compound for sins they are inclin’d to  
By damning those they have no mind to.”<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, the same circumstances are not a temptation to the same person at all times; for the same impulses are not always dominant. This is obvious when we consider the temptations of childhood in relation to adult life. The stately matron would feel little temptation to play with a doll instead of fulfilling her social or family duties, though when she was a child the doll may have repeatedly induced her to neglect her lessons. As we grow older “it is decidedly harder to climb trees, and not nearly so hard to sit still. There is no use pretending; even the thrice royal game of hide and seek has somehow lost in zest.”<sup>2</sup>

Temptation has always the aspect of allurements. It holds out the positive prospect of immediate pleasure, or the negative one of escape from present discomfort, merely at the cost of neglecting to do what we know to be right for us there and then to do. The power to resist temptation, therefore, implies the power to see the relative worth of the present inducement and of the wider good to which it is opposed; and this, of course, is wisdom.

With children the present inducement looms unduly large, for they can look but a little way ahead. They, therefore, must be taught to rely largely on the wisdom of their elders and to accept their estimate. When children love and respect their instructors they are broadly willing to do this, and so to throw their wills on the side of the wisdom of another and against their own immediate inclination. Of course, they will sometimes fall: well may we be satisfied if we secure the general adherence of

<sup>1</sup> S. Butler: *Hudibras*, Pt. I., c. i.

<sup>2</sup> R. L. Stevenson: *Crabbed Age and Youth*.



their wills to what we set before them as wise and good, especially when a vicious habit has been formed, it may be in ignorance, which makes the other way. Scarcely need it be pointed out how the appeal to do right is strengthened when they are assured that the sin to which they are addicted is condemned by the Divine Father as well as by the human counsellor, and that He will strengthen them in their struggles against it. Too often, it is to be feared, the omniscience of God has been made a matter not of trust but of dread. "Thou God seest me" has been interpreted as if God took delight in marking what is done amiss. On the contrary the thought should be made a source of strength in the assurance that He beholds and helps all struggles to do right. So will the child come to regard his religion not simply as a rule of life but also as a source of power.

9. In discussing wisdom, courage, and temperance, we have been considering especially the sub-  
**Justice.** jective side of virtuous acts. But they have an external side as well, and this is broadly what we mean by justice. Plato found that justice, as seen in the human soul, is a harmony of wisdom, courage, and temperance; and, though modern usage will not permit us to speak of justice except in our dealings with others, yet without this inner harmony external acts cannot be just. For to be just implies that we recognise the rights and needs of others as well as our own, and that we allow neither external difficulties, nor the temptation to concentrate our efforts on our own advantage, to keep us from doing that which we see to be true and right in the circumstances.

It is justice which binds together every community, and unless it permeate a school there can be in it no moral training. Justice, then, is fundamental, for it is the atmosphere in which alone the other aspects of virtue can appear.

The conception of justice is both positive and negative: positive, in that it requires each to fulfil his part in the life of the community; negative, in that it forbids him to hinder others from doing the like. It is essentially that consideration for others which makes it possible for each to live his life fully. Its antithesis is selfishness; and selfishness is the negation of all virtue. For selfishness is a refusal to recognise one's true place in the community, and a reference of all things to one's own narrow and personal interests. The selfish man cannot, indeed, estimate even these aright; for, as we have seen, the true wisdom of life is virtue. A just person truly estimates his own place in the world, and the relative values of his own purposes and impulses and those of others; and in his dealings with his fellows he shows that he has drawn the practical deductions which follow from that recognition. Justice, then, involves a true estimate of oneself:

"to thine own self be true,  
And it must follow, as the night the day,  
Thou canst not then be false to any man."<sup>1</sup>

Justice negates falsehood, just as wisdom negates a false self-estimate, and these two are seen to be connected as flower and root.

The Greek conception of justice, however, was too negative, and too coldly intellectual, in its reference to others. Christianity goes deeper, and even as it raises the heart to God in love and not simply in fear or even in reverence, so it expands justice into the loving warmth of charity and generosity. Not, indeed, that the two are in any way opposed. If duty is to do the best we can in any circumstances in which we may find ourselves, and if those circumstances present to us a brother in need, then we fail in duty if we

**Justice and  
Charity.**

<sup>1</sup> *Hamlet*, Act i., Sc. 3.

simply avoid hindering him and do not stretch forth a hand to help: yea, if we help him merely from a sense that we ought to do so, and do not vivify our help by the warmth of sympathy. Justice may be beneficent; charity is also benevolent. We cannot, indeed, judge another in this, for we do not know what is possible for him. But so we must judge ourselves. Still, the whole circumstances should be weighed. "Be just before you are generous" gives a frequently needed warning lest a sudden impulse may lead us, in generous zeal to help one, to do a positive injustice to another. The debtor scattering his money on the needy is a case in point. It really comes to this: justice infused with the warmth of emotion becomes charity. Nor is it possible to improve on the apostle's description: "Charity suffereth long, and is kind; charity envieth not; charity vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own, is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil; rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth; beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things. Charity never faileth."<sup>1</sup>

10. We see, then, that each aspect of virtue implies each of the others. The just man tries to see himself and his acts exactly as they would appear to an impartial observer; the wise man endeavours to see himself and all things in their true relations; the temperate man aims at estimating truly the value of the experiences of life; and the courageous man at estimating truly his own powers. The qualities merge into each other, because their separation is, after all, only the result of the artificial abstractions by which we try to understand the whole complex character of the virtuous life.

Our discussion has, necessarily, taken us far beyond the

<sup>1</sup> 1 Cor. xiii. 4-8.

point reached by the school-boy or -girl, for it was necessary to sketch the end which must be in the educator's mind. Without it he becomes but an example of the blind leading the blind ; and many are the pits digged by ignorance and sin into which both may fall. "The fear of God is the beginning of wisdom." True it is that the children are very near the beginning of life ; but if they are led to reverence and follow the highest then they are also at the beginning of wisdom. To secure this is the greatest triumph of the school.



## CHAPTER V.

---

### CONSCIENCE.

1. We have seen how the law of duty may become the principle of life and how duty, taking on the aspect of desire and joy, becomes virtue. In examining virtue we found that it involves an insight into the nature of our motives, the acts to which they prompt, the circumstances in which those acts are done, and the consequences which flow from them. Duty and virtue are found in actual life, and life is made up of separate deeds.

The virtuous life, then, involves examination of our doings, and the passing upon them of judgments of approval or disapproval. This is the exercise of Conscience. It may occur either before or after the act. When before, it either settles firmly as a fixed purpose the desire to do the act, or it holds up before us a hindrance in the shape of a condemnation of the act by our own judgment. To ignore this is to contradict ourselves. Thus, a judgment of conscience dealing with a proposed act carries with it the feeling of obligation or duty. What we ourselves judge to be right for us to do, that we are impelled to do; what we judge to be wrong to do, that we cannot do without *so far* committing moral and intellectual suicide.

If we do act against the dictates of conscience we feel that we have done ill, that we have wounded our self-respect, that our act was mean and unworthy. But if, despite this, we persist in the wrong acts, repeating them again and again because they give us some pleasure or avoid some pain, or simply because we shrink from the internal struggle involved in resisting impulse, then these feelings become gradually deadened, and the warning protests of conscience grow weaker, till finally they die away, and, so far, we are spiritually dead. The original tendency to seek righteousness has been supplanted by the habitude of saying "evil, be thou my good."

Intermediate between judging conduct before we proceed to enter upon it and judging it in retrospect is the judging an intention which circumstances made it impossible to realise. Evidently, the mere intention is not so certain as the intention fulfilled. 'To mean to do' and 'to do' are often very different things. "We mean to do wicked things that we never could do, just as we mean to do good or clever things that we never could do. Our thoughts are often worse than we are, just as they are often better than we are. And God sees us as we are altogether, not in separate feelings or actions, as our fellow-men see us."<sup>1</sup> That is how we need to see ourselves. But, even though insight into our own nature may lead us to hope that, had the opportunity come, the good deed would really have been done, or that we should, when brought face to face with it, have shrunk from the commission of the evil deed, yet we cannot be sure that it would have been so. The evil passion which was strong enough to cause us to form the bad intention may have proved strong enough to drive us to its execution. In any case, the evil deed was for a time identified with the will, and taken up into life's purpose.

<sup>1</sup> George Eliot: *Mr. Gilfil's Love Story*, Ch. XIX.

In that sense we are fully guilty of it. In that sense we must purge our conscience of it if we would again tread the paths of righteousness.

When conscience judges an act after it has been committed its task is easier. For the circumstances and results which when seen in anticipation or in imagination were more or less uncertain are now actual. We know exactly what an act has been and what it has so far accomplished, though there may stretch before the mental vision a long vista of further consequences. But though the act is done and beyond recall, or the possibility of determining whether an intention would have worked itself out in actual deed has for ever passed away, yet the judgment of conscience is by no means a mere verdict of history. It is a potent force entering into the present, and through the present determining the future. If the conduct or intention bear the scrutiny of conscience, then is the tendency to act in similar ways in the future confirmed. If it stand condemned, then that tendency is obstructed, and the tendency to do just otherwise incepted or strengthened. That is to say, the true outcome of a condemnation of conscience is repentance, which is essentially a turning from one line of conduct to another and opposed line.

When the possibility of amendment seems absent, and still regret is felt for the evil conduct, or  
**Repentance and Remorse.** at least for its consequences, there is not repentance but remorse. That is to say, remorse is repentance without hope or faith in the possibility of grace and strength to do better. But when such hope and faith are awakened that which was only remorse may become true repentance. To the believer in Divine love and help mere remorse is impossible as a permanent state. For a time faith may burn low and

despair fill the soul. But when the first shock of remorse has spent itself faith is rekindled and the eye of the soul turns in hope towards the future. The actual deed is, of course, beyond amendment, and, when it is serious, remorse may still be felt for it, even while there is repentance so far as the general line of conduct is concerned. For example, a murderer cannot restore his victim to life; he cannot make up to him for the evil he has done him: that avenue of conduct is entirely closed, and closed by his own unwarrantable deed. Regarding that he may feel remorse. But if at the same time there arise the determination to do what in him lies to conquer those passionate impulses which led to murder in the past, to change his aggressive attitude towards others into a full recognition of their rights, then he may be said to repent.

So, when in retrospect one stands appalled at the realisation of what would have been the true nature of the deed which would have accomplished an intention of which circumstances prevented the fulfilment, one may feel horror at the self for entertaining the evil design and intense thankfulness that opportunity for its completion in act was wanting, a fervent hope that one may take warning by so narrow an escape and in future keep a bridle over one's thoughts lest they betray one to deeds which must ever fill one with remorse.

Repentance, in a word, looks mainly to the future, to which its sorrow for the past acts as a spur: remorse looks only to the past as an irremediable ill. It is obvious that when remorse alone is felt the soul is spiritually deadened; when the state of mind is more truly called repentance, its spiritual life is quickened. Indeed, as deeds wrong or imperfectly right are intended and wrought by all, repentance must be regarded as a normal factor in the virtuous life.



2. An act of conscience is, then, essentially an intellectual judgment passed on definite acts and intentions of our own. No person's conscience can have anything to say about the conduct of another, or about general modes of action. It simply takes this or that act or course of action, proposed or accomplished, and says 'It is right' or 'It is wrong.'

**Nature of Conscience.** The judgments of conscience are, consequently, tinged with emotion in a way in which judgments dealing with matter independent of ourselves are not. It is ourselves we are judging, and we cannot remain as unmoved by the recognition that we have done well or ill as by the contemplation of a correct or incorrect solution of a mathematical problem. Of course, the satisfaction or dissatisfaction which attends the pronouncements of conscience varies in amount according to the gravity or triviality of the acts judged. Conduct which is condemned as hindering the attainment of one of our great purposes, or of the greatest purpose of all when our hearts are really set on righteousness, arouses a much more bitter and lasting emotion than any that we feel when the condemnation is passed on some small and comparatively unimportant matter which can have no serious or far-reaching results.

It is true that we are sometimes conscious of more mental disturbance when we have committed a social solecism than when we realise that we have been morally guilty. One may feel uncomfortable for months at the memory that one had knocked over a vase in a crowded drawing-room, or had appeared there in evening dress with turned-up trousers and feet encased in large goloshes, and forget during that time many occasions on which one had lost one's temper and said unkind words. But though the former feeling is one of discomfort and is related to one's own actions, yet it is not at all like that which attends the

recognition of moral fault; it is much less intimate and personal, and much more concerned with ourselves as others see us than with ourselves as we know we really are. To feel regret that one is short-sighted, that one stumbled, or even that one was clumsy or absent-minded, and that these defects have had awkward consequences which drew upon one the undesired attention of others is quite another thing from feeling that one has done something which makes one less in the essence of one's being than one was before.

There is, then, a characteristic kind of emotion which accompanies every judgment of conscience; an emotion which should act as a spring to motive and a determinant of action in the future. Some temperaments are, however, prone to rest in the emotion itself—to wrap themselves in the satisfaction which approval entails, and even to find a kind of perverse joy in being miserable when conscience disapproves. The step to living in a kind of continual contemplation of the ideas of actions which are never actualised is but a small one. This is the essence of sentimentalism. It is a similar attitude of mind to that which leads many a shallow woman to shed copious tears over the misfortunes of the heroine of romance or drama while the sufferings of her actual sisters in the flesh touch her not at all. Sentimentalism in the private personal life confuses the having of noble imaginings with the doing of noble deeds; but as the imaginings have little or no effect on conduct, the actual life remains dominated by passing impulses. Of that prince of sentimentalists, Rousseau, it has been said with much force: "His virtues were flowers of rhetoric to adorn his writings: his vices were his life itself."

Conscience, then, is not only judge, but dispenser of rewards and punishments and director of conduct, whose

dictates can be disobeyed only at the cost of starvation of soul and degradation of life.

3. This autocracy, however, carries with it no more  
 Validity of  
 Conscience. guarantee of infallibility than do other autocracies. To be supreme and to be wise are not synonymous expressions. We are, indeed, all well aware that the consciences of those who differ from us often lead them astray. Some of us may even have recognised that our own consciences have at times prompted us to do what the same consciences have afterwards condemned. For conscience can decide only on the facts apprehended, and these may in the actual course of events turn out to be different from what they seemed to us likely to be before we entered upon the line of conduct.

To recognise that our conscience calls upon us to do things which we know to be disapproved by others whose judgment we respect should, therefore, give us pause. We should reconsider the whole case, consult others, and in every other available way get what further light we can upon it. In a word, we should make as sure as possible that we understand what we are proposing to do. If our conscience still tell us to do it, then we have no choice. It is a case of duty, and duty must be done despite the disapprobation of those around us. To act otherwise would mean that we do what *we* believe to be wrong because others think it right. Instead of following the inner voice of conscience we listen to what has been styled the 'outer conscience' of public opinion, the true function of which, like that of the House of Lords, is to delay the carrying out of hasty legislation till the matter has been more carefully considered.

Indeed, the instinct to do and to think as others do and think not infrequently leads people to mistake for conscience what is really nothing more respectable than

prejudice and self-complacency. We all know the man whose 'conscience' will never let him do a generous deed, but as a compensation places no restrictions on his meannesses. We are never justified in thinking or speaking of any assurance of the right or wrong of an act, however strong it may be, as the dictate of conscience, unless we have done our best to understand the circumstances—to look at the matter on all sides, to examine our own motives, and generally to apply our reason as carefully as we can to the question. Prejudices often grow up in our minds without any justification in ethics or in logic for their existence. They are petrifications of habitudes which have never become enlightened purposes; which are, indeed, predominantly habitudes of feeling with which intellect has little to do. They may be survivals from a past different in many ways from the present, passed down by social tradition and drawn in by us with our mother's milk. Or they may be of later growth, and the outcome of religious, political, social, or other strong prepossessions. The strength or the age of a conviction is no guarantee either of its truth or of our right, as intelligent beings, to hold it.

There is, then, no exercise of conscience unless the whole power of the mind has been brought into play, and the decision is seen to be the result of reasoning on the conditions offered. It is because this is the nature of conscience that it is liable to go astray. Every operation of conscience is an act of inference in which a general moral principle of conduct is applied to a particular case. Error may arise from misapprehension either of the principle or of the facts, or from fallacious application. The ultimate moral laws are immutable, for they are expressions of the nature of goodness itself: they set forth the directions in which human nature approaches its perfec-



tion. In this sense they are as truly natural as are the laws of the physical universe. But they are not 'natural' in the sense of being innate. "There is no authentic copy of the moral law, printed, framed, and hung up by the hand of Nature, in the inner sanctuary of every human heart."<sup>1</sup>

Further, the ultimate laws have been applied to different customs, among different peoples, and in different ages. They have been expressed, accordingly, in different maxims, leading to different judgments on outward acts which, removed from their settings, seem alike. Thus, conduct which would be condemned in one age may be approved in another, for it enters into a different texture of life. For instance, the Spartan boy was taught to augment his scanty rations by whatever he could appropriate secretly. In the present day this would be condemned as theft, because our society is organized on a basis of private property which it is a main function of the State to protect from assault. But it was not theft in the Spartan boy; not only because it was allowed, and even enjoined, by public authority, but also because Sparta was organized essentially as a military state, and everything was made subservient to efficiency in war. Ability to forage was thus a desirable power to cultivate in the young. Moreover, the individual citizen was regarded as existing essentially for the benefit of the State, so that what he was allowed to hold as private property he yet held as a kind of public trust. Duty was judged at Sparta by reference to the efficiency of conduct in maintaining the power and independence of the State. With our more settled conditions the question of private rights bulks larger. But even in these at first sight so contradictory rulings as to

**Variations in  
apprehension  
of Moral Law.**

<sup>1</sup> Rickaby : *Moral Philosophy*, p. 145.

right and wrong we see that the ultimate law is one and the same—to do what is judged best for the welfare of the community: the variation is in the specific kind of outward act in which this duty is to be fulfilled, and that variation is determined by the differences in the conditions under which it has to be performed.

The apparent contradictions between the moral principles of different ages frequently arise simply from the error of applying to one set of circumstances conceptions which are valid only in another. To take another instance. Herodotus, wishing to show the power of national customs, says, “For if one were to offer men to choose out of all the customs in the world such as seemed to them the best, they would examine the whole number, and end by preferring their own; so convinced are they that their own usages far surpass those of all others. . . . That people have this feeling about their laws may be seen by very many proofs: among others by the following. Darius, after he had got the kingdom, called into his presence certain Greeks who were at hand, and asked—‘What he should pay them to eat the bodies of their fathers when they died?’ To which they answered, that there was no sum that would tempt them to do such a thing. He then sent for certain Indians, of the race called Callatians, men who eat their fathers, and asked them, while the Greeks stood by, and knew by the help of an interpreter all that was said—‘What he should give them to burn the bodies of their fathers at their decease?’ The Indians exclaimed aloud, and bade him forbear such language. Such is men’s wont herein; and Pindar was right, in my judgment, when he said ‘Law is king o’er all.’”<sup>1</sup> Here it is plain that, though the same kind of

<sup>1</sup> Bk. III. 38 (Rawlinson’s Translation). We owe the suggestion of this illustration to Rickaby’s *Moral Philosophy*, p. 145.

act was regarded with abhorrence by one people and with approval by another, yet the difference was only in the application of the general moral law which enjoined respect and reverence to the dead. The conventional law of custom was "king o'er all" only in dictating the mode in which this universal natural obligation should be fulfilled.

Other variations are due to the amount of insight into the ultimate moral law itself attained by different peoples. For, after all, the accepted maxims are expressions of judgments which though general are also individual. For example, even to the greatest of Greek thinkers slavery was a natural institution. To us it is repugnant to the natural moral law; for we recognise in a way the Greeks never did the universal brotherhood of man, and the consequent obligation upon us to treat every human being as having his own independent life to live and destiny to accomplish, and to refrain from using him as a mere means for the advancement of our own ends. In a word, we have attained a deeper insight into the relations which should bind man to man, and have reached the conception that every man has, like ourselves, the right to that freedom of action which is the essential mark of his humanity.

The great fact that there is progress in morality does not imply a development of the ultimate principles, but an evolution in man's apprehension of them; just as progress in mathematics is simply an increasing insight into mathematical relations which in themselves are now exactly what they were in the beginning. Man is slowly feeling his way into a knowledge of the world, but his increase of knowledge does not add to the richness of reality. So it is with goodness, but with the difference that here Divine revelation has thrown light on his path if only he will avail himself of it.

4. The judgments of conscience, therefore, differ both among races and between individuals according to the amount of moral insight attained. In other words, conscience grows in efficiency with man's spiritual growth. It is not an infallible guide implanted in us, yet not we ourselves, directing the infant as surely as the most mature saint. On the contrary, it is we ourselves judging our own acts and purposes with just the amount of intelligence and good will we possess. As these powers increase conscience becomes more and more capable of piercing to the moral essence of conduct, and of seeing the real bearing of separate acts on the spiritual life.

This implies that it also becomes more sensitive; for sensitiveness is simply response to small variations. Moral sensitiveness means that the conscience recognises deviations from the true and the good which would be imperceptible to a less sensitive conscience. Doubtless, there are innate differences in the sensitiveness of conscience as in all other forms of sensitiveness; but doubtless also, this, like other forms of sensitiveness, can be trained.

The young child cannot see the bearing of his acts so clearly as the adult, nor can he have his heart so firmly and so consciously set on righteousness. Consequently, his conscience allows him, without protest, to do acts which he should not do, just because he does not see their real meaning. In a word, his conscience is only beginning to learn to distinguish between right and wrong, and at first it marks off only the broadest contrasts, just as his sensitiveness to colour at first enables him to separate only well-marked tints. Later on, as his visual perception is trained he sees many intermediate shades in



colour, and as his moral perception is cultivated he sees many intermediate degrees in thought and conduct. The conscience can no more respond to undistinguished differences than can the eye. So, to say that conscience is less sensitive in childhood than in virtuous manhood is analogous to saying that the eye of the child is less able to distinguish tints of colour than is that of the trained adult.

Just as the child will not advance far or rapidly in the discrimination of colours unless his interest be excited and his attention concentrated on such distinctions, so he will not progress in moral insight unless his will be engaged in the work. More true is it, indeed, in moral education—that is, in the training of conscience—than in any other branch of education that no real progress is made without the cooperation of the will of the child.

The training of conscience, then, consists in the cultivation of the good will and the development of moral insight. The latter implies the elucidation of the child's ideas of the content of morality; that is, of power of distinguishing between moral values, and of appreciating the full scope of moral precepts so that he may apply them with increasing ease and certainty to his own conduct.

Now the will of the child fixes itself naturally on the objective world. He wants to do and to act, and he finds small satisfaction in mere mental activity which has no external result. Many people, indeed, never pass beyond this stage.

Ours is emphatically an age of bustle and hurry, and one keen to rush into doing. Is an evil discerned? Its perception urges to immediate action for its removal; too often, alas, with the result that the ill is aggravated, or others even worse induced. Too little is it recognised that not

**Conscience  
and Will.**

**Order of de-  
velopment of  
Conscience.**

mere action but wise action is what life requires, and that wisdom implies deliberation.

This recognition, however, can only come gradually in life, as experience teaches the futility and mischief of unconsidered conduct. Because it is desirable that a future generation of adults should think before acting more than is at present the custom, it does not follow that the way to prepare for this is to try to anticipate the deliberateness proper to maturity amid the restless energy of childhood. The effort to "put old heads on young shoulders" is fore-doomed to failure: it is either quite ineffective or it produces a self-satisfied and morally anaemic prig. As in intellectual, so in spiritual life, the educator must be satisfied with a very slow growth—a growth imperceptible from day to day and only to be gauged by comparing the moral stature now attained with that reached a year or two ago.

That moral growth may be secured at all the educator must work on the spiritual, as on the intellectual and physical life, along the lines of natural development. Thus, the fact that the child's outlook is essentially objective must be accepted. Altogether evil is the attempt to induce in a child a high degree of introspective self-consciousness: with him it can only be morbid. The sad increase in the number of juvenile suicides which is apparent in certain continental countries points the moral.

The child's conscience grows in strength and in activity as the habitude of doing what he knows to be right increases in power. For generally he sees clearly enough what he ought to do, and each time he acts on the recognition he strengthens his conscience, so that he feels its pricks immediately he even proposes to wander from the well marked paths of righteousness.

But this is not enough ; for, as we have seen, virtue goes beyond habitude. The child's moral thoughtfulness and insight must also be trained and his sensitiveness to shades of morality in conduct increased. This is the function of that moral instruction of which we spoke in the last chapter.<sup>1</sup> The whole aim of such teaching, whether directly or indirectly given, is to induce in the child the moral thoughtfulness appropriate to his years, vitalised by the will to do well, and so leading to greater and greater moral insight. Without the will the intellectual consideration of moral questions is inoperative in life and futile in education.

The child is impulsive and prone to act without thinking. When he does wrong he is often conscious of no evil motive, and he does not pause to think out the probable or possible effects of his action. Education must develop the general habitude of checking impulse by regard to the whole circumstances in which the act would be done. This, of course, does not imply the continual delay of action by long deliberation. The impulse is immediately met and checked by the general habitude of looking further than the satisfaction of the impulse. For example, a boy who in simple thoughtlessness throws a stone in a street or on a common may realise too late that it must strike another person. Ignorance that this person would actually be in the path of the projectile is, however, no excuse for the moral fault of his recklessness. A little thought would have told him that in a public place others are likely to be about, that they have a right to pass in safety, and that an obligation rests on him to respect that right ; but that to throw a stone is to infringe the right, and, consequently, to commit a wrong against the community whether actual

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 83-91.

injury to another results or not. Of course when harm does result to a person whose proximity he could have seen had he looked round, his fault is more serious; he is then guilty not only of negligence but of culpable negligence of a type which indicates a callous disregard of others.

The conscience, then, is trained when a child is led to recognise this: that no potential infringement of the rights of another can ever be justified; that when such potential infringement becomes actual through his own negligence his fault is increased; that when no public right is infringed ignorance that actual and positive evil will result from his act is an exculpation only when it was absolutely unavoidable, but that ignorance which is removable by means within his power is an aggravation rather than an extenuation of his wrong-doing, as it indicates a tendency to be indifferent to the effects of his acts so long as they give him a momentary pleasure or excitement.

Often, when a child is, from mere thoughtlessness, about to do something which will be a more or less **Moral Insight.** serious offence against morality or good order, a word, or even a look, from parent or teacher is enough to give him pause. If such a case be considered for a moment it will be seen that its essence is that in that pause the child's attention is drawn to what he was about to do. He recognises that it is disapproved by those whom he respects and loves; so, even if without that suggestion he would not have seen it to be wrong, he so sees it now. In other words, he has learnt to distinguish another moral shade in conduct, to appreciate a distinction to which he has not hitherto been sensitive.

Opportunities for similar and further enlightenment present themselves both in school life and in school lessons. "Prevention is better than cure," and if a child can be led in any case to distinguish between right and wrong before



he acts instead of afterwards, something is gained. Such teaching is effective just so far as it seizes hold of an existing habitude and enlightens it. For instance, a boy may have formed the purpose and habitude of abstaining from lying. Yet he may have a very narrow and restricted idea of where the confines of lying should be fixed. A few words—a suggestion, a hint, a question arising out of some lesson, it may be in literature or in history, or out of some incident of school life—throw a flood of light on the point. His idea of lying is enlarged: what has hitherto seemed to him to stand outside is now seen to be included in its scope. His conscience has been enlightened, for it was ready to receive enlightenment.

But the solemn and reverent exposition of the doctrines of religion, infusing the demands of the  
**Conscience and Religion.** moral law with the sense of loving Fatherhood and the assurance of Divine help in striving to do well, and with the feeling of human solidarity involved in the very idea of a Church, is the most direct and powerful means for enlightening the conscience and identifying the will with holiness. Without this, education must, of necessity, be maimed.

Moral teaching is more directly and personally given when a child, finding himself faced with a  
**Moral Guidance.** problem of conduct he cannot solve, seeks advice. Such cases of doubt are infrequent in child life; for, as has been said, a child generally sees his duty if he only pause to think on the matter. Yet they do arise, and as the years of adolescence are passed through they become more numerous and more vital. Parents often fail woefully in their duty by not seeking, yea by even shunning from a feeling of false shame, their children's confidences at this time. Many a gallant bark putting out hopefully on the ocean of life's temptations suffers shipwreck

from want of the warning beacon which the parent might have lighted.

To a teacher it belongs less to seek such private confidences, but he should be willing to receive them if they are offered, as should every good and thoughtful adult who has youthful friends. The teacher should, indeed, by his generally sympathetic and helpful attitude towards his pupils, tacitly invite them to seek his advice when they feel the need of guidance. One of the evil results of undue familiarity and the elimination of the relation of complementary authority and respect between teacher and pupil is that such advice when given is wanting in constraining power: it ranks with the opinion of a schoolmate instead of taking the higher level of the pronouncement of a guide and leader.

Whether sought or not, opportunities for advice must occur simply because children will never be free from moral faults. The educator's aim, after a child has committed a sin is to lead him to repentance. His mode of dealing with the case must be determined by this. Solemn yet affectionate admonition will be the chief factor. If he feel that punishment is demanded he yet punishes simply as an additional aid to the evoking of conscience. Any punishment which fails to be such an aid is out of court. As Thring warns us, "With the young, grave moral offences, when detected, are felt keenly and bitterly, sometimes with exceeding bitterness, but in all cases conscience is roused to aid any right corrective, and there is great danger that wrong measures will deaden instead of improve boys fresh to sin."<sup>1</sup>

The aim is to produce a lasting impression—a memory of shame that will act as a future safeguard. But in order

<sup>1</sup> *Education and School*, Ch. XV.

that this may be secured it is essential that the fault should be recognised as an offence against a higher and wider law than that of mere family or school order—as one which has a bearing on all life and not merely on one department of life. The words uttered should, therefore, be well chosen, few and weighty, and spoken with tact and much gravity. Most mistaken is it to deluge the offender with a flood of rhetoric. At the best this awakens an emotional excitement which passes away with the eloquence which aroused it, or very soon after; at the worst it raises a feeling of repulsion and dislike; usually the boy simply closes his spiritual ears and emerges from the intercourse unaffected.

It is good that children should be encouraged to that amount of moral thoughtfulness which is suitable to their age, and practised in examining their conduct and estimating the results of their actions, so that their own experience may help to guide them in the future, and so that their ideas of the moral law may grow ever clearer and more lively. The home is emphatically the place in which this should be done. The school can play but a poor second to a good home in this respect. The very strenuousness of its life, and the thoroughness with which it fills up its pupils' time with lessons and games, though of the very essence of its character as a school, are not conducive to those moments of calm reflexion in which conscience makes its voice heard. Yet even in school opportunities arise for appeal to conscience. Such appeal can obviously only be made individually; for nothing can be more individual than the conscience of each one of us. It is made in private talk between teacher and pupil, but the conscience itself needs solitude in which to work. To send a child back into the turmoil of school life after such an interview is to stifle conscience immediately it is aroused. A time for

quiet meditation is needed. It may be found in the home or by leaving the child alone in a room at school for a few minutes. In boarding schools it is plain that every child should have certain times which he can in the fullest sense call his own, and in which the gift of recollectedness may grow in him.



## CHAPTER VI.

---

### THE SCHOOL COMMUNITY.

1. Having examined the personal qualities of the good life we must now consider how that life can be furthered by the school. This enquiry is one of increasing importance, for more and more the home seems to be losing its hold over the children and willingly transferring its functions, as far as it can do so, to the school. That this is to be regretted has already been shown: that it cannot be done with any fullness makes the tendency even more mischievous, as the functions which the school cannot take up, though the family lay them down, are left unfulfilled, and to that extent the child suffers from lack of training.

Of course, the demarcation between family and school functions is very different in boarding schools and in day schools. The former schools have a wider scope than the latter, for to the strictly school functions they add those of the boarding-house. And in a boarding-house the child lives a kind of home life, though it is not a family life.

But even in a day school there are functions which the family cannot fulfil; so that, even were good family training universal, schools would still have a part to play. In

the school the child is brought into competition and co-operation with others of the same standing, and, as a result, his whole life expands.<sup>1</sup> All activity acquires an added zest by being undertaken in company with others, as is shown by the fact that it is easier to inspire a crowd with enthusiasm than an individual, and to induce those who compose it, when thus inspired, to commit acts in common which they would not easily be prevailed on to attempt as individuals. In school this 'contagion of numbers' is combined with that most effective spur to youthful endeavour—emulation; for the work of each is not so merged in that of the whole as to become an indistinguishable constituent in the mass of a common result. "Rivalry without malice" of individual with individual and of group with group is one of the most potent instruments by which the school community stimulates the individual pupil to effort to a degree to which private tuition can never attain.

Moreover, as that wise old Elizabethan schoolmaster, Richard Mulcaster, put it: "*Education* is the bringing up of one, not to live alone, but amongst others, (because company is our natural cognisance) whereby he shall be best able to execute those doings in life which the state of his calling shall employ him unto, whether *public* abroad or *private* at home, according unto the direction of his country whereunto he is born, and oweth his whole service. All the functions here be public, and regard every one, even where the things do seem to be most private, because the main direction remaineth in the public, and the private must be squared, as it will best join with that: and yet we restrain *education* to *private*, all whose circumstances be singular to one. As if he that were brought up alone should also ever live alone. . . . How can *education* be

<sup>1</sup> Cf. pp. 9-10.

*private* ? It abuseth the name as it abuseth the thing.”<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, the school influence is brought to bear at an age specially open to suggestions derived from a common life. From the dependence of infancy the boy is passing to the independence of manhood. In this intermediate stage he consciously and fully identifies himself with a group of his fellows, with whom he measures himself even while he works with them for a common end. The gregariousness of the ordinary school-boy or -girl is apparent to all who study childhood. Instinct cries aloud in them to seek the cooperation of others in whatever they do, and to endeavour to make their own contribution to the success of the common enterprise greater than that of those who are sharing it with them.

This prevalence of what has been called the ‘group-consciousness’ during the years of school life causes the school community to differ in important ways from the adult community, in which each individual is more independent and more prone to seek his personal ends. Though still gregarious in many aspects of his activity—religious, political,<sup>f</sup> recreative—the adult feels more strongly than does the child the primary value of his own private purposes. Too often, indeed, this perception so dominates him that he tries to use his fellows as far as he can merely as his instruments.

The general moral atmosphere, influential on opinion and conduct at all ages, is, thus, of supreme importance in school. That is the real moulding influence the power of which is felt by all and resisted by few. A striking example is given by Mme. de Geöcze : “ A little boy comes to school. He is the best pupil and gets excellent reports. Suddenly he becomes idle and even untruthful. His father

<sup>1</sup> *Positions*, Ch. 39.

enquires into the matter. The child confesses, weeping, 'They mocked me, and would not play with me, and I couldn't bear it.'"<sup>1</sup>

At the same time we must not fail to remember the growing assertiveness which marks these years, especially in the boy. It is not usually an assertion of independence of judgment and opinion. The 'contrary' child, who early shows an innate tendency always to take the other side, is exceptional. Normally it is rather an assertiveness of individual rights, often wrongly conceived, for claims are made which cannot be substantiated and which the self-willed child is often the first to deny to others. Any one who has watched a number of boys of, say, thirteen or fourteen years old at play knows how, unless they have been disciplined by properly organized games, their voices clash and clang continuously in remonstrance and self-assertion. They depart in no wise from the general opinion of their companions as to how the game should be played, but they dispute any application of the rules which limits their own favourite form of activity, indicates want of skill on their part, and generally does not leave them in untrammelled freedom. Sometimes the game is broken up, and a boy refuses to "play any longer" because he cannot have his own way.

Thus, group-consciousness coexists with a tendency which is antagonistic to group-action. If this latter tendency develops it becomes unmitigated selfishness, and its natural outcome is that the adult goes through life with "his hand against every man, and every man's hand against him." From the group-consciousness of his youth such an one will simply have gathered a bundle of prejudices and opinions which he twists in any way, no

<sup>1</sup> *Report of First International Moral Education Congress*, p. 385.



matter how unnatural, which will make them minister to his private will.

The effects which may be wrought by discipline are seen if such a group of boys as we have described be compared with a team of boys of similar age and social condition who have been well trained and each of whom plays for his side. With these the group-consciousness has its natural outcome in harmonious group-action, directed by group-purpose and seeking group-welfare. The boy still does his utmost, and tries in doing it to surpass his fellows; but his motive is no longer merely his personal glory and pleasure but the honour of his side, and to that he will even sacrifice himself by yielding place to another when the welfare of the side demands it. Discipline has influenced the will at the same time that group-consciousness has enriched the understanding.

2. It is in this regulation of conduct through will that the disciplinary work of the school consists. Like every other community, a school has to determine practically the relations of right and obligation among its members. Only to the extent to which this is satisfactorily accomplished can it work as a community at all. Now, rights and obligations are complementary: they are two terms of one relation. One person's right is another person's obligation. For example, the pupil's right to be taught implies the teacher's obligation to teach him. But the right carries with it also an obligation on him whose right it is: the pupil's right to be taught implies the obligation on him to do his best to learn. Similarly, the master's right to command implies an obligation on the pupils to obey. But it also imposes on the master the obligation to be just and reasonable in the commands he gives. Or, to take again the case of a

**Effects of  
Discipline.**

**Rights and  
Obligations.**

game. Each boy's right to the enjoyment due to the combination of others in the play carries with it the obligation on him to respect the same rights in others, to be cheerful and spirited, and to play for the side, as well as the obligation on them to treat him fairly and allow him his full share in the fun.

Rights and obligations, therefore, do not exist simply between individuals. Each individual can exercise many rights only through the active cooperation or, at least, the passive concurrence of the community as a whole or of some smaller group in it. Each of those rights carries with it a corresponding obligation on the individual to avoid trespassing on the rights of others in that particular, and to regard the general good of the community as an end to be sought by his own efforts. So the right to share in the work and in the play of a school implies the obligation to seek in each the good of the school. Thus school life gives both a depth and a comprehensiveness to duty, and consequently to life, which the child cannot get elsewhere.

3. It is plain that the obligation to work for the whole is binding on each; for otherwise it would be binding on none, and that altogether contradicts the concept of a community. For a community is essentially a body of persons, large or small, united together to attain a common end by conjoint effort. This lies on the face of those smaller associations voluntarily formed by persons who desire to carry out a particular religious, social, or political purpose. The larger the community the more vague and general to its members is the idea of its common object, and consequently the greater scope is there for variety in the ways in which its individual members work for its good. Indeed, the common good may not be consciously apprehended by the

**Nature of a  
Community.**

members as the end of endeavour. Each is conscious of seeking his own good ; but in so far as he seeks it through honest sharing in the work of the community he, in such seeking, is making for the common good. In the great community of a modern state the numbers are so large, and the common good so complex, that to obey the laws, to perform certain social and political functions, and “ to do my duty in that state of life unto which it shall please God to call me ”<sup>1</sup> sums up the obligations of the ordinary citizen, corresponding to his right to that ordered social life which alone makes his individual exertions fruitful or even possible.

In the school, however, we have a society, not only on a small scale both as to numbers and as to the variations of age and capacity among its junior members, but with a definite function which all understand more or less perfectly, and with a fairly fixed form of constitution. It is, consequently, comparatively easy to get a clear view of the rights and obligations which enter into it, and of the lines on which that accommodation of possibly conflicting claims may be secured which will enable the school to act together as a community for the attainment of its common purpose. In it the ends of private and common good are often nicely balanced. The individual child seeks what seems good to him, but, as we have said, he is naturally more ready than are adults to seek it as part of a common good which he himself recognises more or less explicitly as an end. He works, partly at any rate, for the credit of his school or of his class, and he plays for the glory of his side. Certainly the common end looms larger to him in some parts of the school life than in others, but seldom, if ever, is it altogether absent.

<sup>1</sup> *The Church Catechism.*

4. To speak, however, of a community organized for the attainment of a common end implies the existence of rules of community life. In an earlier chapter we have insisted that the ultimate moral laws are natural in that they lay down the lines human life must follow if it would draw continually nearer to perfection, and, further, that man advances in insight into their inner meaning and, consequently, into their application to his own circumstances.<sup>1</sup> It is obvious that these moral laws are operative in every community of human beings. These every school must assume; of course, in the best and highest form known to that wider community of which it is an organ.

But as these great laws refer to the living of life as a whole, it is evident that there are others of narrower application which are relative to special forms of organized life. The point to be insisted on is this: the true laws of any community are not mere arbitrary enactments, but are the expression of its nature and the inherent principles of its action. Thus they express those relations of its members to itself as an organized whole, and to each other as constituent parts of that whole, which make their conjoint efforts effective. That is to say, the form of its organization is determined by its purpose on the one hand and by the nature of those who are united in it for the attainment of that purpose on the other. Now, form of organization means that certain correlative rights and obligations are made explicit, the fulfilment of which is a necessary condition of the attainment of that purpose. The relations of right and obligation themselves are implicit in the very nature of the organization; the explicit statement of them is the formulation of the natural laws of that community. These laws, then, are discovered and

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 106-10.



enunciated, not made by arbitrary caprice ; their statement makes clear what the form or nature of the organization is, they do not give it that form. For any law which is not so inherent in the nature of the community, but is imposed from without, does not express the true form of the community but deforms it, just as external pressure on a limb may deform that limb, that is, give it a form foreign to its real nature, and so antagonistic to its true function. Just as physical forces can be utilised only when their true nature is known and accepted, so the purpose for which men unite in a community can be accomplished only in so far as the true moral laws of that community are recognised. In the one case as in the other disregard of natural law makes success impossible.

The true laws of the school are, then, principles of relation between its members which, when actualised, make for the perfect accomplishment of the school aim, and, in doing so, render the school life of each of its members as full and as free as possible. For only when the individual lives are as perfect as possible can the conjoint life also approach its ideal.

The school, however, is a society in which there are different ranks, and, consequently, different rights and obligations. Let us illustrate by considering another social community with a definite aim and a more or less pre-determined organization, but in which both aim and organization are largely material, and so are more immediately obvious than in the case of the school where both are essentially spiritual. Take the case of a well organized factory. There we have a body of workers with specialised skills so banded together and with their modes of working so related that a certain material product results. It is evident that the quality of the result depends partly on the good will and honesty of the individual

**Illustration :**  
**A Factory.**

workers, partly on the distribution of the work and consequent organization of the skill of the workers, and partly on the material appliances of buildings and machinery. No matter how perfect the last may be they are ineffective without the other two. The most essential of all is the first, and that is partly relative to the second, and yet more to the personal relations between the workmen and officers of various grades who direct them. This relation will suffer not only from absence of justice and good will in the treatment of individual workers or bodies of workers, but also from imperfect adaptation of means to end whereby the most willing labour is robbed of part of its effectiveness. Now it is obvious that skill in organizing such a community depends on knowledge of the conditions of factory labour in general and of this kind of factory labour in particular, and on insight into the current conditions of the industry and into the nature and aspirations of the workers as a body.

The organization is expressed in rules and regulations enforced by penalties for non-observance. To the extent to which the officers are wise, these will be well administered. To the extent to which the factory owner or manager is wise, they will be well framed ; that is, they will be derived from the knowledge and insight of which we have spoken and will, therefore, lay down the conditions of effective cooperation. So far as they do this they may be accepted as the natural laws of the factory. So far as they fail to do this they are mere arbitrary enactments, expressing not the real life of the factory but the private will of owner or manager. Of course, such unnatural laws may originate in stupidity rather than in perversity ; but, in any case, so far as they interfere with individual liberty they provoke resentment and so, by lessening the good will of the workers, or in an extreme case by even putting them in an

opposite camp to the factory authorities, they decrease, or even destroy, the efficiency of the factory. A dis-organized and non-cooperative society is, indeed, a society only in name. And in the factory, as in other societies, cooperation is possible only when the mode of reconciling possibly conflicting rights and obligations has been found and made actual by embodiment in the rules and regulations imposed on the members of the factory.

5. It is the same in all essentials with the school, though the preponderance of group-consciousness renders the work of securing and maintaining cordial relations easier than in a community of adults, mainly, if not altogether, bound together by the bond of material interest. The bond in the school is essentially personal and spiritual, but it will nevertheless fail as between scholars and teachers unless the school laws are the result of a true insight by the master into the nature of school life. Just as in a factory, other conditions help. Good buildings and sufficient and appropriate apparatus are desirable, and even necessary for the most effective school life. Numerous and well qualified teachers, a wise classification of scholars, and a skilfully constructed time-table are even more important. But they will all be in vain unless there is the true spirit, and this is impossible unless the teachers are both sympathetic and wise, not simply as men but as schoolmasters.

And, we must add, to be a skilful and wise schoolmaster is quite a different thing from being a skilful teacher. Happy is he in whom both powers are combined; but of those who have but the one form of excellence, the former is evidently the better Head-master, and the latter the better assistant. To be a skilful schoolmaster is to have that knowledge and insight which enables one to

develop an organization governed by rules and regulations which will make that particular school, with its particular pupils, staff, buildings, and apparatus, the most efficient instrument it is capable of becoming for the true education of its scholars.

Such an organization secures the hearty cooperation of the pupils in the general work of the school. For its purpose is their purpose, and even their private purposes are related to the general purpose as tributaries to a river. Without this, indeed, the school is not a community at all. Too often a school has been divided into two camps—masters and boys—in a permanent state of warfare, generally tacit but breaking out into open hostilities when government was weak or provocation on either side more than usually severe. With the advent of more gentle government this has been generally mitigated into at least a neutrality, more or less friendly. But the cases in which there has been developed a strenuous acceptance of school purpose, a living bond of school communion, a feeling that the honour of the school is the care of every one of its members are by no means the rule, especially in primary schools, where, of course, the great numbers, the early age of leaving, the inadequacy in numbers of the staff, the frequent ineffectiveness of the organization of games and other outdoor pursuits with the limitation of function to mere lessons, and often the home tone, all make the task of securing it exceptionally difficult.

Another, and a growing, obstacle to the perfect organization of schools is the increasing tendency towards bureaucracy in English education. The various local authorities, whose duty it is to attend to the material elements in school organization, too often take upon themselves the regulation of the internal organization as well. They direct what is to be

**Effects of  
Bureaucracy.**



taught, when children are to be promoted, what time may be given to games, what punishments may be inflicted and who may inflict them, and often, by means of officials, they direct the inner work of the school in detail as well as in bulk. Nor is the central authority—the Board of Education—innocent of similar interference. Unhappily all these administrative bodies are as incompetent for this as they are—or should be—competent for their proper functions. “There is no dead hand so dead as living power thrust in on work from the outside. It is the doctor putting his fingers on the heart when he ought to feel the pulse.”<sup>1</sup> So wrote Edward Thring, one of the greatest English headmasters of the nineteenth century, and well would it be if our twentieth century bureaucracies would take his words to heart. Unhappily, at present the paralysing influence is creeping upwards from the primary to the secondary schools and even threatening the universities. The Education Committees of Local Authorities should be analogous to Boards of Directors of Limited Liability Companies, which direct general policy but leave internal organization to the Managing Director. The Head Teacher should be the Managing Director of the School: he has the intimate knowledge of the actual conditions of that school which nobody who remains outside it can have. And he has a personal interest in its efficiency which is stimulated by trust and deadened by even an implied suspicion that he is either something of a knave or a good deal of a fool. Moreover, a school cannot be a perfect social organization unless its ostensible head be its real head. The outside authority cannot form part of the school community either in theory or in fact; consequently, laws imposed by it cannot bear on their face the appearance of natural expressions of the school’s life and work.

<sup>1</sup> Parkin: *Life and Letters of Edward Thring*, p. 244.

The Head-teacher, then, should have freedom to organize his school. But he should regard this freedom only as that true freedom which means unhindered effort for the accomplishment of school purpose, and he should remember that unwise regulations will be the most fatal of all hindrances to those efforts. He should, therefore, give much thought to the character of his school and make clear to himself what principles are implied in it. These only should he formulate as laws. Of every suggested rule he should ask the question, "In what way, and to what degree, would this make for the realisation of unity of effort directed towards the purpose of the school to promote learning and a disciplined life?"

When the school laws really facilitate the work of the school it is not difficult to make it clear to pupils who have in any way infringed them that by their action they are frustrating the very purpose for which the school exists, and that, therefore, they are infringing the rights of their school-fellows. The law is seen to be something much more than the private will of an absolute ruler who regards himself as outside the range of its operation. When it is this, indeed, the master is essentially a tyrant, that is, one ruling regardless of any law except his own will or caprice; the whole government is external regulation of conduct with no power of forming character—unless, indeed, it form it by instinctive revulsion from mere personal rule, and then the formation is apt to be the exact opposite to what is desired; the school is split up by the master's action into the two opposed camps of teachers and pupils.

But when the laws are plainly determined by the needs of the school the master is seen to promulgate them rather than to make them. The unity of the school is main-

tained ; for the master, equally with the pupils, is subject to the laws, though, of course, the mode of his observance will differ from that of the scholars, inasmuch as his position in the school is different from theirs. For example, the law requiring attention and industry equally binds teacher and scholar. But the former fulfils it in his preparation of lessons and earnestness in teaching ; the latter in faithful endeavour to profit by this work of the former.

Some rules, too, may regulate the scholar's behaviour and not that of the teacher at all. For instance, at a boarding school the boys may be forbidden to go out of bounds while no similar restriction applies to the masters. Such regulations are only special expressions of more fundamental laws, and may even vary in their application to pupils of different standing, as when privileges are given to the elder which are withheld from the younger. Equal subordination to law does not mean that every member of the school is under rules identical in detail, but that every one is bound by certain broad principles which make for the efficient carrying out of the work of the school and which find appropriate expression in ways differing according to the different relations to the school community of those to whom they apply.

6. This is implied in the constitution of the school, and, therefore, to neglect it would be to negate the general principle we are discussing. For a school implies gradations in rank and, consequently, in function. The immaturity of the pupils and the purpose for which they attend the school imply that they are there in a position of subordination to the master. In the smallest and most simply organized schools these two essential terms constitute the whole. In larger and more complex organizations there intervene

**Characteris-  
tics of School  
Laws :**

various other grades, each in subordination to those above, and in authority over those below, such as assistant teachers, prefects, and other officers appointed from among the elder pupils to exercise certain defined powers over the younger. But the great dividing line is between the masters on the one hand and the pupils on the other, and that is, consequently, the place in the organization where division is most apt to develop into cleavage.

Attempts to ignore this line of division, to abolish the relation of authority on the one hand and due respect and subordination on the other are as doomed to educational failure as the custom, against which they are the excessive reaction, of so emphasizing it that authority becomes mere compulsion, and subordination mere servility tempered by rebellion.

Each extreme is to be avoided. The teacher is neither a being of another world ruling from without, nor is he simply an equal among equals. Master and pupils are engaged in the same work in one sense, and in complementary work in another sense. The one work of educating the young demands the cooperation of two quite different but complementary forms of striving of teacher and taught, of guider and guided.

The ultimate basis of authority, indeed, is sympathy—that true sympathy which prompts the elder to understand, and to help in every way, even by severity if need be, the young soul he is training; not that maudlin sentimentality which risks a child's soul rather than cause him any momentary pain or discomfort. Without such sympathy the exercise of authority wears a harsh and repellent mien. "The very meaning of education," wrote Sydney Smith, "seems to us to be that the old should teach the young, and the wise direct the weak; that a



man who professes to instruct should get among his pupils, study their characters, gain their affections, and form their inclinations and aversions."<sup>1</sup> It would be difficult to state better or more lucidly the essential features of the true relation between master and scholar.

Certainly the last hundred years have seen a great development of the idea of individual liberty, but, as has been before pointed out, this does not negate a legitimate exercise of authority.<sup>2</sup> It is unregulated and unreasonable constraint which provokes the will to rebellion. "Reasonable obedience is extremely useful in forming the disposition. Submission to tyranny lays the foundation of hatred, suspicion, cunning, and a variety of odious passions."<sup>3</sup> Obedience to school rules is recognised by the pupils as reasonable when disobedience is seen to hinder the work for which the school exists. This they will not see, however, because they will refuse to see it, unless the authority is based on sympathy, so that its exercise is kindly. "Thou wilt catch more flies with a spoonful of honey than with a cask of vinegar," says an old Arabic proverb which every teacher may well take as a parable, though, in interpreting it he should remember that an unmixed diet of honey is good neither for soul nor for body.

At the same time it must be borne in mind that the reasonableness of school law manifests itself as gradually to the children as does the nature of other laws. With young children the law is, as it were, embodied in the teacher, and its reasonableness and justice are taken for granted just to the extent to which they trust and respect him. Affection will not compensate for the absence of these relations, though they are strengthened by its presence; for children,

**Reasonable-  
ness ;**

<sup>1</sup> Article on "Public Schools": *Edinburgh Review*, 1810.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. pp. 44-48.

<sup>3</sup> Sydney Smith, *ibid.*

like adults, love many of whose weaknesses they are quite well aware. Indeed, they often show their insight into them in unmistakable, and generally inconvenient, ways.

Strict insistence on obedience to the laws forms habits as well as habits when the ruler is both trusted and revered. Then all hindrance of these habitudes by the disobedience of others is felt as a personal wrong. The reason is plain: the disobedience is seen to interfere with the desired course of conduct. The teacher's reference of all school wrong-doing, to the extent to which the scholars can understand it, to interference with the success of some part of school life clarifies the idea. The growing strength of the group-consciousness strengthens the feeling of solidarity. At last the individual recognises that his own breaking of law is antagonistic to the public weal, and in such recognition sees the reasonableness of the law.

It is thus plain that when a school law is said to be reasonable it is not implied that its reasonableness is perceived by every pupil. Still less is it meant that the teacher should engage in argument to prove to a pupil that he has done wrong in breaking the law. The fundamental wrong is disobedience, and of that the culprit is quite conscious. The mere existence of the law is sufficient reason for him to obey it, though it is not adequate reason for its maintenance. That must be found by the teacher in considerations such as those which should have determined its original promulgation. Indeed, it may happen that, owing to some important change of conditions, a reasonable law becomes unreasonable. For the special laws of a school are not like the ultimate laws of morality. They are all derivative, and are but means relative to an end to be attained in certain definite circumstances.

If a school law is really reasonable it is just, because it expresses a true relation between different members of the school community. This again, especially with young boys and girls, is chiefly a matter for the teacher's judgment. The pupils are more intimately concerned with just administration of the law. As to this their feelings are very keen: "In the little world in which children have their existence, whosoever brings them up, there is nothing so finely perceived and so finely felt as injustice."<sup>1</sup> They resent all that appears to them unjust: all differential treatment of pupils which is not obviously grounded in differences of conduct or strength in the children so treated; all excess of punishment relatively to the known offence; all capriciousness whereby what is forbidden one day is allowed the next according to the teacher's temper or memory. Generally they are right. A fair administration of laws just in themselves provokes no feeling of injustice even in cases in which breaches are commonly met with considerable severity. That may lead to diminution of affection for the teacher but not to decrease of respect. Like Dr. Temple at Rugby he may be esteemed "a beast, but a just beast."

Differences of treatment are not regarded as unjust when they are seen to be well grounded. Indeed, justice itself calls for such differentiation. A habitual offender is not in the same category as the generally righteous person who yields to a strong temptation and repents. Nor is a child of delicate nervous physique in the same condition as the robust young pachyderm overflowing with mischief. Differences of treatment obviously motivated by such evident differences as these do not fall under the ban of a healthy school opinion as unjust.

<sup>1</sup> Dickens, *Great Expectations*, Ch. VIII.

No discussion is needed to show that justice requires that those laws which do apply to the conduct of the pupils should be known and understood by them. It is as well, too, that this knowledge should be shared by their parents. A few simple laws, stated clearly and, whenever possible, in positive form, should be printed on cards and given to the parents when the child is admitted and on the covers of the child's Report Book or Home-work Book, so that they may be kept before his mind. It would be well, too, if they were read publicly by the Head-teacher on such important occasions as the beginning of a new term, and publicly explained and illustrated. Conspicuous public breaches of any of them give further opportunities for drawing specific attention to their existence.

The rules should be as few as is consistent with efficient regulation of conduct. To go further is to cease to be reasonable and to interfere unnecessarily with liberty of action. The result of this is irritation on the part of the children whose liberty is cramped at every turn, leading to continual breach of some trivial rule: this induces counter-irritation in the teacher who responds with reproof or punishment. So the mutual ill feeling grows, and the atmosphere of the class or school becomes one of sullen maliciousness on the side of the scholars and of ill-tempered nagging on that of the teacher. But if the principle be adhered to of imposing no regulations which cannot be justified by consideration of their influence on the life and work of the school this danger is altogether avoided.

7. The existence of every community carries with it the right to enforce the observance of its laws. The aim of the school in such constraint of outward conduct is to influence the will. The principles we have just considered are those on which

**Publicity ;**

**Breadth.**

**Enforcement  
of Law :**



it must act if it would secure this end. But the end is attained gradually and never altogether perfectly. There is always, then, a call for outward regulation of conduct. Offences against school law will arise, and the school must repress these or its work will become impossible and its society an anarchy.

It is convenient to call all outward constraint 'Government'; and all educative influence on the will 'Discipline.' Government may be an instrument of discipline, but only in so far as it operates on the will of the child. Still, government is needful even when it does not so operate. The younger the children the more do they require government, for the greater is their need for specific guidance and the less is their power of self-control. No more absurd doctrine was ever preached than that government should increase with years; so that the younger the children the more should they be left to their own guidance—or had we not better say, lack of guidance?

Government is not cruelty; it is the truest kindness, and, indeed, is welcomed by children so long as it is kept within judicious bounds. The truth of the matter is that as the years increase government should become needless and the instrument of discipline be more the influence of the educator on the reason and will of the educated. Even discipline itself should in time become unnecessary, and yield its place to self-discipline. But this stage cannot be reached by the age of fourteen, or sixteen, or even eighteen; though, of course, the approach should become more and more rapid as the years increase. Unhappily, this is often ignored, and the school endeavours to turn out premature men and women at the ages of thirteen or fourteen. The result is seen in a growing and general want of self-control which is causing much searching of heart among many worthy folk.

Government, then, is insistence on obedience to law  
**Punishment.** whether the will of the governed consent  
or not. Happily, it generally does consent  
when the school is well organized and is officered by  
sympathetic and moderately wise teachers. Then govern-  
ment is an instrument of discipline. But even then offences  
will come; for childhood is thoughtless and impulsive, and  
its wrong doings, if venial, are apt to be frequent. The  
reaction of government on offence is punishment, and its  
justification is to be found in the fact that it *is* a reaction  
of the school society on that which would impede its proper  
activity. The kinds of punishment and their appropriateness  
for various faults will be discussed in a later chapter.<sup>1</sup>  
Suffice it here to say that punishment explicitly appeals to  
the sentiment of fear. Now, fear is good so long as it is  
fear of evil. The fear of punishment is designed to develop  
into fear of committing the wrong which entails the punish-  
ment. When this is accomplished the evil is avoided, and,  
as a consequence, the punishment is escaped. Thus, punish-  
ment is most effective when it ceases to be actual. This  
is when the child has attained enough self-control to be  
independent of government in that part of his conduct.  
In other words, punishment is designed to lead to repent-  
ance, and repentance to amendment of life.

Looked at thus it is evident that punishment may be a  
considerable help to a child. He may even see this himself  
and desire punishment as a partial expiation of a fault  
which he recognises as serious and which he earnestly  
desires to amend. Thus, it may be doing him an injury  
to deprive him of the punishment due to his fault, and to  
which he has a right. No parent would be held unkind  
who insisted on his child's taking an unpleasant medicine  
necessary to cure some physical ill. Surely still less is he,

<sup>1</sup> See Chap. X.

or any other educator, unkind if he inflict unpalatable punishment on a child when he is convinced that it is just the moral medicine he needs. The child is impulsive, but if the occasion to do a wrong deed recalls the unpleasant consequences which experience of past punishment has taught him will follow, he is given pause; his conscience is aroused, his will has time to put forth its full strength, and the contrary impulse is hindered and lessened by fear of the punishment.

The evil of punishment is not in its existence but in the unwisdom with which it is often inflicted. Punishment is, as we have said, moral medicine; and medicine can no more be the food of the soul than of the body. Punishment should, therefore, be infrequent, and should be restricted to cases in which its assistance in enforcing law is necessary.

Again, it should always be a social matter, and never the reply of an individual governor to a personal affront. Too often in practice it expresses the anger of parent or teacher at some act which, though annoying, is not wrong. A child, for example, is punished by its mother for breaking, purely by accident, a valuable ornament, while really serious faults are ignored. The measure of such punishment is not the child's fault but the parent's annoyance.

On quite as unworthy lines is the punishment of children in school for intellectual ineptitude, physiological shortcomings, atmospheric conditions, or unsatisfactory states of the teacher's nerves or digestion. A wrong estimate of the fault is at the root of all bad punishment whether it be bad in amount, in kind, or in occasion. Let one of the fundamental laws of the school be that in every case the teacher should make quite sure of the facts, as sure as possible as to what moved the child to do the wrong act,

and then put the most favourable construction possible on the whole case. Of course, this law would not be promulgated among the pupils as it refers not to their conduct but to that of the teachers. But the teachers should recognise that it is one of the most direct corollaries from the fundamental principle of justice.

8. The need for government implies that the child is dependent upon others for guidance. The aim of education is to fit him to guide himself. The connecting link is discipline. Discipline is determination of will, as government is determination of conduct. Of course, the former determination always involves the latter, though the latter does not necessarily imply the former. Still it may carry the former with it, and then government is itself an instrument of discipline. This can only take place when the exercise of government is accepted by the governed as the enforcement of a law which, though broken, is recognised as right, and, consequently, as morally binding. In this recognition we have disciplinary influence on will.

It is evident that in a school the teacher governs directly, though in exercising authority he acts not simply for himself, but as the representative of the whole school community. The school, in the ultimate analysis, governs itself through its head. But only in the ultimate analysis. The attempt to make a school community directly govern itself as a kind of republic negates the very idea of education as the direction of the young by the more mature. It is only in the sense that the school laws are inherent in the nature of the school as a community that it can be said to govern itself. It is the origin of its own law; but it administers that law through an executive officer to whom the very nature of its constitution gives very extensive powers.



The corporate nature of the school life must still be borne in mind when influence on the pupils' wills is being considered. For, indeed, that life is the great moulding agent. We have already seen that school years are those in which a child is most influenced by his companions. From them he borrows ways of looking at school matters. He imitates their attitude towards the teachers, towards the lessons, towards the games; he accepts their standard of schoolboy honour, and, as a rule, he acts upon that rather than upon the teacher's exhortations when the two are not in accord. It is doubtful if a teacher ever yet convinced a decent boy who was not a prefect that to report to him the wrong deeds of a school-fellow was to fulfil a righteous duty, and not to be a mean and contemptible sneak. Rather does such an attempt cause the boy to classify the teacher in a way the latter would not regard as complimentary.

The teacher, then, can exercise but little influence in direct opposition to the general opinion of the school. School tradition is powerful, and even so strong a reformer as Arnold may find it largely neutralise his efforts when it is opposed to them. There is only one way of meeting such a case—the school opinion must be changed. Without its general concurrence there may be government but there can be little real discipline.

The failure to recognise this and the regarding of discipline as essentially a personal relation between master and individual scholar has often led to a limitation of discipline to government, and has found the perfection of school discipline in a repression of all individual initiative, in an exaggerated culture of immobility, in a reduction of human children as far as possible to marionettes who dance only when the strings are pulled by the teacher, who, on his side, apparently takes the drill-sergeant as his

model and the barrack-yard as his school ideal. No more untrustworthy test of discipline can be found than such a machine-like ordering of outward conduct.<sup>1</sup> The human mind spontaneously tends to reject the influence of one who pushes his interference into every trivial detail of behaviour. Moreover, in activity so externally ordered there is left no room for individual judgment as to what to do. So the habitude is formed of doing nothing in school matters which is not explicitly ordered. Out of school it is quite another thing. There no such regulation exists, and, as a consequence, the child follows every impulse, and, in his reaction against undue restraint, those impulses attract him most which have a spice of lawlessness about them. No more successful culture-ground of the hooligan exists than the school in which reigns a strict martinet government, into which no warmth of human sympathy is allowed to enter lest it should relax that wonderful 'order' which delights the foolish and saddens the wise.

The school as a community is, then, the fount of discipline as of government. Indeed, it exerts its discipline much more directly than it does its government. Or, conversely, the teacher governs directly, but he disciplines mainly indirectly through his inspiration of the school tone. For, ultimately, the school tone will reflect his if he is fit to be its head. The really good disciplinarian is he who can infuse into the school as a whole his own general attitude towards life and its duties. To do this demands wisdom and strength and tact. But unless it is done the school is but a poor place of education. A really weak teacher not only fails to maintain his personal authority but, to the extent of his weakness, he prevents his school from being a place of true education at all. For

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the examples on pp. 11-12.

as each scholar is young and needs guidance, so it is with the whole scholar community. Left to themselves, children are sure to go wrong, and they are certainly not being educated, that is, trained up in the way they should go. "A few boys are incorrigibly idle, and a few incorrigibly eager for knowledge; but the great mass are in a state of doubt and fluctuation; and they come to school for the express purpose, not of being left to themselves—for that could be done anywhere—but that their wavering tastes and propensities should be decided by the intervention of a master."<sup>1</sup>

The recognition, then, of the primary importance of the school tone as an instrument of discipline in no way lessens the teacher's responsibility but rather increases it. "As is the teacher, so is the school," and the wise direction of a force which works so indirectly demands even more skill than does the exercise of that direct personal influence which he has also to bring to bear, from time to time, on individual pupils, and which forms one of the most important of the connecting links between his own personality and the general tone of the school.

Here we are met by the possibility of a danger the opposite to that of the weak disciplinarian—the danger of the overwhelming disciplinarian. The really good disciplinarian is not he whose personality so dominates those of his pupils, that the latter are but pale reflexions of himself. Each individual spiritual life is sacred, and it can attain its full strength only on the condition that it grows in freedom—a freedom marked, it is true, by limits, but by limits which in themselves help it, as they make it easier for the will to attain control over the passions. Indeed, the too dominating personality, who imposes himself without restraint on his pupils, so that nothing in

<sup>1</sup> Sydney Smith: *op. cit.*

their lives and thoughts is immune from his well-meant interference, is in his way more antagonistic to spiritual growth than is the moral jelly-fish whose influence can scarcely be said to exist, except in the negative form determined by the contempt, more or less tinged with kindly tolerance, with which his pupils regard him. The truly great disciplinarian is he who, being strong, yet restrains his strength; who has learnt when *not* to interfere; who has a profound faith in the ultimate triumph of a powerful though indirect influence, and very little faith in the worth of continuous direction; who reigns as much, and governs as little, as possible. With such a head, supported by like-minded colleagues, the discipline of a school becomes a real unified power making persistently and consistently for a clearly conceived and noble aim, imposing no fetters on the true freedom of the scholars, but helping them to become, slowly yet surely and continuously, independent of its support.

Not only in the school itself is the power of such a discipline operative. It is felt in that freer community life of games, excursions, and school societies which is, happily, being gradually more widely recognised as essential to a good school. Further than this: it abides with the child as a directing and restraining influence when he is away from the school altogether; and even after he has ceased to be a pupil it has not only modified his personality by forming habitudes, but as a grateful memory and a continuous affection it still helps him on his way.

The teacher is, however, not the only formative influence in the school tone. Every pupil contributes his share, sometimes imperceptible, sometimes very obvious and considerable. Common opinion influences him, but he also influences it. How could it be otherwise when at any given time the school

**Tone and  
Individuals.**



tone is actualised in the thoughts, feelings, and opinions of the scholars? Evidently, the degree to which the common tone is modified by any one individual depends on the relation between its strength and that of his personality. The tradition of an old established boarding school, especially when the pupils remain till they are on the verge of manhood, is comparatively permanent, though it is always yielding more or less to strong personalities especially when these are heroes in the school sports. The younger the pupils, and the shorter their general stay at the school, the more easily does the tone change under the influence of a popular and strong-willed pupil. And, of course, the smaller the school, the more liable it is to such changes. Schools are, as it were, little States, with a very large democratic element, and, as Plato and Aristotle long ago pointed out, small democracies are very apt to be transmuted into tyrannies. So a strong personality among the pupils may be a serious danger if his influence be antagonistic to that of the master; for the rest of the scholars may follow him like a flock of sheep, and the teacher's discipline be negated. There is still much truth in Crabbe's picture of

“ the Tyrant-Boy, whose sway  
All hearts acknowledge ; him the crowds obey :  
At his command they break through every rule ;  
Whoever governs, he controls the school :  
'Tis not the distant Emperor moves their fear,  
But the proud Viceroy who is ever near.  
Verres could do that mischief in a day,  
For which not Rome, in all its power, could pay ;  
And these boy-tyrants will their slaves distress,  
And do the wrongs no master can redress :  
The mind they load with fear ; it feels disdain  
For its own baseness ; yet it tries in vain  
To shake th' admitted power ;—the coward comes again :

'Tis more than present pain these tyrants give,  
Long as we've life some strong impressions live;  
And these young ruffians in the soul will sow  
Seeds of all vices that on weakness grow."<sup>1</sup>

The task of discipline is, therefore, different according to the character of the group on which and through which it has to work. A few children of strong initiative who have been well trained at home render the task easy. Similar children from bad homes make it very difficult. A sudden influx of pupils of different social status from the rest of a class and with a different kind of tone of their own brought from a different type of school and expressing a different estimate of school life, may entirely alter the problem of discipline for the class teacher and modify it for the whole school.

Thus it is seen that not only does the school community act on the individual and modify him, but he also reacts on it and modifies it. There is continual interchange of influence. The tone of a school or of a class is not a constant quantity. We often speak of it as an atmosphere, but it is not nearly as stable in its composition as is the physical atmosphere. Of course, the individual is the outcome of his innate tendencies and temperament modified by the influences amid which his life has been passed, and is being passed. So it is important that the teacher should so act on individuals that he may add to the moulding force of a good general tone. Especially must he watch new-comers, so that he may seize every opportunity to secure their active acceptance and hearty support of the established healthy way of looking at things. Thus he will do what in him lies to secure the permanence of the tone he values.

<sup>1</sup> *The Borough*, Letter 24.

Even when the teacher's discipline works indirectly through the general tone, it acts on individuals. In no other way can it act, for discipline is influence on will, and will is of the essence of personality. But when the teacher brings his influence to bear directly on individuals—and this is no unimportant part of his functions—the utmost tact and sympathetic insight into disposition and character are needed. For children vary very much, and the teacher must deal with each after his kind. Plato called oratory “the art of enchanting the soul,” and surely that is exactly the task the educator has to set himself to accomplish. So we may apply to him Plato's deduction: “Therefore, he who would be an orator has to learn the differences of human souls—they are so many and of such a nature, and from them come the differences between man and man . . . such and such persons are affected by this or that kind of speech in this or that way. . . . He who knows all this, and knows also when he should speak and when he should refrain . . . when, I say, he knows the times and seasons of all these things, then, and not till then, he is a perfect master of his art.”<sup>1</sup>

An examination of such differences would take us far into the domain of psychology, and even so could never approach completeness. Much as we hear of “the average child” he really does not exist. No child is an average, after all. Each one differs, to a greater or less degree, from every other who has ever been born, or ever will be born, into the world. The teacher's study must be essentially a study of individuals, just as the physician has to study each separate case before he can treat it. A mere acquaintance with the nature of the disease is not enough for him. Far less is it sufficient for the educator, who has to

<sup>1</sup> *Phaedrus*, 271-272 (Jowett's Translation).

try to keep young souls in health as well as to seek to apply the appropriate cure to the disease of sin. Still, these human problems do group themselves more or less round types, and a brief glance at the most marked of these may not be devoid of value, so long as it be remembered that they are only types and abstractions.

Differences show themselves, of course, in many ways, but those of most importance from the point of view of discipline are probably of three chief kinds:

The first is the distinction between children of strong social tendencies, who readily identify themselves with the common life and opinion, and find their chief pleasure in social activities, and children who are inclined to stand aloof from their fellows, who make few friends, and consequently have little influence. The former of these do not aspire to be innovators; the latter have not the power.

The second is that between children of strong initiative, full of restless life, and always seeking a new vent for their energies, and children of a more passive and imitative nature, as truly born to be followers as the others are to be leaders.

The third is that between children of good moral tone, and children who, from innate deficiencies or evil training or both, have little or no moral sense. Either of these may be among the leader class, and the teacher's most difficult task is when a leader is also a centre of moral contagion. Duty to the school may demand expulsion, just as amputation may be the only way of dealing with a gangrened limb. But that is, of course, an acknowledgment that in this case discipline has failed. Moreover, however necessary it may be, expulsion is not always practicable; for, most unwisely, this power is too often taken out of the Head-master's hands.

On consideration of these broad distinctions it would



seem that the teacher should direct his energies especially to winning over those meant by nature to be leaders. If they are good as well as strong and energetic this will be comparatively easy, if the teacher be not tactless; for such pupils are already predisposed to join all the forces in the school which make for righteousness. When a boy is both evil and strong the teacher should still remember that he is young and not wholly corrupt. So he should seek diligently for the one fertile spot, in which he may sow the good seed, and having sown it be very watchful and not shrink from any form of influence or government that will prevent the evil weeds from choking the tender plant of right purpose.

For a good school does not mean one in which offences are absent. The attempt to secure this always leads to so minute a supervision of conduct that no scope is given for the growth of personal initiative. Even so, the thoughts of the heart cannot be controlled, and there is grave danger of the formation of the double personality of which we have already spoken,<sup>1</sup> and that without true strength of character.

Nor would a state of entire absence of temptation be desirable even were it attainable. Strength develops through conflict, and virtue cannot grow if there be nothing to resist. So long as the general school opinion is healthy the teacher need not be depressed because faults are still committed. And of course one should not desire that a precocious prudence should keep children out of every possible scrape. It is the general habitude and the broad trend of will that the school wishes to train; and, especially with such imperfect beings as children, the free exercise of will must sometimes lead to unfortunate results, both

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 19-20.

from mistakes as to the worth of the end sought and from insufficient knowledge and insight to see the means which will lead to its attainment. Nor should the claims of individuality be forgotten. The attempt to watch over every act of every child so as to exclude all occasion of evil necessarily leads to the cultivation of a uniformity of mediocrity. If we escape vice, with at least equal certainty we escape virtue.

The Head-teacher's influence, then, should be felt throughout the school and should be brought  
**Summary.** to bear in special modes on individual pupils as occasion may demand, but it should be felt most continuously as re-incarnated in the pupils themselves. That this may be secured he must be seconded loyally by his colleagues, and the discipline will be all the more effective if it be reinforced by the influence of the parents. But the most fundamental conditions of all are that it should be directed by the great principles of morality ; regulated by the essential laws of school life which embody those principles in the special form adapted to the specific purpose for which the school exists ; and exercised with justice, with sympathy, and with tact, by a teacher whose own personality both attracts and inspires the young souls committed to his care.

## CHAPTER VII.

### EXERCISE OF DISCIPLINE.

**Relation  
between  
Discipline,  
Government  
and Influence.** 1. In the first chapter we considered the general nature of moral training and, in those which followed, the characteristics of the product it aims at securing. We then turned our attention to the nature of the school as an organized community the essential function of which is the education of its pupils, that is the fitting of them for their future life by the regulation of their present life. To be effective such regulation must affect the whole nature of the child, not only his intellect through teaching but also his bodily conduct, his feelings and his will. Of these the training of the will is fundamental and should permeate the whole of the life and work of the school. But just because it should do this it should not, usually, be made the ostensible object sought. Will cannot be trained abstractly: it can only be trained where it is found, that is, in the actual occupations and interests of life.

**Discipline and  
Government.** All training of the will comes under the general term Discipline. But in so far as the will is moved the conduct is determined. Hence the outward sign of discipline is found in conduct. But conduct may also be regulated directly by laws and commands which as a last resort may be enforced

by penalties for disobedience. Such regulation when it stands alone is educationally disastrous as it cultivates the organized hypocrisy of acting in one way under compulsion while the will and desires point in an opposed direction.<sup>1</sup>

Government, or direct regulation of outward conduct, therefore, does not coincide with discipline. Even in the best schools there is need, at times, to enforce the unwilling observance of law. But that should always be exceptional, and the better the school the more exceptional it will be. In a good school government is, as a rule, an instrument of discipline. In other words, laws and commands still impose certain lines of conduct and behaviour, and so far we have government. But the laws and commands are willingly accepted by the pupils, so through them the authority of the school determines the will, and so far we have discipline. Discipline and government, therefore, are not of necessity opposed nor are they in any way incompatible. They overlap; and the more efficient the school as a place of education the less of government is there which is outside the scope of discipline.

Even when this is thoroughly secured, however, there is not coincidence between the two. All school government may be merged in discipline: that is the ideal at which to aim. But all discipline is never confined to government.<sup>2</sup> Discipline is influence on the will which determines conduct in cases in which no definite law or command is operative; it determines it in spheres of life outside the whole range of school government. Government is but an occasional determinant of conduct, for only at times is there a definite consciousness of law or command and then generally when a temptation to break the one or to

<sup>1</sup> Cf. pp. 19-20.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. pp. 143-146.



infringe the other is felt. And without a definite and explicit consciousness of law or command there is no direct regulation of conduct by government. In so far as the conduct is determined by law without any explicit consciousness of that determination, there is indeed government but it is acting as an agent of discipline ; the real power is discipline.


On the other hand discipline does not coincide with influence. Every person is influenced in all kinds of ways by those with whom he is brought into contact, by his circumstances, by occurrences in the physical world. In short, anything which enters into his experience may influence his will by moulding his purposes and stimulating or deadening certain forms of desire, and so may determine his conduct. A sudden change of fortune—an access of wealth or a descent into poverty—the loss of a parent or the acquisition of a wife, may, for example, alter in many ways not only a man's material mode of life but the objects of his pursuit and the aims of his endeavour. So a child's will is influenced by all his surroundings. They give him the range within which he must find the objects on which he sets his desires and they limit the scope of his activities. Influence is a moulding of life ; and such moulding may be conscious and purposive, unconscious and unintentional, and even merely physical. It is only the first of these which is educative ; for education is training, or the organization of effort directed towards a predetermined end. This educative influence, however it may be exercised, whatever form it may take, is discipline.

Discipline, therefore, is a part of influence but not the whole of it ; just as government is a part of discipline but not the whole of it. There will certainly be influence, and

most probably there will be government, which lie outside the range of discipline. Over both of these the educator should keep a watchful eye. The latter is largely within his control; it mainly rests with him to decide how far government shall extend. The former is much less within his power to determine. But the need for parents and teachers to be on guard against influences adverse to their training becoming operative in the life of any under their care is obvious. At times they can remove such influences by their own action, but more often they have to meet them by a stronger and more direct exercise of their own discipline.<sup>1</sup>

Discipline is, therefore, the directive factor of the educative process. It is to the soul what logic or geometry is to the mind, or gymnastic<sup>2</sup> to the body: it aims at bracing

<sup>1</sup> The relations of government, discipline and influence may be represented diagrammatically—



We can state the relations implied by this diagram in the following propositions:

- |                     |  |
|---------------------|--|
| (1) Some G is not D | <i>i.e.</i> , Some government is not disciplinary.             |
| (2) Some G is D =   | <i>i.e.</i> , Some government is disciplinary.                 |
| Some D is G         | <i>i.e.</i> , Some discipline is exercised through government. |
| (3) All D is I =    | <i>i.e.</i> , All discipline is influence.                     |
| Some I is D         | <i>i.e.</i> , Some influence is disciplinary.                  |
| (4) Some I is not D | <i>i.e.</i> , Some influences are not disciplinary.            |

<sup>2</sup> That is, in the wider Greek sense of 'physical culture,' not in the narrower modern use of 'gymnastics.'

the will. But it has been seen that self-direction grows out of external direction; self-discipline out of the discipline of the home and the school. External discipline is good only when it does lead to the development of self-control.

2. But discipline though it works on individuals is applied to masses. In this characteristic lurks the danger of resting satisfied with the outward and visible signs of discipline even when the inward and spiritual grace, which alone makes for the formation of character, is absent. For certainly government is necessary apart from its value as an instrument of discipline. It is needed in every community for the maintenance of law and order; and law and order are necessary for the comfort and convenience of the individual members of the body and for the success of its corporate work.

External control becomes gradually less necessary in proportion as the power of self-control increases, and it is for this reason that in schools, prisons, or barracks—communities of immature, perverted, or ill-educated persons—external control seems to play so large a part. And, as we have seen, such control may be something much more valuable than appears on the surface: it may be welcomed by the will. To the extent to which this is so the community is educative. When the will was at first not only not acquiescent but absolutely antagonistic to the external control, then to the extent to which it is led to accept the control, the influence of the community is not only formative but reformatory. This should be an essential aim even of prison government; needless to say it must be the aim of the school in its dealings with a refractory pupil. But the general process is the same with the individual who starts with direct opposition and with him who only

begins with neutrality ; it differs in duration and difficulty but in every case it aims at inducing the child to accept the law of duty.<sup>1</sup>

The aims of school government, then, may be briefly stated :

First, its aim is to secure in the class-room such conditions as will not interrupt the processes of  
**Convenience**  
**in Teaching ;** teaching and learning.

There is no fear that teachers will ever lose sight of this aim. At the present time most of the failure and most of the ineffectiveness of our schools may be traced to the fact that masters and boys have only this view of school government. In broad, general terms teachers will admit the wider aims, but it is an academic admission rather than a vital belief. Their actual practice is cramped and narrow, boys are punished and accept punishment not with a view to their moral improvement, but because of incidental annoyances to the teacher for which they are responsible. To check such annoyances is, of course, not unreasonable, provided that the deeper purposes be continually borne in mind. This wider outlook characterizes the life and work of the best schoolmasters, men with wide and lofty aims doing petty tasks because they further those aims. The bad schoolmaster may be simply the man who does the petty tasks but lacks the lofty aim.

But government has a further function of training the  
**Formation**  
**of Habits ;** pupils in habits useful for their own sake apart from their disciplinary value. Habits of punctuality, industry, attention, mental alertness, tidiness, cleanliness, and decorous behaviour, may all be the outcome of consistently administered government. But unless the government be disciplinary the formation of the corresponding habitudes will be impossible.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Ch. III.



Thirdly, it is of value as a training of character. In the pupil, submission to external control aims at cultivating ready obedience to command and recognition of his own position as a subordinate member of an organized community. This is to say no more than that discipline through government teaches discipline.

**Training of Pupils' Characters ;**

And this consideration brings us to a fourth possible aim of disciplinary government. It is in matters connected with discipline that the relation between master and boy is most intimate and most personal. In discussing such matters the master is compelled to define most clearly the relation between himself and the boy, and the relation of both to the community. It is when such relations are defined that they begin to have a practical effect on conduct, and discipline through government may thus be seen to have an aim connected not with the boys' conduct only but with the masters' as well. The teachers of a well disciplined school must benefit by the rule under which they live and which they help to maintain. The maxim that we learn by teaching is true no less of the lessons of life and conduct than it is of the purely intellectual knowledge of the classroom or the lecture-theatre.

**Training of Teachers' Characters.**

3. Having discussed from the practical standpoint the purpose of disciplinary government, let us proceed similarly to examine the manner in which it is exercised. Every teacher of any experience will have probably his own ideals of government for its own sake, and so it is not unlikely that there will be a particular 'atmosphere' of conduct in which each teacher will best be able to do his work. With some it may be a genial spirit of comradeship, with others an attitude of tense intellectuality,

**Disciplinary Government.**

**It depends on the Teacher,**

with others a rigid deportment of body. Some teachers appear to do excellent work in conditions that would fill the martinet with horror and disgust; while there are others who can teach only in absolute silence; the scraping of a foot or the clatter of a pencil "gets on their nerves" and destroys alike the harmony of the class-room and the efficiency of the work.

Boys also have their own standards of order. There is a limit at each end of the scale beyond which  
and on the Pupils. the boy feels that it is preposterous to go.

With girls the tolerable minimum and the intolerable maximum are both higher, but they do exist, and it must be borne in mind that nothing is gained and much is lost by attempting to pass either extreme.

These cautions are especially needed in those cases where men teach girls, and still more where women teach boys who are beyond the years of infancy.

Speaking quite generally, boys are more reasonable and girls more obedient, and it follows that a girl will be readily shocked at an absence of restraint which a boy will take for granted as a natural thing. If a master is teaching a class of girls he is naturally inclined to adopt a standard of order suited to boys, and it is not uncommon in such cases for the girls to take advantage of the circumstances to do something which they, with one accord, would recognise as 'naughty' but which the teacher does not check because he takes a different view. But whether the 'naughty' act—such, for example, as opening a desk without express permission though it has never been expressly forbidden—be really one which the teacher regards as an offence or not, the fact that the class considers it to be so makes it undesirable to permit it. The teacher must, therefore, either modify his standard to suit the particularly tender conscience of the class with which

he has to deal, or else modify the girls' standard of judging such behaviour. If he neglect to do so the children do with impunity what *is* wrong for them, because they believe it to be wrong, and his government loses, at once, its disciplinary value.

Similarly, where women teach boys allowance should be made for the boys' greater abhorrence of detailed control. If a child wishes to refer to a book reasonably or to replace an old nib with a new one, the boy is apt to resent the petty restraint of being obliged to ask permission, but the girl usually depends on such permission at all times. In short, the boy does it, the girl asks if she may do it.

There is also a necessary variation of the standard and methods of order which arises from the consideration of the age of the pupils. Certain forms of fidgeting which must be tolerated in the infant school or kindergarten should be checked gradually in the preparatory or in the elementary school and excluded altogether in the higher standards or in the secondary school. And, in the secondary school, methods effective in lower forms or in the Upper Sixth would often be perfectly inapplicable to the requirements of the elderly people of small ability who become the sediment of the Fourth Form or are drafted bodily into a 'Shell' or 'Remove.'

The social position of the pupils is another factor determining the standard of order. The easiest classes to handle, in spite of their large size, are probably the fifth and sixth standards of elementary schools in a good district and the classes in municipal secondary schools. Next in difficulty to these are the classes in the best type of preparatory school, then the budding hooligans of a slum school, and finally, for a new master, the middle forms of a good public school. Probably no difficulties of government are comparable to those of a new master

who begins his professional career in the 'Shell' of a large Public School.

Having regard, then, to the manifold difficulties arising from these varying factors in the work, what advice can be given, or what rules laid down, for the guidance of those who are entering the profession?

**The Teacher's  
Standard of  
Order.**

We have seen that the nature of the order ultimately secured depends on the master himself, and on the age, the sex, and the social position, of the pupils. It may, therefore, be recommended that the teacher who is entering the profession, or who is beginning work in a new school, should first consider the particular conditions of these external influences as they obtain in the school to which he is going, that he should interpret them by the light of his own conception of discipline, and so should fix a standard of order for the particular class he is about to teach.

In the formation of this standard he may be guided by his own experience, but it must be in harmony with the general standard of the school. He may be fortunate enough to remember a class in which he was well and happily governed as a boy; or it may be that he can only construct his standard as a contrast to that of those classes wherein he was too rigidly governed or governed not at all. But even if he can only fix his standard as an imaginary construction of his own, each teacher should be able to enter the school with some picture in his mind of the condition of affairs that he wishes to be prevalent in his class-room. As he grows in experience and power he may probably find that his standard is too strict or too lax. In either case he should quietly and unostentatiously modify it, being careful that no sudden change of standard suggest to his class that its new teacher is a person of vacillating will or of uncertain temper.



It is, however, wise for a beginner to aim at securing a quality of government somewhat more rigid at first than that which he conceives to be the most suitable for permanent use. His boys do not yet know and trust him, nor he them, in a way that will define their future relations, and it will be better for both the teacher and the class to know that there is a reserve of strength; for the teacher to know that he is able to tighten the rein if necessary, and for the pupils to recognise that the liberty allowed them is due to the good-will and not to the incompetence of their teacher. He will be better advised if he first get the class well in hand and then allow greater liberty, than if he realise too low a standard of discipline and then be compelled to make demonstrations of power at irregular intervals.

Although, as it has been shown, the standard of order must depend on individual ideals and capacity, yet it may be a help to the formation of a reasonable standard if we consider the effects of the extremes in each direction.

**Examination  
of Extreme  
Cases :**

The extreme of lax order may be shortly dismissed. Few will be disposed to defend it, either as a training of character or for its effect on teaching. With it no good work is ever done and its effect on the boys is obviously detrimental. The only considerations that might induce a beginner not lacking in strength of will to adopt too low a standard would be those of saving himself trouble and of gaining the affection of his boys. Both these considerations are mistaken. The troubles arising from careless control are far greater and far more serious than is the unconscious effort expended in maintaining good order or even than the effort consciously put forth to secure it. There is no economy of effort in

attempting an impossible task ; it does not save trouble to try to teach arithmetic in a bear-garden.

The second consideration arises from a mistaken notion of good nature. Boys will readily ascribe to weakness what may have arisen from good nature, and they will probably describe as "a fool" the man who aims by such means at securing that highest praise of boys, the appellation "a decent chap." He may possibly obtain the affection of his class but it will be an unprofitable affection without the essential foundation of respect. It is often an affection of mushroom growth and of short life, and compares with the liking for the man who "stands drinks" rather than with the love, reverence and gratitude for the man who is able by his personal influence to save the drunkard from his own weakness. And it should be noted that any such affection will be in spite of his weak government, not by reason of it.

Further, it is a mistake to suppose that boys or girls prefer even a single lesson during which they are ill-controlled. Where teaching is skilful and attention to it is secured by firm control time passes quickly and not unpleasantly. But if order be absent there will be little attention given to the matter in hand and the pupils will find means for their own amusement. They readily follow the line of least resistance and, if sufficient interest can be derived from listening to what is being said, they will listen, but if not they will rely upon their own ingenuity to find occupation which will dispel the tedium of several hours' confinement to a class-room, and occupations devised with this intent are apt to be disturbing and disorderly.

The extreme of rigid government is less obviously bad, but it is bad nevertheless. Boys are punished  
**Rigidity.** by reproof, impositions, detention, or caning, for mere involuntary movements or changes of position

which are by no means symptomatic of idleness or wandering attention. The master who has his class in such control is usually proud of his "discipline," as he fondly calls it, and flatters himself that in *his* class-room at least there is strict attention to business from beginning to end of school.

Such a man probably has little real sympathy with boys, and therefore does not realise, or if he realises does not care, that the boys are thoroughly uncomfortable all day and physically very tired at the end of it. He goes to school to work and he expects the same amount of work from his class. But it would probably affect him profoundly if he could realise that it is not in such circumstances that the best work is done, for attention is divided between the lesson and the maintenance of the required immobility; that his boys, therefore, do not in fact learn so much nor work so hard as the boys in neighbouring class-rooms which he would consider undisciplined bear-gardens. If he imagine that a boy can keep his attention continuously fixed for a whole morning on lessons, and that absence of movement signifies absence of wandering of mind, let him examine his own experience of listening to an academic lecture or to a long sermon. He may not fidget much, but his mind will wander to topics far remote from the subject of the lecture or sermon, unless the matter be unusually interesting to him and the form in which it is set forth attractive. He may find himself thinking of his last round at golf or of his engagements for the afternoon, or, if he be married, of the need for a new stair-carpet or for children's boots, and he will only bring his attention back to the subject of the lecture by an effort of will. Now when we consider the greater length of the school day and the greater immaturity of children's minds, the possibility of securing continuous undivided attention

for any great length of time is seen to dwindle to vanishing point. In the ordinary class-room, where there is no undue restraint, wandering attention can instantly be observed and recalled. If a boy is becoming exceedingly weary of a dull lesson he will be tempted to look at the clock or at his watch to see how much longer it must be endured, if he is thinking of the passing motor-car or the coming cricket match he will probably wish to look out of the window at the one or to speak of the other to his neighbour. In the *well* disciplined class the boy will not be restrained by fear from expressing either of these desires in action, and the wise teacher, while regretting that the boy has yielded to temptation, may yet welcome the symptom as an aid to his diagnosis and treatment of the disease. If the class shows signs of boredom by looking at the clock, he will realise that his teaching has become flat and unattractive, and he will either modify the teaching or provide the class with more profitable work to occupy them; if a boy glances at the passing motor-cycle or is seen to speak to his neighbour, a question or two addressed to him personally will recall his attention to the present work, and divert it from the extraneous attraction.

It must, however, be clearly understood that it is only the symptom and not the disease which the good disciplinarian will welcome. We are not, of course, advocating the ridiculous doctrine, already condemned, that the child's inclination or impulse is to be the only guide to his conduct. The function of government, as we have seen, is to create self-discipline, and the boy must be taught to control his impulses and, by controlling them, to concentrate his attention. The diseases to be cured are self-indulgence and ill-manners, and the judicious governor will use his influence, and support it either by reproof or



by punishment as expressions of his displeasure, to train the child's will in the directions of concentration of thought and of self-restraint. But the wise teacher will not permit an atmosphere of terror in his class-room which would check the symptom without curing, or even while aggravating, the complaint.

In the class of the martinet none of these symptoms are visible. The boy who is bored does not risk punishment by looking at the clock, but sits with "eyes front" and the question recurring in his mind "When is this blather going to stop?" The other, interested in motor-cycles, dare not satisfy his curiosity by a glance, but, nevertheless, hears the sound and ponders for several minutes on the important question whether it proceeded from one cylinder or from two. The third does not gossip, but with ingenious secrecy finds opportunity for writing his question and for passing it, by a slow process involving a dozen boys, to the class cricket-captain, who replies in writing. The martinet would be aghast if he thought such a thing could happen in his form, but it does happen and, even if circumstances are favourable to the passing of notes, wastes some ten minutes or a quarter of an hour of the "strict attention to business" which he believes to be the invariable rule in his class. Nor is this the end of the evil. The habit of rigid deportment tends also to kill all enthusiasm and spontaneity in work. Even if a boy be attending chiefly to the lesson his mind is harassed sub-consciously by the feeling that he must not "let himself go." He feels that he may, in his desire to answer a question or in his interest in the narrative or description, adopt some forbidden posture and be punished for lolling or for standing without permission, and so he puts a restraint on his bodily movements which reacts harmfully on the natural activity of his mind. His desire for having credit for the

matter of his work is subdued by and subordinated to his fear of being snubbed or punished for the manner in which he offers it.

It will be seen, therefore, that ideal government lies somewhere between two extremes. Excess on the one side or on the other may be due in part to a want of balance in the teacher's conception of the relation between the intellectual and moral factors in education. If he attach too great importance to the intellectual aspect he may neglect the moral value of a friendly relation between himself and his pupils. Then he is apt to defeat even his intellectual ends by erring on the side of severity. On the other hand, if he look too exclusively on the moral aspect he may neglect the intellectual, and defeat his moral aim by indulgence instead of control, under the mistaken idea that any compulsion may lessen his influence with his pupils.

But all philosophic consideration of the purpose of disciplinary government, and all merely academic discussion of what it is, are of no avail to the schoolmaster or the schoolmistress who does not know how it is to be exercised. It may be well, therefore, to deal briefly with the means by which discipline may arise out of government and without which it is in a measure impossible.

Discipline being the name commonly applied to a certain relation, it follows that each of the related parties must contribute something towards it. It is a relation, in one aspect, of the child to the school-community; and the contributions in this case are inflexible justice combined with reasonable liberty and proper material conditions, granted by the school to the child, and, on the child's part, recognition of his subordinate position in the community, docility, willingness to work, and physical fitness to profit by the material conditions.

**Relations  
involved in  
Discipline.**

In another aspect discipline is a relation between the child and the teacher, and here the contribution of the teacher is his personality and the force of his will, to which the child responds with trust, obedience, and the will to please.

Yet a third aspect of discipline is that from which we regard it as a relation between the child and his work; and here we expect interest and a sense of duty to be contributed by the child, and the attractiveness of showing that the learning demanded is a means to a desired end to be a feature of the work. The recognition by the pupil that the work, even though distasteful, helps him to acquire a power which he sees to be worth having will carry him over the drudgery which is incidental in school lessons, as in all other work worth doing in this world.

To summarise these contributions on each side: we may expect from the child physical health, subordination, docility, and interest in his work; and from the other parties to school discipline we may expect a wholesome physical environment and a good tone in the school; firmness, kindness and impressive personality on the part of the teacher; and stimulating method in the teaching of the subjects of the curriculum.

Thus stated, it might appear to be a very simple matter; but in actual experience it is not unusual to find teachers with whom government is a real difficulty. Whence, then, does the difficulty arise? If our analysis of the factors of discipline be correct, such difficulty must arise from the failure on the part of one of the related parties to contribute to the relation which we aim at establishing; but, such is the prejudice of scholastic mankind, that one party only—the boy—is usually blamed by the master for the failure. If the difficulty arises from the defective ventilation or the

**Difficulties of  
Government.**

squalid and unattractive appearance of the classroom, or even from an established tradition of idleness or hostility among the boys, the school is to blame, but the boy is punished. If it arises from the weakness of character or from the insufferable dullness of the teacher, the teacher is to blame; but still the boy is punished. If, again, it arises from the tedium that results from a lesson of an hour and a half on one subject, or from a curriculum or time-table devised in such a way as to reduce the pupils' interest to a minimum, it may be said that the work is at fault; but yet again the boy is punished.

Failure in government may arise, and often does arise, from another cause,—the unsuitability of the teacher for his work. Teaching is a fine art, and no more moral stigma attaches to the man or woman who cannot attain success in it than to those who are incapable of becoming great executive musicians, sculptors, or painters. The giants in teaching will always be few as are the giants in the arts whose material is more manageable than the living souls in which the teacher works. Many can, however, attain a fair amount of skill and can do good craftsman's work even if it be not of the highest artistic worth. But some there are whose inborn nature quite unfits them for the management of children. Excellent in intention, zealous in endeavour, kindly in disposition, persevering in effort, they yet fail systematically even though they digest mentally all the manuals on discipline that were ever written and endeavour to carry out their precepts. They are, and will always remain, "round pegs in square holes," and the wisest thing for them to do is to recognise before it is too late that excellent pegs as they may be, and admirably fitted to stop circular holes, yet in the square holes in which they have placed themselves, they are, and ever will be, hopelessly out of place, and with much dis-



comfort to themselves will be woefully ineffective. Let them seek some other occupation even if they have to follow old Montaigne's advice and "go to make minced-pies."

But children are not impeccable, and the boy is not much less likely to be at fault than the teacher, the school, or the work. Cases do arise in which the boy fails to contribute his share of subordination and docility, or even, through the influence of his home surroundings, comes to school morally or physically unfit to profit by the system of school life and work; and in these cases he has to be "kept in order." But this keeping in order of recalcitrant boys is a small and merely instrumental part of the system of disciplinary government and not, as many teachers appear to believe, the whole of it.

Two points require some further elucidation in this consideration of disciplinary government. We have included obedience as an element in the relation on the boy's side, and this carries with it the implication of some fear. For, in the last resort, disobedience can only be met by repression. But we have made no explicit mention of punishment as the corresponding element in the other side of the relation. It must, however, be noted that fear is a part of the relation of the boy to the school rather than a part of his relation to the master. Any element of fear, as distinct from respect, in a personal relation implies some lack of confidence, and we have already made it clear that the ideal relation which the master should aim at establishing is that of perfect confidence in himself as a well-disposed, capable and experienced guide and friend. But the school-master has a double function to fulfil, as a man and as an officer. He is a man in personal contact with children entrusted to him, and must cultivate a personal relation

**Fear as a  
Factor of  
Discipline.**

with his boys untrammelled by the cold restraints of officialism, and authoritative mainly by virtue of his age and experience, very much as his relation is authoritative towards his nephews and nieces. But he is at the same time the fly-wheel in a big spiritual machine, working in contact with other wheels, of which the individual boys may be regarded as cogs, and driven by a power which is the school life and organization. In this capacity he becomes almost impersonal, and the class must have this idea of him, subordinate, it is true, to their knowledge of him and affection for him as a man, but present, none the less, and operating in a wholesome fear of his authority, or, to continue the metaphor, a fear of his inevitableness. He is a wheel that *must* turn, and that must crush any foreign body thrust in between itself and the cogs that engage with it. When a great machine is at rest no one will fear injury from any part of it; it is only the driving power which makes it formidable. And so, the boy should learn to regard his master as formidable only when he is directly representing the power of the whole system. Out of school he is to be regarded chiefly as an agreeable and sympathetic friend; in school he must at times sink this friendliness in a dealing with offences which is so impersonal and inflexible that it may even appear to the boy as relentless and almost unhuman.

Here, and here only, the element of fear may enter as a contributory factor into discipline; and then it is not the craven fear of physical pain, nor the mental panic of a weak will in opposition to a stronger, but rather that fear of the unknown which is akin to reverence.

As a corollary it may be seen that frequent demonstrations of power weaken government by removing this element of mystery, and further that the frequent use of severe punishments puts government on a lower plane by

converting a dignified fear into mere cowardice or fear of physical discomfort; that is, the government fails to be disciplinary.

The inclusion of punishment, also, as a contributory factor of disciplinary government may be accounted for in very much the same way as we have accounted for the inclusion of the element of fear. Punishment is the normal consequence of what is abnormal; it is not designed as a part of the normal working of the original machinery. It is a factor of discipline; but a factor which becomes operative only as a reaction upon a breach of law that cannot be treated otherwise.

We are fully aware that this conception of the place of punishment may appear visionary or ideal in view of its actual position in the practice of government in many existing schools; but we have also tried to show that punishment owes its present position largely to its use in correcting or covering faults in the relation of the boy to his surroundings which would be more efficiently and more justly corrected by modifying the surroundings instead of by punishing the boy. Punishment is often an admission of weakness; not infrequently a confession of failure.

It is an important feature of school discipline that it shall encourage or create a confidential relation between the pupils and their teacher. The responsibility of the schoolmaster does not end when the boy leaves school any more than the responsibility of the ship-builder ends on the day of the launch. Each is commissioned to construct a seaworthy vessel, competent to sail either in calm or in stormy seas, and each neglects his duty if he is content merely to build up a fairly handsome structure which will glide gracefully off the ways and keep afloat until the crowd has dispersed. In the storms of life, and especially in the

equinoctial gales of youth, the vessel is certain to receive many hard blows and to sustain trivial or serious injuries. Often it has to put back for repairs, and the shipyard at which it was built may well be one of those at which it seeks them. It is, therefore, the function of the school to provide a boy, in the person of each master who has any part in his training, with a "guide, philosopher and friend," willing and capable to give advice in time of necessity, either during or after the school period of the boy's life; and it is the duty of the master so to treat his boys that they will have confidence in his ability, and no fear of his unwillingness, to give such advice in a friendly and unofficial spirit.

This relation between boy and master is frequently destroyed by the too rigid government of the martinet, or by the fond indulgence of the lax ruler. The one by his habitual severity maims himself as a schoolmaster by rendering impossible a relation which is essentially a part of his life as an active member of the body to which he belongs; the other fails to inspire respect for his own character, and consequently does not appear to the boy as one competent to help in times of stress.

4. How then shall the earnest schoolmaster set about establishing the true relation? As we saw in the preceding chapter, he influences individuals through the tone of the mass. But he influences that tone through his dealings with individuals. Of his influence on the school tone we need add nothing to what was said in that place, except that at times of general wrong-doing a public address to the school, temperately and firmly given, may be in place. It need hardly be pointed out what a powerful instrument of discipline the sermons in the chapel of a Public School may be made.

**Disciplinary  
Influence.**



But with reference to his dealing with individuals a few more words may be said. Times must occur when the watchful master sees that individual boys are going wrong—are becoming idle or untruthful, or are contracting an undesirable, or even a vicious, habit. At other times, an individual—it may be an individual usually virtuous—falls into some special sin; if such sin be not met at once, a sinful habit and a wicked habitude may be formed.

**Personal  
Relations.**

The master must deal with such a case privately. Let him remember that mere reproof is not enough. In every boy's soul is some spot of goodness, and upon that the master must act. He cannot, therefore, meet sin unless he know his boys. Nor can he learn them just at the moment when he most requires that knowledge. Only a regular study of each individual can enable him to deal with the case when occasion demands. Knowing his boy, let him affectionately, yet gravely and earnestly, appeal to his better nature and show him in a few well chosen words—the fewer the better, so long as they are sufficient—the real nature of his fault; let him point out without exaggeration the consequences to which it must ultimately lead if it be continued: let him, in short, help the boy to see himself. For only so can his words have the effect he desires. He may apply the torch, but the inner light must be kindled and must burn in the boy's own soul.

But in addition to dealing with individual cases of wrong-doing, the master also brings his personal influence to bear in special ways on the elder boys of his school, especially upon those who are, as prefects, in a position of authority. With these his relations should be confidential and intimate. He should show that he regards them as fellow-workers with himself for the good of the school. He should make quite clear to them the functions they are

to fulfil, and he should show himself ready at all times to give them advice and to welcome and consider their suggestions. But he should not attempt to pry into every detail of their dealings with the other boys over whom they have authority. On the contrary, he should let them see that he has given them responsibility, and that he trusts them to bear the burden of it nobly and well. At the same time, he must hold himself ready to depose from office any one who shows himself unworthy or incompetent.

Similarly should the Head-master work with his assistants. While controlling the main lines both of government and of teaching, he should yet leave to his colleagues freedom in all details, should be ready to listen to suggestions for improvement in any part of the school life, and, by often seeking the advice of the members of his staff, should encourage them to seek his. So only can that unity of purpose and of effort be achieved without which a school cannot be a place of true discipline and training.

Above all, no schoolmaster can afford to neglect the tremendous force of personal example. **Personality of Teacher.** suggestion, conveyed by the characters of those with whom we are in daily contact, is a powerful factor for good or ill in the lives of the strongest; it affects the characters of adult men and women more surely than any element in their lives other than their own actions. "A man is known by his friends" is only half the truth; the other and more important half for our purpose is that a man is made by his friends. And children, whose characters are yet in the making, are naturally still more subject to such influence. They imitate quite unconsciously, apart from the conscious mimicry in which they delight; and the teacher, recognising that example is more powerful than precept, should see to it that it is also better.

It is not enough—though perhaps it is much—for a teacher to have a sentimental feeling that his example must be good. He should enquire also in what directions especially his good character will be most telling.

It is often assumed that the athlete can do no wrong, and we hear of head-masters who telegraph to Lord's Cricket Ground to engage a young man—with whom personally they are not acquainted—who has just made a 'century' or taken many wickets in the University match. Let it not be thought that we despise these achievements; doubtless they are the outcome of some specialised merit and of much specialised skill. But in themselves they can be no substitute for the sterling qualities of character which may be attributes of the man who is scholarly rather than athletic.

The best schoolmasters must have some degree of intellectual ability and culture. They must, in fact, know much more of their subject than they propose to teach. And this indicates that it is the duty of every teacher to keep moving. He must never stagnate. He must read, not only in his special subjects but for the general culture of his mind. He should be able to discuss, rationally and without prejudice, the topics of the day, he should know something—more than a mere smattering—of literature, art and nature, besides being thoroughly familiar with the background and position in general thought of the subjects of which he may be teaching only the rudiments.

And with this depth and width of knowledge there should be simplicity and sincerity. The teacher is not a mountebank to parade his vast erudition before gaping louts at a country fair. In fact, he should not recognise that he has great knowledge. Erudition has been called the grave of thought, and the teacher's aim must be not to become learned but to become serviceable to his boys.

For this reason he must have great reserve and self-control. His is not a business in which it is wise to put all the goods in the shop-window with their prices clearly marked. He must tempt the eye with a few good articles within easy reach of acquirement, and then, like a good salesman, lure the buyer to purchase things which at first he would have considered to be widely outside the resources of his purse. The child, who in this parable is the customer, would be driven away from intellectual sympathy with the ostentatious scholar, but he may be wooed and won for great intellectual acquirements if the teacher hold these in reserve. But they must be there for production when the necessity shall arise. Knowledge of rudiments is a good groundwork for the child, but the teacher must not rest content with rudiments as his own equipment.

With knowledge, with simplicity, sincerity, and reserve, the teacher should also have feeling, enthusiasm and cheerfulness. It is his duty not only to impart information, he must also provide inspiration. And inspiration was never yet derived from a jelly-fish, not even from the most thoughtful and scholarly of jelly-fishes. The teacher, therefore, in order to inspire must have enthusiasm for his work and must be able to express that enthusiasm—still, be it remembered, with reserve—by speech, by look, by gesture, so that it becomes contagious and is communicated to his class. An enthusiasm which is ill-controlled becomes, if intellectual, a fad, if moral, fanaticism. Either of these is sickening to those on whom it operates frequently, and each produces, sooner or later, a revulsion of feeling which the faddist or the fanatic would be the first to deplore. But when it is held in check, enthusiasm is a moving force which inspires our own lives and communicates the lust for progress to others. That was a good testimonial which was given by an American



business man to one of his late clerks "This young man kin be relied on not to slop over."

And this reference to business men leads us to the consideration of the last quality of a teacher which need be introduced here. Whether he be a scholar or an ignoramus, whether he be a man of fire or a man of mud, he must be methodical. Regular setting of work, regularity in writing reports or in issuing lists of marks, regularity and punctuality in attendance at school and in returning corrected exercises, above all, punctuality in closing school,—all these are the essential framework upon which the good teacher's character must be built up. All schoolmasters have these routine duties, all boys recognise them as part of the machinery of school life, and a feeling of instability and unrest is aroused if they are irregularly performed. Surely it must have been for schoolmasters that the encouragement was intended, "Despise not the day of small things."

## CHAPTER VIII.

---

### DISCIPLINARY ORGANIZATION OF THE SCHOOL.

1. We have seen that government is educative only when it is an instrument of discipline; and, **Organization as an Instrument of Discipline.** even in government, we have found that punishment should hold a very subordinate and entirely auxiliary place. For the aim is to influence the will, and this is attained mainly through the positive corporate life of the school, and but little through reaction on offences. The organization of this life is, then, a potent instrument of discipline, and from that point of view we must now examine it.

2. This machinery of discipline, as we may call it, is necessarily widely different according to the **Differences of Organization.** different kinds of school and classes of children in which and for which it operates.

For the better consideration of such differences of organization, it may be well to deal separately with day schools and with boarding schools. In the former, much more must depend on the influence of the home upon the child, and much more drastic treatment is necessary in cases of recalcitrant behaviour, since the day school aims at accomplishing in five hours a day what the boarding school may achieve by more gradual means in twenty-four hours. In other words, the day school is more obviously the complement of the home; the boarding school, for long periods, has, very largely, to act as its substitute.

Further, in the day school, the parent has readier access to the child, and hears immediately of any of those trivial details in which the relation of the child and school ceases temporarily to be harmonious. Such details must occur in every school, but they do not rankle; and in the boarding school they are usually forgotten or rightly ignored in the weekly home letter. In the day school, however, the parent usually hears the child's version and, even when there is fault on both sides, not unnaturally feels that the school has betrayed its trust. As a result, the day school, in which the cooperation of the home is most needed, loses this cooperation more frequently than the boarding school, because the parents see the details narrowly and often interpret them with prejudiced minds, and because they do not, cannot or will not take the backward step from the easel which would obscure the detail to reveal the total effect of the picture.

3. The common ground in the organization of day schools<sup>1</sup> and boarding schools is obviously the organization for purposes of teaching and games; but, since the teaching officers and the disciplinary officers are, in a measure, the same, we may avoid repetition by considering the duties of the teaching staff<sup>1</sup> in connexion with discipline in both kinds of school at the same time.

So far as they decide the course of study, the Head-master and Form- or Class-masters are clearly responsible for the attitude towards work which the boys assume. Discipline, so far as it is regarded as the relation of the boy to his work, is in their hands, and the Head-master must cultivate a right

<sup>1</sup> In referring to form masters in boarding schools it must be understood that they are considered only *as* form masters apart from their work as house masters or house tutors.

relation in this respect by requiring a high standard of industry and careful work both from the boys and from his staff. But it is essential that he should not obscure the real issue by trivial or formal requirements. The practice of some Head-masters and Head-mistresses of insisting on all written work throughout the school being presented in a particular form, with certain invariable rules as to margin, or underlining, or the use of red ink, is unwise and unwholesome. These matters are surely the concern of the class-teachers only, and should be left in their hands. Some of them doubtless will approve of this uniformity of detail, and these will insist upon it in any case; but others will regard such things as trivial and non-essential, and will prefer to expend their energies on the quality rather than on the form of the work. Friction is certain to arise if the Head require his staff to issue orders with which they are not in sympathy about their own work. He is, of course, perfectly justified in insisting on careful work and good writing, and should call the attention of individual form-masters to any general or particular laxity in these or other respects in the forms or boys of whom they have charge.

The Head-master should support his staff in every possible way in cases of conflict between boys and masters which result in an appeal to the Head or in a boy being sent up for punishment. But this does not mean that he can dispense with the impartiality of the judge. The Head is the Final Court of Appeal, and he is head over his colleagues as well as over his pupils. To regard it as the duty of the Head-master to punish a boy whenever an assistant demands it is to depose him from his headship, and to make him merely a mechanical executioner of the will of his subordinates. Such a position is fatal to the true working of

**Appeals to  
Head-master ;**



the school: far better would it be for the Head to hear no appeals at all, but to delegate all his disciplinary powers to his assistants. In each case the school ceases to be a school and becomes a collection of independent class-units. In the latter case it does this openly; in the former it does it as truly, but pretends that it retains its essential unity.

When an appeal is made to the Head—whether it be by assistant master or by pupil—each party to the appeal must recognise that it *is* an appeal to the higher court, and each must loyally accept the result. The Head-master cannot divest himself of the responsibility of deciding the case and of acting on his decision. Of course, if the assistants are worthy of their posts, the decision required by justice will usually be in their favour; for they are wiser, less impulsive, and more self-controlled than the boys. But in the cases in which justice is on the side of the pupils, the Head does incalculable mischief if he decide against the boy merely in order to support the authority of his colleague. For the authority thus bolstered up is obviously that of the tyrant; the law supported is that “justice is the interest of the stronger.” The true law of justice, which is the very life-blood of the school, is negated. And this negation is perfectly evident to the boy. His respect for the Head is slain; his relation to the assistant master is not improved; his whole attitude towards authority in the school is vitiated.

But a just decision adverse to an assistant need not entail any serious results. A boy does not expect his masters to be infallible; rather does he scorn any assumption of infallibility by them; and, when the Head is frankly recognised as Head, no contemptuous feelings are evoked in the boy against his form-master

because the latter has, for once, been shown to be mistaken. Indeed, the wise assistant, when he recognises during the hearing of an appeal that he has been in the wrong, will frankly and openly acknowledge it; and nothing so thoroughly re-establishes true relations between him and the boy as such an exhibition of true courage on his part.

It need hardly be said that when appeals are regularly decided against an assistant it is evident that either he or the Head is unfitted for his post. If his colleagues have the same experience the presumption is against the Head: if they do not, it is against the assistant.

Thus, the Head-master's loyal support of his colleagues must be restrained within the bounds of justice; but within those bounds it should be absolute and whole-hearted.

In many schools, especially of the types of lower secondary schools and preparatory schools, it is the custom for the Head-master alone to administer corporal punishment.

**Power of  
Corporal  
Punishment ;**

There are some good reasons for this custom. The Head-master thus protects himself and the reputation of the school against the indiscretion of the more inexperienced members of his staff, and he is able also to obtain a more personal knowledge of the principal delinquents in the school and the capacity for government of his several colleagues.

But there are objectionable features of the system as well. It suggests a distrust of the discretion of the assistant masters, and is apt to lead the boys, who often think very crudely on such matters, to regard them as inferior in every respect to the Head-master because of their inferiority in this particular. It has a further disadvantage in the fact that it often deprives the punishment of its chief value. Corporal punishment, even more

than any other, is most appropriately administered immediately after the offence; and its deterrent value is greater if it take the form of a caning "there and then" than if it is regarded by the boys merely as an interview with the Head-master, either reported to be painful and unpleasant or else made light of, according to the individual temperaments of successive victims.

A further objection is that it piles up another barrier between the Head-master and his boys. From the nature of his duties he can see little of the individual boys of his school; and if his interviews with them are always, or even frequently, occasions to be dreaded, he can hardly hope to win the affection or confidence of the school. The form-master has opportunities of showing that his caning is an exhibition of his official personality and that his human personality co-exists with it. In extreme cases, the Head-master, for all that the boys know to the contrary, may have no human personality at all!

Again, for a new master in a troublesome class the value of judicious caning is very great, and it is often a serious handicap at the beginning to compel a master to rely for government upon the force of his own personality, before he has had time or opportunity to make that personality felt.

It would probably be satisfactory in most schools if an arrangement could be made whereby a new master might be allowed to use the cane at first; the question of the continuance of the power to be decided later. Knowing that his power in this matter would lapse unless he used it with much discretion, he would naturally try to depend less and less upon the exercise of that power, and corporal punishment as an instrument of government would be kept in its proper place—merely to enforce order at the time when the master's relation with his boys has not

become so firmly established as to preclude disorder, or to meet any sporadic outbreak of disorder, such as might be caused by a new boy before he is acclimatised to the class, or by the want of self-control of a mischievous or impertinent pupil. In any case of indiscreet exercise of the power, the Head-master would be in a position to warn the assistant that he would be deprived of the power unless he mended his ways.

Apart from corporal punishment, the teaching staffs both of boarding and of day schools have means of securing order in the stimulus of their teaching, in their own attitude towards work, in their personal influence and example in this and other directions, and in the use of other forms of routine punishment which will be discussed in their proper place.

The disciplinary organization other than that of the teaching staff differs so widely in the two Prefects ; kinds of school that we must deal with them separately.

In day schools it is not uncommon to find boy-officers, known as prefects or monitors, who have in Day Schools, certain duties in connexion with government. School-prefects may be empowered to check disorderly behaviour of junior boys in streets or trains, to keep order in the school hall or corridors, to undertake roll-call in school or at compulsory games, and to report cases of smoking or other impropriety. In schools where there is considerable difference of age between the older and the younger boys there is little objection to this practice of giving considerable authority to the older. They are able to take responsibility seriously and of an age to profit greatly by having such responsibilities. They are made guardians of the honour and reputation of the school, and are on duty at times and in places where there is little



chance of effective supervision of the younger boys by masters or by parents.

But there is a practice among many elementary school-teachers of making a Class-monitor or Head-boy responsible to a certain extent for the discipline of the class-room. The least objectionable form which this practice takes is that in which the monitor's duties are mechanical or secretarial. Teachers are often heard to say, "Monitor, put that boy's name down," merely to save themselves the trouble of doing so or of remembering what boys are to be punished. It is so obviously a dismissal of the subject from the teacher's mind—if indeed it be not a confession that he does not know the names of his boys—that, when the tone of the class is unsatisfactory, boys may trade upon the fact, and either fail to put down the name or substitute a less popular name for it. A worse form of the practice is to give the monitor discretionary power. "Monitor, come out here and put down the name of any boy who talks" is not an uncommon command, though it is a very vicious one. The great fault of all such practices is that the boy is put into a position of authority without having any increased responsibility. He is in authority over his equals, and possibly his seniors, in age, and instead of being a responsible officer he becomes a petty informer. The elementary school has not, usually, a strong tradition against tale-bearing or 'sneaking,' and this use of class-monitors does nothing to create such a tradition. We have actually seen a monitor in a class-room from which the master was temporarily absent accepting bribes of sweets and other desirable things in the most unblushing manner from boys whose names he was threatening to put down. His collection from the whole class was enormous, but his value as an officer of discipline and his contribution to the moral tone of the school were negative. Speaking

generally, it may be said that disciplinary officers should not be appointed from among the children in elementary schools. The leaving age is too low for the elder boys to have arrived at a time of life when they can make any wholesome use of authoritative power.

In preparatory boarding schools this immaturity of youth is, to a certain extent, modified by the circumstances of school life. Boys who are not living at home generally develop somewhat more rapidly in their power of acting, or at least of thinking for themselves and for their fellows, than do those for whom everything is done by attentive parents or by elder brothers or sisters. For this reason it is often desirable that the older pupils in preparatory boarding schools should be given some authority whereby they are enabled to make use of this greater power. But it must always be borne in mind that such boy-officers are actually very young, and their duties and responsibilities should be strictly limited to ways in which the wayfaring men, though fools, cannot err.

In the secondary boarding school the disciplinary value of prefects is very great, but many problems present themselves in connexion with their selection and duties. There are two classes of boys who apparently have claim to selection as prefects, and schools vary, at the present time, in their recognition of these claims; most schools compromise by appointing both classes.

The persons eligible for such duty are obviously the Sixth Form by virtue of their intellectual superiority and their age, and the persons distinguished in the school by being office-holders in cricket or football teams or in other branches of school athletics. It is argued in favour of the former that they are the better qualified for the difficult

and responsible work of prefects, that their position in the school commands respect and justifies authority. In favour of the latter it is urged that a small boy's hero-worship is naturally inclined more towards those who are eminent in games than towards the others; that the athletes will therefore be more likely to command respect and obedience.

In the school to which we chiefly owe the present practice of government by boys, the tradition has been unbroken since Arnold organized the system by which the school was transformed from a very unsatisfactory to a thoroughly sound condition. Here it is the 'Sixths' who have authority in many matters of disciplinary government. The 'Swells,' who are the people of athletic importance, have certain privileges, but no definite authority outside their own sphere. This system seems to be in many respects the most reasonable. The 'Swells' (to keep the convenient Rugby appellation) already have the command of their teams or clubs, they already have the respect which is the due of athletic prowess, they already have the influence of position and achievement which will benefit the school if they exert it rightly; and if they do not make a right use of command, respect, and influence, they are obviously unfitted for the office of prefect. Admittedly, the small boy needs no encouragement to respect the 'Swells,' it would, therefore, be a waste of powerful influences to duplicate offices and to make the Cricket Captain the Senior Prefect by virtue of his office. But it may be that athletic achievement looms too large upon the healthy boy's horizon, that he may occasionally regard school work too much as a necessary rest from the real business of games; and for this reason alone, apart from any question of their superior fitness for office, it may be well to make the members of the Sixth the office-holders of the school.

Of the duties of prefects little need be said. Much will depend on the general conditions of the life and organization of the school in which they hold office. Their obvious function, and that for which young officers are best fitted, is in connexion with the maintenance of order at times and in places where the presence of a master, for purposes of teaching, is unnecessary. They can, and do, keep order during evening 'preparation,' in the dormitory, and in the house generally. But they can do more than this somewhat mechanical duty. Their knowledge of the other boys is more intimate, their contact with them more frequent, than the master's can possibly be; and it is for this reason that prefects may be used to deal with graver offences in the school or in the house. But it must be understood that no half-measures in this direction can be successful. Prefects must deal with ordinary cases, and not merely detect and report. They are officers of the school, and must not be degraded to the position of common informers even to avoid the risk of an indiscreet handling of matters which might benefit by the intervention of an older and more experienced man. In practice, the method of giving such full powers and responsibilities to prefects—we are speaking now mainly of those schools in which the prefects are not younger than seventeen or eighteen—is found to work well. Prefects do work with tact and do consult with the Head-master or the House-master when they feel that satisfactory treatment of the case is beyond their personal or official power. But, when the prefects' duty is held to be merely that of reporting names of offenders to be punished by one who is in equal authority over the offender and the informer, then such cooperation is unusual and is, indeed, hardly to be expected.

Let each prefect, then, have full authority in matters of



the conduct of the younger boys; and in matters of life and morals, either let the whole body of prefects have authority to punish, and let each individual prefect act in consultation with that body, which should, in cases of exceptional difficulty, bring the matter before the Head-master; or, let it be clearly understood that the prefects' duties in this connexion are solely to exert a wholesome influence.

4. The Head-master, Assistant-masters, and Prefects, of any school compose the organization for purposes of discipline so far as it depends upon personal command or influence; but there are other than directly personal influences which contribute to the discipline of the well-ordered life of a school-boy.

Games are recognised as having valuable disciplinary effect, and the organization of games is, therefore, an important factor in school discipline.

In day-schools the first problem to be considered is whether games should be made compulsory for every pupil who is not excused by medical certificate as physically unfit for them. The practice of making games compulsory is undoubtedly growing. It has been found beneficial in many schools, and is made easier in 'grant-earning' schools by the sanction of the Board of Education for reckoning attendance at "organized games" as a school attendance. There are in every school, whether of boys or of girls, some 'loafers,' whose distaste for active exercise is detrimental to their own health and to their subsequent efficiency as citizens. The distaste arises in the great majority of such cases either from lack of initiative and consequent inexperience of the game they profess to dislike, from self-consciousness and consequent dread of ridiculous

incapacity on the playing field, or as a result of sheer indolence and self-indulgence. In either of these cases a system of compulsory games is useful. In the first case the child is made to play, and discovers the enjoyment which he or she would otherwise miss ; in the second case the shy child finds others no better than himself and familiarity with the experience usually reduces the self-consciousness ; and in the third case compulsory play is an appropriate and wholesome treatment which may correct a definite and dangerous defect of character.

In the organization of games in day-schools there are two alternatives in common current use. The school may be classified for games either in 'vertical' or in 'horizontal' divisions. By the latter system, commoner in elementary schools, the cricket or football teams are selected from the several classes, each class having two or more complete teams. In this way, boys of equal age play and practise together, and games are arranged between the various teams of one class, with occasional matches between classes of approximately equal ages. An obvious objection is that the same boys remain in the same teams practically throughout their school career, and much of the feeling of corporate life in the school is lost. By the principle of dividing the school 'vertically,' older and younger boys are distributed in all the clubs. The organization is borrowed from that which arises naturally, and works successfully, in boarding schools ; and the wholesome rivalry between houses has suggested the division of a day-school into clubs which, even there, are usually called 'Houses.' Clifton, Cheltenham, and other schools in which there are both boarders and day-boys, keep the distinctive name of each of the actual boarding-houses and have 'house-masters' in charge of groups of day-boys, who belong to East House, West

House, and so on, according to the distribution of their houses in the town. This plan is found to be very satisfactory, and has been applied equally well in day schools where there are no real houses at all. Its advantage over the 'horizontal' division is that boys or girls have opportunities of promotion in games as they have in work. They will try to get into their House eleven or other representative team, and the matches can be arranged between large and equally matched clubs, instead of being confined to classes in the school where the natural pre-supposition, usually justified by the result, is that the higher class wins the game.

In boarding schools the House system operates naturally, and provides an organization which is the nucleus of all non-academic rivalry or competition in the school. Some modifications of natural divisions may be necessary, as in the case where two numerically weak houses are combined against single large houses or other pairs of weak ones; it is always less satisfactory when such combinations have to be made since the 'patriotism' of a boy for the combination can never rest on so secure a footing, nor be so profitable, as his 'patriotic' feeling for his own house.

We shall have occasion to recur to this question of house-patriotism as it is a point of special importance in the boarding school.

So far our consideration of play has been directed entirely towards that kind of exercise which is corporate and organized, and is therefore recognised officially by the Board of Education as part of the curriculum of the day-school. But, in considering personal discipline, a part of life, by no means the least important, is that in which we are neither working nor taking regulated exercise. The

Use of  
Leisure in  
Boarding  
Schools ;

employment of a man's or of a child's leisure time is probably one of the greatest formative influences on his character as it is the most trustworthy index to it.

In the day school the responsibility for the use of leisure by the children is shared with the home authority, and will be discussed in the next chapter.

In boarding schools the question of the occupation of leisure time is of much more serious importance. The responsibility in this case is not shared with the home, and the home cannot relieve the school of the actual labour any more than it can of the responsibility. The training of a boy or girl is incomplete if this part of teaching be neglected. A child must learn how to amuse himself effectively and harmlessly, and it is the business of the House-masters or -mistresses to teach this accomplishment. A common argument, in boys' schools at least, is that leisure is difficult to provide for; boys get into mischief—"Satan finds some mischief still for idle hands to do"—therefore, cut the Gordian knot by taking good care that the boy gets no leisure. We have even heard it stated by a master in charge of a large house of an important school that his invariable rule is that if boys are not at work they must be playing cricket or football, or else eating or asleep. "Then they can't do any harm." Perhaps not, but how much harm may not this system do *them*? It may possibly, though not certainly, protect the House from the more obvious dangers arising from the idleness of the boys, while they are still in the house, and if this discreet house-master could arrange that his boys might pass straight from the school to a lethal chamber, perhaps they would not "do much harm" after they left his fatherly care; but when they leave school they become in some degree masters of their own time. At the universities, and to a less extent in business, they are relieved of restraint, they are not



compelled to spend evenings at work and afternoons at cricket, and they have not learned any rational occupation for their free waking hours.

What, then, can a House-master do? Speaking quite broadly, the proper occupation of leisure is the pursuit of Art or Nature in any of their forms. Literature, music, painting, sculpture, architecture, drama or the study of some aspect of nature—plants, insects, rocks or whatever it may be which regards nature as a real concrete thing, not as a mere subject for laboratory dissection—are all profitable and restful occupations for those who are not professionally engaged with them. Boys readily follow one or other of them either in their pure or applied forms. Wood-carving, clay-modelling, photography, fret-work, examination of old churches and other buildings, search for and study of various natural phenomena, are all attractive to boys. For those to whom none of these appeal directly, there is usually a fascination in constructing or manipulating model engines, electrical or otherwise, while for some boys surveying and out-door engineering are attractive. Surely this is a sufficient catalogue of occupations to fill the leisure time of boys, even if the severity of compulsory cricket were relaxed. But it is not enough for the House-master to catalogue possibilities of occupation. He must suggest, encourage and assist. In this matter he can be greatly aided by his prefects. In one school, at least, the prefects are given charge of this important part of the work, and are found to be of great service in helping and stimulating the younger boys. They are under instructions to see that a hobby begun by any boy is persisted in for, at least, a whole term.

In every art, in fact in every study, the ordinary boy or girl is a smatterer. A point is reached where the charm

of novelty wears off, where self-improvement becomes more difficult, and the child, left to itself, drops or changes its hobby. It is here that a sympathetic House-master or a prefect can do more by a word or two of praise or encouragement, or by more active help if he have the technical skill, than the regular teacher of the subject can do by months of drudgery. In any case it should be his care to provide some, at least, of the material for such occupation, and all the personal influence and energy he can command, to lead boys to the recognition that horse-play has its limitations as a recreation for sane beings, and that other pursuits are really enjoyable substitutes for it. But, for all that, he need not be a stilted pedant nor a long-haired *dilettante*, and he will lose nothing in dignity, affection, or respect, if he can join spontaneously in an occasional 'rag' or romp with the junior boys of the house, provided that his house-prefects have not very strong views on the matter!

An important detail of school boarding-houses often receives insufficient attention from those who have charge of them. The civilising effect of material comforts is frequently overlooked. If boys are expected to spend all their leisure in a 'day-room' furnished with a bare table and forms, supplemented perhaps with a few desks of the pattern used in the class-rooms, there is no obvious reason for restraint or refinement of behaviour. If the chairs be of coarse wood and of the most vulgar pattern, boys will feel little hesitation in indulging in horseplay that results in their wreck. But if the room have an appearance of comfort, if the table have a cover and the chairs be sightly and comfortable, boys will usually, for their own sake, check such disorder as is likely to lead to damage of furniture. The appearance of the play-room affects also very seriously

**Material  
Comfort.**

the whole attitude of the boy's mind towards school. Why should a boy from decent home surroundings do his work in an unattractive or squalid class-room, and then be expected to spend his leisure time in bad weather in a room less comfortably furnished than a railway waiting-room? This is the fate of most of the junior boys in nearly all of our best Public Schools, and that in spite of the fact that boys do show their appreciation of better surroundings and their desire for them, by the fastidious care with which they furnish or decorate their private studies when their position in the school or house entitles them to occupy or to share them.

There is, however, an opposite danger which is not altogether avoided in some schools of the more expensive type. It is sometimes overlooked by schoolmasters and by parents that there is a real risk of producing the enervating effects of luxury by the sumptuous conditions which obtain in some schools or school-houses. The expensiveness of games, of hobbies, and even of babies' toys, is increasing so rapidly that children are in some danger of losing, or of not acquiring, a just sense of proportion in the matter of the relative importance of essentials and non-essentials; and there is an additional risk of children forming habitudes of selfishness and self-indulgence if their physical comfort be studied in every detail.

5. Finally, there is that all-powerful factor in the disciplinary organization of the school which, as we have seen,<sup>1</sup> is to a certain extent independent of headmaster and staff, and even of any individual boy-officers or body of boys. This is the *ethos* of the school, the general attitude likely to be adopted by any representative boys of the school towards questions of conduct whether trivial or serious. It is commonly spoken of

**Tone of the  
School.**

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 143-148.

as the 'tone' of a school, and though it is a very complex and a very intangible quality, yet it is sufficiently potent to enable us to distinguish, after very short acquaintance, the product of one school from the product of another. There is a recognised type of Wykehamist, Harrovian or Etonian, and it would be unusual to make a mistake in assigning to the right quarter any young man who has recently left either of these schools. Clifton and Cheltenham would not usually be confused, nor, to compare day-boys, would the products of St. Paul's, City of London and Merchant Taylors'. Nor again can there be much possibility of mistaking a boy who comes from any one of these for one who has been educated at a small provincial secondary school.

As the 'Public School boy' is recognised and distinguished, as he can be classified on inspection as coming from a particular school, and as any person familiar with that school could probably say with reasonable accuracy which master's house he was at, it follows that there is undoubtedly a brand or stamp that each school and each community puts upon its members. This is the factor which, more than all else, directs the conduct and moulds the character of the boys who come under its influence. In boarding schools this *ethos* is the most fundamental element, but even in day schools it is of immense importance. Indeed, in them it is, relatively to the direct personal influence of the masters, of even greater weight than in boarding schools; since in the latter the personal intercourse is more intimate and more constant. It affects general behaviour in public places; it is the attitude of the majority of the school towards a boy who is noisy or otherwise selfish in his use of trains, towards a boy who smokes, towards a boy who lies or is dishonest without discovery by the master. It concerns the attitude of the school towards tale-bearing



or sneaking, and the general relation of the boys to the masters.

Much can be done by the masters to improve or to encourage the tone of the school. The essential feature of the *ethos* of any community is its dependence upon suggestion ; it is the effect of corporate suggestion on individual thought and action. Direct precept has little to do with it, and prohibition of any action by a master may affect the conduct of an individual, but will not influence the tone of the school. We remember a case in which a schoolmaster wished to improve the tone of his class in the matter of 'sneaking.' A boy had just made a complaint about another boy by name, and the master's only reply was, "If I had sneaked about a boy like that when I was at school I should have been kicked all round the playground." The practice of sneaking which had been common in that school died suddenly in that form, and disappeared very rapidly from the whole school.

The consideration of the tone of a school leads us, in its connexion with boarding schools, to touch upon the important question of *esprit de corps*. In day schools the matter is simple, as it involves merely loyalty, or 'patriotism' as boys prefer to call it, to the school. It requires that boys shall be loyal in act, as well as in word, and the reputation of the school is often among boys a powerful motive for right action. In this connexion it may be strongly urged that the authorities of every school, whether elementary or secondary, should insist on all boys wearing a distinctive school cap. By this simple means every boy is at all times entrusted with his share of the good name of the school ; and if he be reminded of this from time to time—for his faults are often those of thoughtlessness—the natural chivalry of the boy is exercised with the best effect.

But in boarding schools the matter is complex, as there is a divided allegiance, or rather an allegiance which is sub-divided. There is the boy's loyalty to his own school in rivalry with other schools, and in addition there is a loyalty to his own House in rivalry with other houses in the same school. To a less extent this may be found in day schools organized for games on the House system. Now, there is a strong feeling among many schoolmasters that this sub-division of the natural allegiance is a source of weakness to the general sentiment of patriotism to the school; and we do, in fact, find many schools where house matches arouse much keener interest and partisanship than the school matches of the first fifteen or the first eleven. But is this state of affairs wholly undesirable? The school is a large organization, imperfectly known by the individual boy, and brought into comparison at rare intervals in the fields of sport or scholarship or conduct with other large organizations of which the individual boy knows practically nothing. His adverse opinion of other schools, nay, even his good opinion of his own, is based on tradition and prejudice supported by one-sided and imperfect knowledge. It is an emotion which cannot easily bear fruit in action, and of which the reasonableness cannot readily be tested by the immediate comparison of his own school with the merits and defects—unknown to him—of several others. Again, it is apt to make the boy as well as his school ridiculous, if the only possible reply to his enthusiastic "There's no school like ——" be "Thank heaven for that!"

Now these objections do not hold with regard to strong house-feeling. A boy's pride in the achievements of his house must be sustained by fact. He can only 'swagger' about the merits of his house in the presence of

those who know also its demerits; and boys of other houses, when they cannot agree with the energetically urged claim of a rival house, do not politely change the conversation. They ask pointedly "What has your beastly house done?" The young patriot is thus forcibly reminded that the bubble reputation must be sought at the cannon's mouth, and not by waving flags and singing

"We don't want to fight,  
But, by Jingo, if we do —."

From the question of others, oft repeated, "What has your house done?" it is no great step, as the boy increases in age and in experience, to the question "What can I do for my house?" So, instead of praising extravagantly a school which may stink in the nostrils of half England, he will, in the desire to support his own house, consider carefully what he may do to make that house cleaner or more wholesome; stronger numerically or in games; wiser or more distinguished in scholarship; or, at least, and that is much, he will see to it that he bring no discredit upon it either by unsavoury conduct, by idleness in work, or by shirking in games.

Thus every boy may be brought to expend conscious effort on the betterment of his own small community, and the larger school community of which the houses are component units profits by individual effort which may be, and often is, dissipated by being directed towards too wide and vague an object. This personal effort is a profitable form of 'patriotism' and is a heavy weight in the balance in the perennial controversy as to house-feeling as opposed to school-feeling.

## CHAPTER IX.

---

### THE RELATION BETWEEN THE SCHOOL AND THE HOME.

1. It is an aphorism of the scholastic profession that  
**Failure of** "boys are always right, masters sometimes,  
**the Relation:** parents never," and though this does not  
represent actual fact it does unfortunately  
represent the habitual attitude which many schoolmasters,  
under great provocation, have taken up with regard to the  
parents of the children in their charge. Fortunately also  
it implies that they are prepared to judge mercifully in  
times of strained relation between boys and themselves.

The schoolmaster is the product of an advanced civilisation. Education, even in its narrower applications, is the duty shared, in primitive races, by the family and the whole tribe. It is the father who, after his day's hunting is over, must sit at the door of his tent and instruct his sons in the gentle art of breaking heads. The mother instructs her daughters in cunning handicrafts, in the making of earthenware pots, and the brewing therein of intoxicating drinks; the husband, when he has duly purchased her, undertakes to teach his wife, with a rawhide thong, the duties of her new rank. The Boer father is said to give his son a gun and one cartridge in the early morning, and to chastise him with considerable emphasis



if he do not return with sufficient material for the family breakfast. But the city clerks of civilisation are apt to give their sons neither the cartridge nor the thrashing, and still to expect the breakfast. The conditions of modern life and employment make it impossible, and even, as we have seen, undesirable for a man or a woman to attend adequately to the whole education of the children<sup>1</sup>; and so this duty, the most important natural duty of parenthood, is to some extent delegated to those who make it their profession to undertake such part of these functions as the parents are unable to perform. Mischievous arises when either parents or schoolmasters incline to the belief that it is possible for the parent to delegate to the school the *whole* duty of education.

In many families the miserable routine is this: in their childhood and infancy the parent regards his  
 through  
 Neglect; children as amusing playthings; when it is  
 "time for them to learn something" he packs them off to school, (for which in these days of minimising parental responsibility by legislation he often does not even make the small personal sacrifice of a direct money payment,) and still indulges them or ignores them, according to his temperament, at home; then, when they are old enough to leave school, he is disappointed to find them undisciplined in character, as little capable of self-sacrifice or strenuous effort as he is himself, and even then, when it is still perhaps not too late to influence them, his only resource is—to grumble at the school. Having provided them with neither the gun of home training nor the cartridge of his own contribution to their efforts, and being fatuously disappointed that they have not brought home their proper contribution to the family life, he does not even then administer the 'sjambok' of home

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 119-121.

discipline but grumbles that other people have neglected *his* duty.

It is little wonder, then—for the number of parents of this kind is very large especially at the upper and lower extremes of the social scale—if schoolmasters are inclined to assert in moments of depression or irritation that parents are never right.

But this is not the only form in which parents fail to maintain a right relation with the school.   
 through Interference ; There is another, far less culpable but possibly more irritating to the schoolmaster who is honourably doing his best for his boys, which proceeds not from moral but from intellectual weakness on the part of parents. It is the unreasonable interference with the proper work of the school. In describing the foolish parent in his more culpable form we have advisedly used the masculine pronoun throughout, but in this other matter we must reluctantly attach the chief blame to mothers. It is perhaps, a constitutional difference between a man's and a woman's command that men can delegate authority and women cannot. A man gives his orders and criticizes the result of the work ; a woman gives an order as to the result, and then directs the work during its progress in every detail. If we consider in addition the intense solicitude of maternal love it becomes apparent that when it is combined with this inability to delegate authority, interference with the relation between the boy and the school is more likely to come from the mother than from the father. "The only son of his mother, and she a widow" is recognisable in every school at a glance, and the "hen with one chick" is apt to be the greatest trial of the Head-master.

But the fact that these two types of parent are common, and perhaps even in a majority, does not justify even the

good schoolmaster in regarding all parents as a necessary evil. He must not be embittered by his difficulties in this connexion any more than by the other difficulties of the work which he has set himself to face and to overcome. He must not, as a result of such bitterness, blame the home on the one hand for his own dereliction of duty, nor dispute on the other hand the right of parents to some interest in the welfare of their children and to some direction or control of their progress. It should be recognised by both parties that, as the existence of a son presupposes a certain relation to his parents, and as the existence of a school-boy presupposes a certain relation to his school, so where the son and the school-boy are identical he becomes as it were, a mathematical mean which involves a relation between the school and the parents.

Further, it must be acknowledged that bad schools are no less possible than bad homes—some parents would say they are even more frequent. Certainly no one who knows the facts can deny the existence of bad schools, schools whose tone or whose teaching or both fall lamentably below a decent standard. But often such a feeling on the part of parents arises less from actual badness in the school or even from stupidity in the parent, than from a want of harmony between what the school is doing for the boy and the results which the parent wishes to attain. The father does not “see the use” of what the boy has to learn; the mother thinks the government unduly meddlesome; no explanation is sought, and consequently, if there be no active opposition between home and school, there is no active cooperation of the two. The parent too often regards the State recognition of a school as ‘efficient’ as carrying an implication that it will be efficient for his boy: he does not recognise that different individuals need different

through In-  
compatibility.

educational treatment, and so he does not feel it incumbent on him to make any personal enquiry into the character and aims of the school to which he sends his boy. He sends him to the nearest—or to the cheapest—school, and then grumbles that the school is not doing good work. The worthy father and the worthy schoolmaster thus are often in relations which, if not positively strained, are certainly not those of that sympathy without which home and school cannot do their proper work in the education of the child.

2. All human intercourse is compounded of relations, and the basis of all such relations is the principle of “give and take.” Each of them would be a perfectly harmonious relation if the parties to it could observe the second ‘Great Commandment’—“Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.” But since, through ignorance of school conditions, parents may sometimes be unable to manifest their perfect love of the schoolmaster to his satisfaction; and since schoolmasters, through lack of consideration or forgetfulness, are apt to dissemble their love for parents, it may be well here to set forth some particulars of the giving and taking in this relation by showing what each party must give, since we may safely assume that he will take no less than is given.

We have already alluded to the difference of responsibility of the day school and the boarding school, and since this difference arises from the greater or less degree in which the school shares responsibility with the home, it follows that the relation of the home to the day school must differ somewhat from its relation to the boarding school. The difference is one of degree rather than of principle, and it will probably suffice if we deal first with the relation of the home to the day school, and then add those special details which the boy’s residence away from

**Duties of  
School :**



home involves. The details applicable to the day school only can easily be omitted by readers who are mainly interested in boarding schools.

In the relation between the school and the home, as in almost all human relations, much is gained  
**Intercourse with Parents ;** by making the relation as personal as possible. If the parent form an estimate of the character of the teacher based entirely upon the child's picturesque account of the exceptional incidents of the class-room—and a child seldom mentions or even considers the events of the day that are not exceptional—it cannot be wondered at if there be little human sympathy between the two, and little predisposition on the part of the parent to second the efforts or to support the authority of so eccentric a person as he believes the teacher to be. It is, therefore, the duty of the school as well as of the parents to make opportunities of social intercourse. A father can ask his son's schoolmaster to "come and smoke a pipe with him" in the evening; a mother can invite her daughter's mistress to the informal intercourse of tea after school. The teachers on their part should as a rule regard it as a duty, willingly undertaken, to accept such advances from parents, whether they are or are not in a position to return such hospitality. Above all must there be no taint of snobbishness on either side in such intercourse. Whatever be the social positions of the teacher and the parent relatively, they are, in their relation through the child, on common ground. They are both, either by nature or by profession, *in loco parentis* to the same individual. Neither is conferring a favour upon the other in offering or in accepting hospitality; each is simply adopting a conventional means of making an absolutely necessary acquaintance with a view to a perfectly cordial friendship based upon their common affection for the child and interest in its welfare.

In cases where the parents do not take the first step the teacher should try to do so. An opportunity is afforded at once if a child be absent through illness. Even in those cases where social etiquette would make it difficult for a teacher to call on the parents without a definite reason, no offence can be taken, and much kindly feeling may be aroused, by this exhibition of practical interest in the child. Parents gossip about a school no less than schoolmasters gossip about their boys, and it is not unlikely that the report that "Mr. — must be rather 'nice' because he took the trouble to call and enquire about Tommy when he had influenza" may spread to several families, and so improve the harmony of the relation between those homes and the school, and, incidentally, may greatly facilitate Mr. —'s work.

Parents who do not give informal invitations to the teachers, and whose children sturdily refuse to fall ill, may possibly be induced to make the acquaintance of the school staff if the school invite them so to do and have periodical "parents' nights" with the express intention—possibly stated in the invitation—of giving parents the opportunity of making the personal acquaintance of their children's teachers. Part-songs by a selected choir of the children, a few musical contributions by various members of the staff, and any other additions to the programme of which the resources of the school are capable, will provide the conventional excuse, if one be needed, for the gathering; but it must be carefully arranged that the evening's business does not become merely a school concert. Intervals between the musical items should be long, and the room (presumably the school hall) should be arranged so that the teachers, who are the hosts, may be able to circulate freely among their guests and not, like stewards at a concert, merely marshal them into rows of seats.

It is, further, the duty of schoolmasters to solicit the help of parents in matters of home-work, or of the conduct of children out of school. Letters to Parents ; Any device which leads to the realisation of the fact that masters and parents are fellow-workers in the interests of the child will be helpful in the establishment of a cordial and useful relation; and this idea should guide both parents and schoolmasters in the expression of their wishes to one another. Letters which pass between the school and the home are much too apt to take the form of complaints. There is a tendency on the part of parents to regard the school as an institution which is hostile in purpose to the child, and from which the child must be defended by frequent and angry remonstrance. To this kind of letter the schoolmaster is inclined to reply that the parent should "mind his own business," which is precisely what he is doing if his assumption is correct. The school must admit the right of the parent to feel and to express interest in his children, and in communications with the parents should make that interest the basis of operations. In enlisting the cooperation of parents in the matter, for example, of home-work, it is easy to give offence by a tone of complaint about the child's or the parents' alleged neglect of duty; but just as easy and very desirable is it to put the request upon the ground of the common interests of the school, the parent, and ultimately of the child. In the latter case the desired cooperation is usually secured; in the former an undesirable hostility is frequently created.

The day school, since it is entrusted with the intellectual and, to a certain extent, the moral training of the child, must obviously be prepared to give periodical accounts of its trust in precisely the same way as a body entrusted with public moneys must be prepared to publish a periodical balance sheet. In other

words, it must give the parents, as being the persons interested, periodical reports of their children's progress. And these reports, it is unfortunately not unnecessary to add, should be truthful and ample. They should not develop into a weekly or fortnightly routine by which *g.* and *v.g.* are scattered promiscuously over a printed form, with the intention of keeping the parents in a good temper and of staving off undesirable interference. But even this form of report is better than nothing, in virtue of its power of compelling parents to take at least that much notice of their children's school progress as is involved in writing their initials on the report card every week or fortnight. But reports on the children need not be so frequent and should be much more definite than this.

One of their most valuable functions is that they should give the class masters or mistresses the opportunity of 'taking stock' in the case of each child; of considering the child's special strength and weakness and the use that they have made of his capacities, whether his strength has been developed and his weakness decreased; and whether their favourable or unfavourable view of any child's work or conduct is based upon fact or upon a prejudice which it is the teacher's most difficult duty to minimise. Certain children who have an irresistible charm of manner often suffer severely for it because their instructors, in all honesty of purpose, are blinded to their weaknesses, and when these are brought forcibly to light in examinations, it is charitably assumed that the cause must be ill-health or nervousness, and they are promoted in the school on the strength of their term's marks or reports. The charm which was irresistible at ten may be modified to the point of imperceptibility at sixteen, and in any case the profit that the child might have derived from his schooling has been minimised. But if the report be honestly treated by



each teacher as a balance sheet for each child, the vivacious and lovable manner will not find its way among the child's assets as definite mathematical or literary ability, but will be duly credited to him in its proper compartment of manners or conduct. The mathematical and literary deficit will be coldly audited, and vigorous efforts will be made to "push the business" in those departments before next audit.

It must not be understood that the foregoing remarks are intended to be a condemnation of the system of weekly reports. Where these are conscientiously prepared by the teachers, and rightly regarded by the parents, they are of great value especially in those elementary schools where the parents are not very familiar with scholastic practices and are likely to profit more by the frequency of the report as a stimulus to interest in and cooperation with the school, than they are by the fullness of the report as a guide to an intelligent appreciation of their own duties and its efforts.

Such reports are most conveniently made on a card in which the first column gives the weekly dates for a quarter or a term, the second the number of absences, the third the number of late comings, the fourth the general estimate of conduct and work. All this can be filled up by the individual children in class at the teacher's dictation and takes but a few minutes. Moreover, this publicity given to the teacher's estimate of the conduct and work of each child is a great guarantee against the influence of favouritism, and a powerful incentive to effort on the part of those who are estimated as unsatisfactory. Then follow columns for the initials of the class teacher and the parents. Such reports when taken seriously by the teacher have been known to have most beneficial effects.

But in cases where the weekly report alone is in use, a careful teacher will do well to spend some hours at least of

private cogitation at longer intervals in summarising his weekly impressions, and in comparing them with results of written tests or examinations; and this with especial reference to those children for whom he has a pronounced liking or antipathy. The effectiveness of any system of reports depends mainly upon the degree of intelligence and honesty with which they are written and received, and therefore, if the right relation between home and school is to be maintained in this respect, the master must report candidly and the parent must understand literally. The master should resist the strong temptation to write pithy epigrams, and the parent be slow to take offence at statements about his child which are made in all sincerity for no other purpose than for the child's welfare.

The purpose of reports is to quicken the interest and to secure the cooperation of the parent in the work that the school is doing for him and for his children, and it is the parent's duty to accord that interest and cooperation by treating the report on his child as a matter of consequence, by acting upon the tenour of the report in such matters as praise, blame, entertainments or pocket-money, and by consulting with the school authorities if there is any point upon which he desires fuller information or upon which his opinion is greatly at variance with that expressed in the report.

Brief mention may here be made of a point in which **Text-Books**; some schools are not sufficiently considerate. No school is justified in putting the parents to any needless expense or annoyance, as by ill-considered selection and frequent change of text-books, in those cases where the books are paid for by the parents, or by such arrangements in connexion with work or games as would be inconvenient in the majority of the homes from which the pupils are drawn.

Day schools should cooperate with the home in the matter of the occupation of their pupils' leisure time. Here the responsibility rests primarily on the home, though the school can and should perform an important directive function. If the home generally did its duty in this respect the school would specially have to guard against encroaching too much on its functions, and against making social intercourse too small in amount, by completely filling up a child's spare time. But, as a matter of fact, both home and school commonly neglect this function, except in so far as the school demands home-work. And that demand does not teach the child how to use leisure, but rather secures that he has the minimum amount of leisure to use. In secondary day schools this abuse of home-work is often a serious evil. It takes up so much time that the boy has leisure neither for play, nor for necessary social intercourse, nor for the cultivation of a hobby; and he grows up as an aimless person with narrow interests, uncouth manners, and uncultivated tastes.

The formation of good taste and good manners, the checking of bad taste and bad manners, are too often regarded by the school as being "the parents' affair," and parents are not infrequently heard to complain (if they interest themselves sufficiently in the matter) that "the schools don't seem to teach manners now-a-days." Obviously the two spheres in which the home and the day school are operative are different; it is less obvious but equally true that improper behaviour permitted in one sphere will react injuriously on the child's attitude towards the apparently trivial things that mean so much in the other. It is of small service to the child for the schoolmasters to take pains to teach him politeness of speech, and to labour to increase his vocabulary, if he find that both his parents get

through life with only one adjective which is made to do duty as an adverb as well. It is useless for parents, especially if they live in humble surroundings, to struggle to bring up their children with delicacy and refinement, if these find at school that their teachers are coarse and insulting (for even a child resents personalities), and that their schoolfellows regard refinement as affectation and call it by a worse name.

The day school master is not free from responsibility when school is dismissed. He is freed from official control, but a conscientious master or mistress will realise the possibility of doing work of as much real value in the quarter of an hour after school as in the whole day of actual school lessons. It is then that taste can be formed, not by mere sneers at the 'penny dreadful' or self-styled 'comic' paper which children may produce at that time for their reading, but by suggesting, showing, or lending, more profitable books. It is no use simply to decry the idiotic or sensational stuff with which many children delight to occupy their leisure. It has its place, and a very low place, in literature and it does actually appeal to the child or other person of uncultivated taste, and nothing but a breach of intellectual sympathy is effected by telling a child that he "ought" not to like such stuff. One might with little less reason, tell a child that he ought not to like making mud pies because of the unknown glories of sculpture and architecture. With literature, as with painting and music, taste is progressive; and in training taste each stage must be given time to develop, and should even be made to pall upon the learner by comparison with something conceived as slightly better. A man whose musical ideal is Mendelssohn's work, can easily progress to an appreciation of Beethoven, but there are—happily for most of us—many stages to be travelled before he can leap to a perfect understanding of Glazounov or Strauss.



In many town schools considerable use may be made of the lending library. Some elementary schools have arranged for the librarian to send to the teachers lists of books suitable for boys, and in some cases, the books themselves are sent and kept in the school class-rooms. This is found to be a very popular and a very valuable way of helping the teachers in their direction of the boys' use of leisure. It may almost serve the purpose of a school library, though it is better for every school to get its own library together gradually, and to use the town library to supplement it, not to replace it altogether.

There are other opportunities also for the master or mistress of a day school. In towns public museums or exhibitions afford opportunities to the staff of teaching children how to employ leisure time with enjoyment and profit; and in country districts, as well as in towns, masters may well identify themselves with such organizations of boys as Baden-Powell's Boy Scouts, St. George's Club, Field Clubs, Natural History or Photographic Societies connected with the school or district, all of which aim at widening the interests of boys and at discouraging the puffing of cigarettes or the gorging of sweets as the sole exercises of the child's leisure time.

If in favourably circumstanced schools, more than this can be done, the teacher may apply some of the suggestions already made as to the use of leisure time in boarding schools.<sup>1</sup>

The delimitation of the duties of school and home mainly occurs at those points where, in states of advanced civilisation, there are demanded an expert knowledge of teaching and of the subjects taught, and expert study of the varying capacities and characteristics of children. The

Employment  
on leaving  
School.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 193-196.

acceptance by the school of such complementary responsibility involves the further duty of helping parents to "settle their children in life." The schoolmaster should have obtained the special knowledge of the ability and tastes of the boy which are the chief guides to the right selection of a profession, a knowledge which the parents would have acquired more fully if there had been thrown upon them alone the duty of training their own children. It becomes, therefore, the schoolmaster's duty, as well as the parents', to look to the immediate future at least of the boys' lives. He should make himself acquainted with the conditions of employment in the various occupations suitable to the social position and age of the boys who leave his school. He should be perfectly familiar with the avenues of entrance to various professions and should know which professions are best suited for the individual abilities of each of his boys, which of them offer fair prospects of success to men with or without capital, and which are overcrowded. Or, in the case of elementary schools, he should be familiar with the conditions of employment in the various local trades or industries; he should find out which firms give regular advancement to their workers, and which of them employ boys and discharge them when they are old enough to demand men's wages. Also he should know in what kinds of employment a boy can pass from the position of unskilled labourer to that of a skilled workman, and in what particular factories or mills a child just leaving school can work without undue risk of moral contamination by his or her fellow-workers. It is the parents' duty as well to find out these things, but the schoolmaster's and schoolmistress's opportunities of obtaining information are greater, and, through conversations with old pupils or correspondence with employers who apply to them for boys or girls, they can

place themselves in a position impossible for individual parents and of immense value not only to parents and their children but to employers of labour as well. In any consideration of the relation of the school to the home this field of usefulness must have a place. The school should endeavour, as far as possible, to become an employment bureau having as its *raison d'être* not a pecuniary commission on its transactions, but a lively interest, parental in its nature, in the welfare of its children, and through them of the whole district. This amongst others, is one of the practical examples of patriotism that the school can set before its children and before others who learn from it.

3. We have dealt thus far mainly with the obligations laid upon the school and its teachers by their relation with parents, and the corresponding duties of parents have only been introduced incidentally. It may be well, however, to indicate a few of the ways in which parents, through ignorance of school organization or through indifference to it, occasionally cause annoyance and hinder the work of those who are employed in their interests.

Parents should support the authority of the school as far as they possibly can do so, and should conduct home discipline on lines similar to, or harmonious with, the lines of school discipline. If work is being done in school, and a child were to ask permission to go into the street to listen to a barrel organ, that permission would not be given; and if there is home-work to be done, and discipline indicates that the pleasure of the moment should yield to duty, a parent is unwise in telling the child that he need not do his work and in taking him to a pantomime or other form of entertainment. He is doubly unwise if he follow this

Duties of  
Parents :

in Supporting  
Authority of  
School ;

first indiscretion, as in cases we have known, with a note to the teacher that his child was prevented by severe headache from doing his home-work.

And as parents should support the authority, so also should they try to avoid interference with the organization, of the school. They should realise, in order that their children may realise, that engagements must be kept. If a boy has been in the habit of playing in school games on his half-holidays it is the duty of the parent, quite as much as of the school, to teach him that it is bad manners to absent himself without previous notice ; and if the boy has actually arranged to play on a particular day the parents should see that no obstacle is placed by them in the way of his fulfilment of his engagement. Or if such obstacle is inevitably necessary then good manners demand that notice should be given.

And as with games, so with work. The school has certain arrangements, known as the curriculum and the time-table, both drawn up with forethought and both involving much intricate labour. To ride rough-shod over these gives incalculable trouble at the school, and probably does little good to the child. The parent of a child at a private school has no right to request the Head-master or Head-mistress to allow her child to "miss the French lesson on Tuesday afternoon as she has to go for her violin lesson at that time to Herr Pumpernickel." The effect of granting that request is that perhaps twenty other girls are delayed every Thursday while their teacher is trying to teach one girl what she missed on Tuesday ; or it may be that this effort is not made and then the reputation of the school for teaching French suffers in the eyes of the unreasonable parent. The effect of refusing the request may be the loss of



a pupil, which the private school often cannot afford, especially if the loss of the pupil be accompanied by an acquisition of the reputation for being “so dis-obliging.”

But there are requests which it is reasonable for any parent to make in connexion with the work of the school. If a parent desire his boy to be transferred from the Classical to the Modern Side, he is at liberty to ask that this shall be done; but he should do so at the end of a school year, or at some time when promotions are commonly made. In other cases where change of work is required the Head-master or Head-mistress should be consulted as to the feasibility of the change. It is not wise for a parent to send such a letter as the following, which was once received by an assistant master: “Dear Sir, I want my boy to do Architectural Drawing instead of French and to learn much more History and begin German. Will you please arrange for him to do so?”

*A propos* of requests from parents, it is well for them never to make a verbal request through the children. It may be quite impossible for the school to grant the request, and it is then difficult for the teacher to say so without giving offence to the parent. All communications between parent and teacher should be in writing and, if delivered by the child, should be in a closed envelope.

We have already indicated the duty for parents of making the acquaintance of the school staff. It is necessary also that they should, whenever it is possible, show that they feel some confidence in the good intentions and ability of the school and its teachers; and even if, in an

in Correspond-  
ing with  
Teachers;

in Loyalty to  
their Fellow-  
workers;

individual case, they can feel no such confidence they should at least refrain from making their want of trust manifest to the children. In family conversation parents should avoid encouraging their children in rudeness or contemptuous regard for any of their teachers. Even if any one of them really is weak or incompetent nothing is gained by encouraging children to see only his weakness or incompetence, and still less by pointing it out to children who have not yet discovered it. It would be well if parents made it a rule never to criticize either the school or the masters in an adverse direction in the presence of the children. The school is helping them in their own work and parents should be as loyal to their assistant, the school, as they are to one another. Perhaps more loyal.

Finally, it is the duty of parents to give to the schools the best material with which to work. They should see that their children are adequately and wholesomely fed and clothed, and that they live a regular and wholesome life at home. They should give them opportunity for ample sleep and as much fresh air as possible. Parents of straitened means should add to their previous self-sacrifices that of allowing their children to finish their schooling before sending them out to work, and when they do send them out to work they should be prepared to sacrifice the prospect of immediate wages rather than to let them enter upon such employments as the selling of newspapers, which are injurious and ultimately unprofitable. Parents in more comfortable circumstances fortunately need not fear these deadly risks to their children: their peril lies more in the disappointment consequent upon the discovery that their ability or intelligence has been wrongly estimated.

**in Physical  
Care of the  
Children.**

4. The modifications of detail in order to maintain the right relation between the home in the case of boarding schools and the Home : The weekly reports from the class teachers do not then concern the parents but their deputy the House-master. It is he who must watch and take action with reference to the gradual progress of the boys. But although the parents are absolved from direct responsibility in this matter they are more than justified in retaining their interest in it, and the House-master is under the obligation of corresponding freely and frequently with parents.

The desirability of the personal acquaintance of parents and masters is certainly no less in the boarding school than in the day school, but the difficulty of securing this is perhaps greater. In some houses it is the custom, desirable from many points of view, for the House-master to invite parents to pay short visits to the house throughout the term. During their visit they can make the acquaintance of the house-tutor, of the form-masters under whom their boys work, of the captain of the house and some of the house-prefects, and of those boys with whom their son is especially intimate or friendly. They will readily understand that their host is prevented by his duties from giving them all the attention due to guests at a private house, and it is wholesome for them to learn that their presence is not allowed to interfere with the work even of their own son. In spite of these limitations to the enjoyment of their visit they are usually very grateful for that courtesy which enables them to enter more fully into the school life of their children, the ignorance of which is sometimes a bar to intelligent sympathy.

It is the duty of House-masters also to adjust the material things of their houses so that the general standard of living may be neither much worse nor any better than that of the boys' homes. And in this matter, too, they should enlist the cooperation of parents. Much well-meaning injury is done to boys by parents who indulge them to the point of sensuality in their holidays. The life of a well regulated school house is wholesome and regular, the boys are sufficiently and, now-a-days pleasantly, fed. They live a strenuous and profitable life and are given enough sleep at the proper time. The holidays, for young people as for adults, should provide relaxation from routine, change of scene and of occupation, some freedom from external control, but no license in respect of self-discipline. The winter holiday may reasonably have its concomitants of evening parties, of pantomimes or other festivities, and the late hours and excitements of the evening demand a *corresponding* change of the breakfast-hour, and possibly a slight increase in the amount of sleep. The summer holiday has its outdoor enjoyments, its substitution of lawn-tennis, croquet, camping, picnics, *et hoc genus omne*, for the eternal cricket of the summer term, and in this holiday a thorough weariness of body may make the bed time earlier. But early rising at this time of the year should be required and is no hardship.

But there is no justification for parents who interpret the need for relaxation as a sanction for permitting their children to exchange a Spartan life at school for the life of Sybarites at home. We have known cases in which boys have been almost intoxicated nightly at dinner with the acquiescence and encouragement of their fathers, and of others who have become selfish and self-indulgent through misguided cosseting by their mothers. And in



most of these cases the evil is due to the parents' idea that the boy needs a change from the rigours of school government, and that the indulgence is only temporary and can easily be adjusted next term at school. They overlook the facts that discipline and government are not identical, that a change is not profitable if it be a change for the worse, that the school does not exist for neutralising the follies of the home, and that encouragement in self-indulgence cannot be corrected by short and alternating periods of external control.

The House-master may reasonably ask the parents of his boys to cooperate with him in such matters of holiday discipline. He may describe the conditions of life at the school, and in writing to fathers may indicate plainly the dangers which such regularity is designed to minimise; and the parent, on receiving such suggestions, and at other times also, should endeavour to recognise the fact that schoolmasters are in the position of expert advisers and are at least men of wider experience with boys than most men outside their profession.

## CHAPTER X.

---

### STIMULUS AND RESTRAINT.

1. The discipline which aims rightly at training the will involves, as we have seen, external control or government in order to secure the ultimate operation of an effective self-discipline. The educative function of this external control is largely to show the child the path of duty, and so to influence his action and will that he will prefer the path of duty to other byways of personal enjoyment. It is the aim of self-discipline, nay, the aim of life itself, to identify duty and pleasure in such a manner that duty shall be chosen on all occasions with the minimum effort of will upon each.

The Christian conception of heaven illustrates our attitude towards duty and pleasure by its contrast with non-Christian conceptions of the after life. The Valhalla of the Norsemen was an eternal alternation of feasting and fighting, the glorious exercise of brute strength and virile passions, shrewd blows given and grievous wounds received, and then the magic balm that healed the wounded and revived the dead in time for the

feast which strengthened them for the morrow's fray. The Nirvana of the Buddhist is the cessation of labour, relief from a weary round of incarnations, absorption into the being of the Buddha himself, loss of individuality, perfect rest. In the Mohammedan Paradise the sons of the Prophet are rewarded by infinite gratification of sensuous desire; perfection of beauty and luxury, ministrations of heavenly houris, wine denied to them in this world, costly jewels, rich raiment, luscious sherbets—these comprise their Paradise.

But it is peculiarly the characteristic of the Christian idea of perfect joy that it involves perfect compliance with duty. In the rich symbolism of the Apocalypse the golden crown, typifying the reward of eternal happiness, is accompanied by the golden harp which typifies the duty of eternal praise or worship—the particular form of *work* most suited to the whole conception of the heavenly condition.

But in a school, as in other human institutions, we fall somewhat short of heavenly perfection, and duty and pleasure have not yet become identical in the minds of the children. If the teachers had already attained a state of perfection it might be possible for them to exercise an immediate influence upon the wills of the children which would lead them at once to make this necessary identification. But the effect of imperfection on both sides is to involve the use of imperfect and mediate means instead of those which are perfect and immediate, in order to secure even that partial recognition of the identity which is possible to the limitations of humanity.

These means usually take the form of reward and punishment, or, in more general terms, of stimulus and restraint. Neither of them has any place in the perfect

life of duty ideally performed, but in the imperfect state each is of some practical value.

2. In the ordinary system of reward and stimulus the leading features are usually prizes and some  
**Stimulus :** scheme of marking by which an account is kept of the progress of each pupil and according to which the prizes are awarded.

In any system of marking there are many objectionable features. Numerical marks represent merely  
**Marks for Achievement ;** the value of the result and not the value of the effort put forth to obtain that result. Boys or girls cannot be expected to make accurate allowance for the intellectual ability or dullness of others, and, if written exercises are returned and they find one with eight marks and another, apparently better, with only five, they will naturally conclude that the work has been carelessly or unjustly marked. But the exercise worthy of eight marks may be the very creditable work of a dull child, and the other a careless piece of work by a child who ought to have earned ten marks. The difficulty of making this position clear to the class leads most teachers to assign marks simply to the exercises according to their absolute merit and not to the relative merit of each exercise as representing the ratio of effort to ability.

Another common misuse of marks is that of giving marks for oral work. We assert without  
**Marks for Oral Work ;** hesitation that no method has yet been devised by which numerical marks can be given justly for oral work. The few methods which approximate nearly to fairness in this respect are, without exception, methods which on other grounds are injurious to teaching. Classes may be questioned in order and the child who answers the question may "go up" above those



who failed to answer. At the end of the lesson the children number from the bottom and the same places are taken at the next lesson. There certainly is a stimulating competition by this method, but the element of luck enters so largely into it as to make it very unfair. It also makes it necessary for the teacher to question the class or to set them on to oral work in a fixed order. This obviously hampers his teaching. He cannot distribute his questions so that inattentive boys are kept at work; he cannot even accomplish a clear or closely reasoned piece of logical teaching by means of questions without interruption by boys who are changing places; and, in such oral work as translation or construing each boy can calculate when and where his turn may come, and may not concern himself with any other part of the work.

A method devised with a view to fairness is that by which questions are asked by the teacher and the answers written by the whole class. They are then marked by the children themselves and each child's mark is recorded. The chief objection to this method is that the wrong kind of questions *must* be asked. Only those are suitable which can be answered in a single word or phrase or by a date, and these details of fact or word are regarded, since they are the mark-getting elements of the work, as being the most important, if not the only important, things in the subject of study. All careful deduction, all historical perspective, all geographical 'atmosphere' are found to be unproductive of marks, and, being commercially unprofitable, are regarded by children as the less important or as unimportant parts of the work. A system of 'cram' is the inevitable result of this method if it be carried too far, though, when judiciously employed and without reference to a general system of marking, it is undoubtedly of value as a means of impressing necessary facts.

A great fault in almost every system of marking is the amount of labour for the teachers which it involves, a labour which is almost always unprofitable, sometimes positively harmful.

**The Labour  
of Marking ;**

With young children probably marks do serve as a certain stimulus and indirectly as an incentive to effort, but more usually it is found that the immature mind of the child does not connect the award of marks directly with any effort of his own. He does not work to get high marks, but simply works and is pleased if his work is marked highly and disappointed if it gets low marks. He regards the whole matter as being far more one of luck than of personal effort, and so, even with young children, marks often fail to operate as a stimulus to work.

But supposing that they do act as a stimulus, it is still an open question whether advantage should be taken of the motives which prompt boys to excel in the competition for marks. Is it a wholesome stimulus? Ought not the school

**Marks not a  
wholesome  
Stimulus ;**

to check rather than to encourage that spirit of selfish competition that is so pitiful an evidence of human imperfection? Why should a numerical value be attached to every detail in a boy's attempt to do his duty, and why should the performance of duty be rewarded with prizes to the most intelligent? There is far too little encouragement given to boys by most modern systems of school government

"To set the Cause above renown,  
To love the game beyond the prize ;"<sup>1</sup>

and the practice of giving marks for the performance of duty, and prizes for the acquisition of marks, is unwholesome to the children's conception of duty.

One of the most obvious objections to the ordinary

<sup>1</sup> Henry Newbolt : *Clifton Chapel*.

methods of marking in schools is the selfishness of motive in work which such systems promote. Boys work entirely for their own credit or promotion, and their regard for the other members of the community is the regard not for a fellow-worker for the good of the community but for a personal rival or competitor.

To preserve the stimulating effect of marks and to remove from the system its more obvious objections an admirable plan has been devised for use in preparatory schools, which can be applied by simple modifications to many schools of other types. It is known as Grenfell's System of 'Stars and Stripes',<sup>1</sup> and a full description of its working may serve to demonstrate its value and to dispel any prejudice which the name of the system may arouse.

A 'star' is a mark of distinction, and is awarded in full or as a 'half-star' for special effort or meritorious action. It is not awarded to a boy merely for being at the top of his class, nor merely for producing a better written exercise than his fellows. Some special effort must have been used to gain it, and such effort is similarly rewarded whether it be put forth by a clever boy who does some piece of brilliant work or by the dull boy who exerts himself to rise even slightly above his normal low level.

A 'stripe' or a 'half-stripe' is a mark of disapproval, and is awarded for such offences as talking in school, eating or inattention in class, slovenly writing, dirty hands in school or at meals, being without books, pen, etc., leaving books or clothes about, breaking bounds, unpunctuality,

<sup>1</sup> The inventor of the system is Mr. A. G. Grenfell, Head-master of Mostyn House School, Parkgate, Cheshire, and the publishers of the material for it are Messrs. Matthews Bros., of Thomas Street, Liverpool.

'ragging' at times or in places where it is not allowed, and offences of a similar nature.

Two stripes cancel one star, and one star cancels two stripes.

Any boy who gets a stated number of stripes without countervailing stars renders himself liable to be whipped. The number actually fixed must depend upon the freedom or restraint with which the stars and stripes are awarded; but it is well to fix a fairly low number, and to award half- or quarter-stripes in order to emphasize the enormity of offences which call for the award of a full stripe.

Each boy, when the award is made, receives for the star or stripe a pink or a blue cheque bearing his name and the reason for the award. This is taken home and initialled by the parent and returned to the class-master or to the Head-master.

A summary of all stripes given is made each week, and if the number exceed one-third of the number of boys in the unit taken—the school or the class—all the stripe-winners will attend school on Wednesday afternoon, or at some other time of leisure, for 'detention.' On the other hand, if the number of stars in excess of the stripes exceed one-third of the number of boys, the captain or head-boy has the right to ask the Head-master for an extra half-holiday or some similar benefit for the whole unit. In this way every boy is made to feel his personal responsibility to his fellows, and considerable force of character is developed in the striving for stars or at least in the careful avoidance of stripes which would cancel the meritorious work of others.

If the additional stimulus of prizes be considered desirable or if, for other reasons, an annual prize distribution be considered necessary to the welfare of the school, the award of prizes may be based upon the personal record of each



boy in the matter of stars and stripes. The same number which is fixed in the case of stripe-winners to justify a whipping may reasonably be assigned to star-winners to qualify for a prize. And this award of prizes is valuable in connexion with the system, since it may prevent a good boy from feeling that his stars are altogether wasted by the cancelling stripes awarded to other boys. The community thus bears the loss of all offences, the individual suffers only for his own.

At the end of each term a balance of stars, stripes and prizes is struck for each boy, and resultant stars are carried over to next term. Stripes are wiped out and forgiven so that next term all boys start with a clean sheet.

The system can well be extended by parents in co-operation with the school so that it may help in home discipline as well.

A list of the boys is posted on the school notice-board, or in each class-room in the case of large schools, and wafers are attached to the list opposite to each boy's name. A red wafer indicates a full star and a blue wafer a full stripe; a fraction written in red or blue pencil will serve to keep account of half-, or quarter-stars or stripes until it is covered by the wafer. This list makes the weekly and terminal account very easy to keep and also serves to show the boys at a glance, by the preponderance of red or blue wafers, which boys are being helpful to the community and which are standing in the way of the extra half-holiday by their idleness or other indiscretions.

To summarise the advantages of the system: it dispenses with much unnecessary punishment; it rewards effort as well as mere success; it fosters the spirit of acting for the benefit of the whole community rather than for individual gain; it facilitates cooperation with the home;

and it gives some degree of publicity to the conduct of each individual.

Another effective means of promoting cooperative rivalry in place of selfish competition is the system, 'Romans and Carthaginians', invented by the Jesuit Fathers and still used in their English schools, of dividing classes into two sides called generally Romans and Carthaginians, sometimes Athenians and Corinthians. Each side has its leader or 'Imperator', and the two leaders pick their followers alternately. Each boy has his own opponent on the opposite side. The aim of each boy is to secure for his own side more marks than are scored by the opposite side. The reward is an extra half-holiday each half-term for the winning sides. Sometimes to this are added shields denoting the winning and the losing sides.<sup>1</sup> In all memory lessons marks are given. Each boy has his own 'adversary' and stands up also if his adversary is called upon in class; if no mistake be made the boy answering scores a mark for his side; if he make a mistake his adversary corrects him, if he can, and so scores a mark for his own side. The teacher nods to the 'Imperator' of the side which is to count the victory, and the 'Imperatores' keep tally of the marks for their own sides, and each boy checks this by a record of his own victories. Marks may also be lost by individuals or by a whole side for 'slacking,' and may be earned even by the dullest boys by effort. Each day the marks are handed in and the master puts up a list in the class-room. Owing to the alternative mode of choice and the keen emulation developed, there is usually very little difference between the sides. After the half-term victory the sides are chosen again.

The system is very elastic and is used by different

<sup>1</sup> They bear the inscriptions *S.P.Q.R. VICTORIAM REPOR-  
TAT* and *SVB IVGO ITVR* respectively.

masters to different extents. It is found especially effective with young boys. An interesting variation of 'sides' may be adopted in individual lessons mainly devoted to revision of memory work, by allowing the sides to question each other in turn, boy by boy. Then if the required answer be not forthcoming the side which proposed the question scores a mark for the failure provided the answer is supplied from its own ranks.

These methods are stimulating and can be applied with or without modification in many circumstances where the teaching of formal parts of the work seems to call for some extraneous stimulus.

3. Prizes, unless their award be based upon some system such as that which we have described, are not generally desirable. To rewards strictly so called, given as marks of approbation but not promised beforehand, there can be little objection, but much can be said against the giving of prizes, that is, of rewards held out as a motive.

They are essentially worldly and appeal to worldly motives, and therefore logically reward worldly qualities. Hence they should never be given for good conduct, though that should always be a qualifying condition for receiving a prize, but they should be regarded simply as incentives to exertion for non-moral ends. For this reason care should be taken to avoid any overlapping of the prize-motive and the duty-motive, and this end is best secured by offering prizes only for voluntary work, done out of school, such as essays on given subjects, special periods of history, prose or verse compositions in English or other languages, natural history collections or other scientific work, or for artistic work or handicrafts such as wood-carving, holiday sketching, photography, and the like.

Prizes awarded upon the results of the 'Star and

Stripe' system are less objectionable than ordinary school prizes, since it is an essential feature of that system that the mere performance of duty is never rewarded even with a quarter-star, and therefore a prize given for a credit balance of stars must be given for special effort and not for perfunctory work or intellectual brilliance.

The stimulus of reward is not confined, by any means, to those rewards which are material or tangible. **Promotion ;** Promotion may be used in cases where a clever and hard-working boy is likely to profit by it. We do not refer, of course, to the periodical promotion of whole classes, but rather to the singling out of a particular boy for promotion to a higher class as a definite recognition of his industry. Care should be taken that the reason for such promotion is known by the other boys, and that such promotions are not of sufficient frequency to injure the work of the higher class or form.

School offices, such as prefectships and the captaincy of the school, are attractive rewards to the upper boys, but in lower forms, as well, the right of performing small duties may be eagerly coveted and so may be used as a reward of merit. **Offices and Duties.** The privilege even of cleaning the blackboard appeals to very young boys as a desirable thing, and the duties of fetching necessary maps, of keeping the master's cupboard tidy, or of marking attendance either at school or at games, may be distributed with good effect among deserving boys.

4. The correlatives of stimulus and reward are restraint and punishment, and, as we have considered **Restraint and Punishment.** reward, its functions and limitations, we should also accord similar consideration to the functions and limitations of punishment in school.



Functions of  
Punishment.

Punishment, as we have seen, is the reaction of any society upon an inefficient or injurious individual, or the assertion of its right to maintain itself in pursuit of its aim. Hence, punishment fails if by its severity, frequency, or unwisdom it makes a child dislike school, since it thereby alienates the will of at least one member from the intention of the community. It fails yet more disastrously if it inflict real or permanent injury whether physical or mental—if it produce either a physical cripple or a craven, timid, or untruthful character—for thereby it decreases the efficiency of the individual and of the community. And, since punishment is the reaction of society upon the individual in consequence of definite deviations from lawful conduct, it fails if it is out of all relation to the offence, for then it is felt to be not a natural reaction of the society but an act of vengeance arising out of the mere power to avenge.

Punishment in school, then, has, as its primary aim, the reformation of the offender. This is its essential feature ; it *must be* corrective or reformative. But, as we shall show later, there may be occasions when the offender needs no further reformation, but when, nevertheless, it would be unwise to let the offence go unpunished. Punishment therefore *may be* deterrent—may be used, that is to say, in order to prevent those who are not yet offenders from becoming offenders as a result of the attractiveness of the offence and the observed impunity of one who has offended. But one conception of punishment is out of place in schools : school punishment *must never be* simply retributive. It must never be possible to interpret or to explain punishment as the result of having annoyed or irritated a person—whether master, mistress or prefect—nor yet as a payment at a fixed tariff for which a corresponding offence may be com-

mitted. This is often the effect produced by school rules, or rather school prohibitions, which assign a definite penalty to the breach of each commandment. If a boy be told beforehand that a hundred lines is the penalty for being late at roll-call, he may consider carefully whether the finishing of the chapter in a story or the development of a photographic plate is worth a hundred lines, thus making the whole conception of punishment personal and selfish, and the virtue of punctuality a matter not of loyalty to the community but of personal convenience.

Now punishment at school is incurred by two very different kinds of offences—those which involve some amount of moral turpitude, and those which are merely technical violations of school rules which exist only to secure external order by restraining acts which in any other circumstances would be blameless. Very frequently no distinction is drawn by the school between these: each is an ‘offence,’ and each is punished in the same way. The result can only be a confusion in the children’s minds between the great principles of morality and the mere conventions of particular forms of society. The primary essential, then, for an administration of punishment which aims at being an instrument of discipline is that the children’s offences should be separated into these two classes.

Some, of course, are on the border-line. In itself the particular act is not positively wrong, but persistence in it may form a wrong habitude. For example, to do nothing is not at all times evil; to do nothing for part of a dull lesson is not a very serious thing from the point of view of life rather than from that of the annoyed teacher; but to form a habit of idleness means to form a slack habitude of mental and moral life. Idleness is, thus, one of those minor offences which may have a

**Punishment  
and the  
Offence :**

**Idleness ;**

serious cumulative effect, and must, therefore, be cured for the child's sake as well as for the sake of the work of the class. The most frequent plan is to punish a boy for each act of idleness by giving him extra work to do. If that be all, the punishment touches only the outward acts; it does not at all reform the habitude. So we have the common experience that the same boy is punished daily for idleness, and yet becomes continuously more idle. As an instrument of discipline the punishment has obviously failed; and it has failed because the teacher has not looked beneath the surface, and has therefore dealt only with the symptoms of the disease, not with the disease itself.

Any true dealing must treat the disease itself. In practice it is not found effective with the majority of boys to exhort them to be industrious for their own sakes: that is appealing to the same kind of feeling in the boy which has prompted him to be idle—namely, his own advantage. But when there is anything like a good tone in a class, experience has shown that it *is* effective to appeal to the boy's sense of justice and of community life. "You have been idle, and have not learnt this or that which the others have learnt; unless you get up to them you will delay their progress; so go and learn in your private time what you should have learnt during school hours." So effective has such treatment, when applied regularly, been known to be that it has become the invariable custom in a class for a boy who has been forced to be absent from school to ask the teacher spontaneously what work he should do in order to catch up to his fellows.

"But," the pedant for government may urge, "this is not punishment at all." We reply that it is the obvious reaction of the school society upon an act of which the wrong was essentially that it hindered the common progress, that it has turned the boy to repentance: in a word

that it has succeeded as a matter of discipline. In dealings with children which are intended simply to train them up to good, what more ought to be required?

If, however, such an appeal does not prove effective, and the boy comes to school the next day without having done the work, then evidently he has committed another offence—that of deliberate disobedience. And the deliberateness of this, combined with its thorough-going rebelliousness, shows that the boy in question must be brought into submission to the law before he can become a recipient of grace. No better way of convincing such a deliberate rebel of the error of the ways of rebellion has yet been discovered than a whipping. But let it be quite clear that this is the reaction on his disobedience, not on his idleness. The latter is not purged, nor are the requirements of justice met, until the boy has accepted the obligation to do again, and that to the best of his power, the neglected work.

This is, evidently, a very different thing from setting work as a punishment. The boy can see the justice of doing the work he ought to have done, and such a requirement has no tendency to form the habitude of dislike to the subject even while outward compulsion is simulating the habit of working at it. But this result is the natural outcome of setting work as a punishment for other offences, or even of setting *additional* work as a punishment for idleness. The old Protestant custom of punishing all kinds of childish misdemeanours by the learning by heart of a Psalm of David or a chapter from the Gospels is happily nearly extinct. But many of the punishments which still obtain in schools—especially in secondary schools—are of exactly the same kind. To form an inseparable association between any occupation and the deprivation of liberty, the displeasure of parent or teacher, and the general sense of



being in disgrace, is not the most obvious way of leading a child to love that occupation. If this be granted, then the time-honoured 'Imposition' goes to its long-deserved and appropriate last home—the limbo reserved for exploded fallacies.

The other common offences against order—such as talking in class, restlessness, unstable attention, and the like—are often due to physical conditions. Then they are pretty general in the class, and the only sensible treatment is one which is addressed to those physical conditions. No punishment is called for. The air of a room is not made less stuffy and oppressive by plunging a number of children into tears. So when a whole class shows signs of boredom the teacher should mentally kick himself, not cane his pupils.

But when in a generally attentive class one or two individuals show that they are not working, and so make themselves a nuisance first to the teacher, then to their class-mates, then individual treatment is needed. The great question is: Is this fidgeting or chattering a usual thing or an exceptional incident with this particular boy? If the latter, a glance, a word, or some other sign of warning, is enough. In such a case it is only the martinet pedant who is "extreme to mark what is done amiss." The wise teacher knows that no evil intent is there, that the whole incident is trivial in the extreme, and that it would be the height of folly to magnify it. But if the boy at fault habitually offends in that way, then we have the symptoms of a bad habitude. Again the treatment is effective just in so far as it reforms the habitude. Sharp reproof, even a caning, may be found needful to check the lawlessness of the outward conduct, to help the offender to remember the law—which he rather prides himself on forgetting—and to teach him that "Please, sir, I forgot" has but

narrow limits of acceptability. But, as in the former case, this governmental treatment is only preliminary: its function is to clear the ground of weeds so that discipline may have a chance of developing the good seed which is surely there, though, perhaps, nearly dead from want of cultivation.

Other small responses to small offences will be found effective means of that government which concerns itself merely with the smooth working of the scholastic machine. To call an inattentive boy to the front of the class and while he is there to ply him with questions and to make him take more than his proportionate share in the class work is not only an appropriate reaction against his having just taken less than his share, but quite generally stirs up his interest, merely dormant for a time, and then he may return to his place cured of his small disease and not merely cleansed from its symptoms.

With small boys a very effective mode of dealing with small faults in school behaviour is a few minutes' detention after school, during which the offender does absolutely nothing and is forbidden to move even a finger. Three or four minutes of this seems to the boy a very long time—as the reader may verify by himself trying to do absolutely nothing for five minutes—and as every movement adds half a minute to his imprisonment, his attention is concentrated just on doing nothing—a 'centre of interest' utterly void of interest and attraction. Moreover the plan has the advantages of not punishing the teacher as well as the boy by detention, and of not giving an irate mother time to reach the school to demand the immediate release from durance of her cherubic offspring.

A very common source of trouble in many schools is the readiness of the pupils to 'copy' from their  
**Copying ;** neighbours. Too often this is most unwisely treated. The teacher tells his class that "copying is

stealing." Of course, they are far too logical to believe him. They know quite well that the essence of stealing is the transference of property from its lawful possessor to his own use by one who has no right to it, and that when they copy they leave the person from whom they copy in full possession of his goods. Often, too, the person copied from is quite willing to give this assistance to his friend. When a boy complains "Please, sir, Jones is copying from me," there usually lies at the bottom of the complaint not an abhorrence of *this* act of Jones, but a dislike of some other act. Perhaps Jones has refused to give him a share of the sweets which he has in his pocket, or is surreptitiously eating.

Now, when Jones is willing that Brown should copy from him, it is quite hopeless to try to convince Brown that he is acting dishonestly towards Jones in accepting his help. Here again, unless the habitude be made right it is useless to treat the symptoms. Obviously, a deeper analysis is called for.

Now, in itself, the helping of one child by another is not only in no sense wrong, but is positively virtuous. And in much school work the giving of such help should be encouraged by the teachers.

Nor can we find it morally blameworthy to seek help from another which he is not willing to give. Of course, if something extraneous depend on the result so that the gain of one involves the loss of another then, and then only, copying is a kind of indirect way of securing not what is, but what might possibly become, another's. But in ordinary school work this does not hold. So there the evil of copying is not to be found in the simple relations of Brown and Jones and all attempts to place it there are doomed to the failure which is the fully deserved fate of unreality.

The evil of copying consists not in the fact that Brown

gets the help of Jones but in that he presents the result as his own unaided product. This is obviously dishonest towards the teacher, and further, by deceiving him as to Brown's knowledge it misleads him in his subsequent teaching. Brown himself, therefore, suffers educationally. He is encouraged to further idleness; he is habituated more and more to rely on others rather than on himself; he is becoming inured to lying, tacitly and in act if not overtly in word. In short, Brown is becoming a contemptible sneak and an intellectual parasite.

Now, if this is the real disease, obviously the remedy is found only when Brown is led thus to regard his conduct.

But suppose Brown is the common type in a class. We must say again that the disease is cured only when the tone of that class is changed. Nor can this change be brought about by negative means, such as not allowing neighbours to do the same sums. A want of honour cannot be cured by a parade of suspicion. If a teacher implicitly says to a class, "I know you are not to be trusted," his assertion will soon be fully justified in fact. Let him, on the contrary, say a few stimulating and encouraging words to his pupils immediately before he sets them a piece of common work which each is to do individually, and then tell them he puts them on their honour. Let him be watchful, and give a warning word to anyone he sees beginning to yield to the old habit, but let it be a word of warning rather than of reproof. Let him assume that the boys are trying to break the old habit, but let him also bear in mind that old habits are not easily broken. Let him not expect instantaneous conversion, but be satisfied with slow progress, so long as it is real progress. Further, let him only call for this severely independent work in cases where its reasonableness can be seen by the boys: in other cases let him encourage mutual helpfulness. Let him make



quite clear, in short, that copying is wrong only when it poses as independent work. Above all, let him trust his boys to mark their own sums Right or Wrong, to correct their own errors in a piece of dictation, and so on. Of course he will keep a watchful eye over all such things. But never will a wise teacher suggest to his pupils that he does not trust them, nor sow the seeds of distrust and dispute among the boys themselves, by 'changing' written exercises, so that each boy marks that of his neighbour instead of his own.

Bullying as a school offence is by no means uncommon, but the bullying as depicted by the female novelist is very rare. Of course cases may occur where a big, hulking fellow does take a cruel delight in inflicting physical pain upon a smaller or weaker boy. Some even of the savage tortures of which we read in books purporting to describe public school life may occasionally take place.

This kind of bullying does, in all probability, demand punitive treatment. In the rare cases when it is found, the bully is very appropriately shown the discomfort of severe physical pain; and by any other appeal to his better nature should be led, at the same time, to change his cowardly for a more chivalrous habitude.

But the form of bullying which is a real terror to many boys in preparatory or other schools is the oppression of a boy of weak character by another of dominating will. Physical violence may be absent altogether or, at the most, is but incidental to this kind of bullying. The bully in these cases is often the tough little chap with curly hair and blue eyes, of good physique and determined appearance, whom the novelist would select as her faultless hero and the champion of the weak, and who usually, in fact, is justly liked by his masters and by a majority of the boys. A sense of security and general happiness arising

from such popularity may have made him a little thoughtless and selfish, and his strength of will very frequently finds expression in the mental domination of one or two boys of weaker character but often, or even usually, of greater size. He enjoys issuing his commands to such boys and seeing them meekly obey him, he may even order certain humiliating acknowledgments of his power. We have heard of such a boy insisting that his victim—a boy older, physically stronger, and much bigger than himself—should lick a certain stone in the road; and of others who demand that the object of their attentions shall kneel to them in the playground and ask pardon when no offence has been committed.

The victim seldom gets much sympathy either from parents or from masters. If, in desperation, such a boy reveals the facts, he is probably met with "What? Bullied by *that* little chap? Why don't you give him a good thrashing?" But here is the real trouble. If he felt that he could do so, he would thrash his tormentor with the utmost delight, and it would be very wholesome for them both. It is lack of courage to face the bully and the possible opposition of the bully's friends that holds the softer natured or softly nurtured boy in terror and makes resistance morally impossible even though physically it might be easy.

Curative treatment rather than punishment is needed on both sides. Encouragement and sympathy, combined with the suggestion that the remedy is in his own hands, should be accorded to the victim, and care should be taken that the boy is not made to feel still further humiliated by being constantly reminded of the physical inferiority of his tormentor, a fact which is really beside the point. The bully, too, in such a case hardly needs to be punished. He can be shown the moral cowardice of his conduct, and an appeal may be made to his natural chivalry all the

more easily because he will probably recognise very readily the cowardice of ill-treating boys who are physically weaker than himself. Let the master show him frankly what the situation is and why the boy has derived enjoyment from it; let him treat the matter rather as one of thoughtlessness than as one of real ill-will; and, by positive rather than by negative exhortation, let him show that a man owes protection and kindly treatment to those who are weaker in will—to the craven and even to the criminal—no less than he owes protection to women and children by reason of their physical inferiority.

Speaking broadly, punishments are essentially of two kinds; appeals to shame and appeals to pain. The former kind is effective just in proportion as the offender feels the shame. Shame, too, must be of the right kind; it must be shame for the commission of the offence and not mere humiliation arising from public rebuke. For this reason such punishment is best administered in private, since any public attempt to evoke shame too often produces an attitude of indifference or of bravado.

Punishments of the second kind are effective in serious cases just in proportion as they accentuate and stimulate shame. Mere pain may be a deterrent from the pursuit of mere pleasure, but it has not in itself any moral efficacy. The application, therefore, of corporal punishment to moral offences must be decided on this ground, whether it does or does not accentuate shame. If caning be used as a punishment for small offences against school regulations, no particular stigma may attach to it; but if it be reserved for moral offences, then it may carry with it a stigma more punitive than the actual pain.\* Yet, it may be doubted whether the smart of severe physical pain is auxiliary to the feeling of repentance for wrong done and

not to mere repugnance to its consequences. Sin is a moral disease and requires moral treatment.

If a boy came and confessed a private sin it would be only in very exceptional circumstances, and in the case of a boy of very exceptional temperament, that a judicious schoolmaster would cane him. Now, if a caning is administered when the same sin is discovered by the master, instead of being confessed by the boy, is it the sin or the discovery which is the real object of punishment? And this question brings to our notice one of the real dangers which beset school punishment—the danger of punishing a child, not for the offence but for the discovery of it.

The whole point is ‘Does the cane help to lead a boy to repentance?’ Pain, as pain, is not much regarded by the healthy British boy. In his games he learns quickly to regard pain as incidental and negligible, and not only men but even young boys have been known to finish a game of football while suffering intense pain from broken ribs or dislocated thumbs or other injuries which do not actually incapacitate from necessary movement. In such cases it may be urged that the excitement of play, the lust of battle, may be so absorbing that the physical pain is hardly perceived until the game is over; but that cause certainly will not apply in the case of a Spartan practice current in more than one, at least, of our public schools, which takes the form of the boys taking turns in inflicting terrible and ingenious tortures on one another, with the sole object of seeing who will stand the greater amount of pain before making a sound. Pain, to a degree that no schoolmaster would dare to inflict, is cheerfully borne in cold blood by the competitors who have voluntarily chosen this game in preference to the comparatively painless occupations of chess or magazine reading.

With such boys, obviously, pain, for its own sake, can



have little punitive value, and our conclusion must be that punishments which depend mainly upon the pain that they cause have no effect as educative agents, or have effect only as an appeal to a particularly low and craven part of an unmanly child's nature. Upon the will, upon the moral character, they can have no effect excepting that which arises from a child's consideration of such punishment as being a payment in full for the offence. This is right enough when the offence is mainly technical, but with *sin* we must desire a treatment which continues till the fault has been overcome. "To give a boy a punishment and then suppose that you have done your duty, is a fatal misconception. Having forcibly arrested his attention you must bring other forces to bear upon him—exhortation, encouragement, tactful guidance, until he voluntarily chooses the right path."<sup>1</sup>

As to caning for smaller offences, to which, in effect, our foregoing argument has practically limited corporal punishment, the chief objection is its facility. It tends in many classes to become the only form of reproof. Irritation is aroused, breaches of sympathy are created or widened, continual interruptions are caused in the work of the class. Such punishment has no disciplinary value, and we venture to think that if the system of awarding 'Stars and Stripes' were adopted, or some simple modification of it were devised by the teacher, the appeal to shame would be more direct and consequently more effective as a real discipline, and the use of corporal punishment would be reduced to a minimum.

It is unfortunately frequently overlooked by school-

<b>Punishment and the Offender:</b>	masters that punishment is directed not against an offence, as a mere occurrence, but against the deed of an offender; and since
---	--

<sup>1</sup> H. Bompas Smith : *Boys and their Management in School*, p. 76.

the form of punishment is, as we have seen, appropriately modified to suit the offence committed, it may be well to examine next that relation of the offender to his crime which makes these apparently contradictory considerations reconcileable.

The mere facts of any occurrence do not by themselves indicate the line of action to be followed as a  
**Motive ;** consequence. To take a simple and extreme case:—We know that A has plunged a knife into the body of B. Is his action wrong or right? Without information or evidence as to his motive we cannot say whether A is an assassin or a surgeon. And as in this crude case we see that intention determines the merit or demerit of an action, so it may readily be seen that the attitude of an offender with regard to his offence may affect in very delicate gradation the action taken by the community with reference to the treatment of crime.

To say that “sin is the transgression of the Law”  
 is only partially to express the truth. It is  
**Law and** true only from the standpoint of the law-  
**Personality ;** abiding person. To the law-breaker it is less the actual transgression than the failure to realise the law. So long as the law against murder forms part of the scheme of ideas which governs a man’s actions he is incapable of murdering. He may, as a soldier, take life without personal provocation and without the motive of self-defence, but he is not considered, he does not consider himself, and he *is* not a murderer.

But when murder ceases to be repugnant to a man, either through a general blunting of the moral sense or through the preponderating influence of some vicious motive, then he is potentially, if not actually, a murderer. His personality has undergone a definite change, whether he has actually killed or not.

Let us assume that restraining motives of fear of discovery and punishment are not sufficient, or that imagination of the consequences to society and to himself is not keen enough, to prevent the deed, and he becomes actually as well as potentially a murderer. The pulling of a trigger, the thrust of a knife, have effected no change in the man's personality, and he remains on the whole well-pleased with the result of his action. He *remains* a murderer.

Or we may take a second case in which, independently of fear of punishment, the death of his victim fills the murderer with remorse. He loathes the deed; he loathes the motives which led him to the deed; he loathes himself—that is, his *former* self—for being susceptible to the influence of those motives. He would give anything in his power to recall his action, he would voluntarily undergo any penalty to expiate it, if that were possible. In a word, his remorse has produced repentance, and so his personality has undergone a change.

This change of personality may, perhaps, take place before the actual commission of the crime. By no stretch of imagination or of language could he then be called a murderer. But if the deed has actually been committed, may we not say, if the change of personality has also occurred, that he has *ceased* to be a murderer?

Now the functions of punishment have been stated above. It *must* be corrective or reformative, it *may* also be deterrent.

In the case of the man of whom we have said that he has ceased to be a murderer, no fresh reformation is needed. His personality has so changed that it is obviously now impossible for him to offend in the same way again. He may even earnestly

**Remorse and  
Repentance ;**

**Expiation ;**

desire some form of punishment to satisfy himself in some degree, even though he may recognise that no penalty can adequately balance his offence; but it is for his personal satisfaction that he desires it, and not for the purpose of aiding his reformation or of protecting the community against himself; for his reformation is complete and therefore, so far as he is concerned, the community is safe.

We cannot, however, be content to discharge him with a caution. The fear of punishment which was not enough, in his case, to deter him from the crime may in other cases protect society from the acts of others who already are potential, but not actual, murderers, that is, of those persons whose personalities are not invariably and essentially opposed to the idea of killing.

And thus we reach an apparent paradox: that the more punishment is felt by the offender to be merited, the less it becomes necessary, so far as he alone is concerned, to inflict it. In other words, the corrective value of punishment is in proportion to the acceptance of its necessity by the culprit. Therefore it is only *perfectly* successful when it is perfectly unnecessary.

But here is the suitable opportunity for a penalty that will be deterrent. The culprit recognises the justice of punishment, may even desire it as an expiation of his offence, and it is simply by undergoing an exemplary punishment that expiation can be made. By personal suffering he can benefit the community that he has injured. He will not murder again as long as he lives, whether his punishment be death by torture or a mild reprimand. But these sentences upon the immediate culprit will have a widely differing effect on Bill Sykes who for the moment is a mere spectator in the body of the court, but whose programme for the evening includes burglary with a fair chance of homicide.



We have stated above that the corrective value of punishment is in proportion to the acceptance of its necessity by the culprit. In other words, it is of value only in so far as his personality rejects the offence, and identifies itself with that particular manifestation of the spirit of Right which, in the present instance, is embodied in the person authorised to punish.

How then can punishment be operative on the personality which is still identified with crime and opposed to Right?

In such cases the effect of punishment may be of two kinds according to the nature of the offence and the temperament of the offender. If the offence be merely a habit, undesirable socially but physically attractive to the offender, punishment may be of use as a coercive measure to check the repetition of the offence until the 'patient' is enabled to learn that immunity from the habitude is of more value, and is productive of more real pleasure, than the habit itself can give. It is with this end in view that punishment in its simplest forms is used. Bitter aloes on a child's fingertips checks the socially undesirable but physically attractive habitude of biting the nails, until the child is old enough or has enough experience to make a deliberate and wiser choice of food stuffs or of occupation.

But where the commission of the offence depends more upon deliberate choice, and less upon mere physical desire, punishment serves only to prevent its occurrence on certain definite occasions, and may have the injurious effect of creating a double personality in the offender—a personality which ardently desires, and sees no objection to, the practice of the prohibited actions, but which at the same time refrains from them with reluctance and with the determination to practise them when liberty of action is restored or obtained.

It is in such cases as these, when there is also in the personality of the offender an egotistic habit of mind, that punishment is apt to produce a sulky or rebellious spirit and to do, from the educative point of view, the greatest harm. It is in such characters that punishment produces what is known as the hardened offender, an offender who still enjoys the commission of the offence and regards himself merely as an ill-used person, ill-used because the society in which he lives is stronger than he, and is in a position arbitrarily to exercise a coercive authority.

But here again punishment may have its chief value as a deterrent and may therefore not be wholly out of place.

In recognition of these complex ethical and psychological principles, most schools are gradually relying less and less upon punishment as an educative factor or as a factor in government. Many schools, indeed, especially schools for girls, claim to have succeeded in doing away with punishment in any form excepting that of rebuke or other evidence of displeasure. Obviously, forcible punishments are undesirable if better results can be obtained by other means, and it is equally obvious that the ideal of all discipline is to make punishment unnecessary. But not less obvious is it that, so long as both teachers and children are peccable, the possibility of punishment neither can nor should be banished from any school which claims to be a place of real moral training.

## INDEX.

---

### A BOLITION OF SCHOOL punishment, 252

Action : rash and wise, 111-2

Acts : virtuous and vicious, 69-70

*Adams* : on example and precept, 86

„ : on value of moral habits, 39

*Adler* : on ethical instruction, 83-4 ; 86-7

Adolescence and ideals, 76-7

„ : temptations of, 115-116

*Aidōs* : Greek conception of, 90

Aim of moral training, 12-14

„ of teaching, 3-7

Aims : spiritual and material, 73-4

Analysis of virtue, 77-9

Appeals to head-teacher, 182-4

Arabic proverb, 135

*Aretē* : Greek conception of, 68

*Aristotle* : on human Good, 57

„ : on moral instruction, [84

Asceticism, 63

Aspirations, 76

Assimilation of child to surroundings, 7-8

Assistant teachers : relations to head, 181-6

Associations : human, 52

‘Athenians and Corinthians,’ 232-3

Athletics : teachers and, 177

Authority as basis of school law, 134-5

Authority : need of, 44-8

Autocracy of conscience, 104-5

‘Average child,’ 149

### B OARDING SCHOOLS : leisure in, 193-6

Boarding schools : relation to home, 180 ; 221

„ „ : visits of parents to, 221

Boer father, 202-3

Boys’ and girls’ standards of order, 160-1

Boys’ Brigades, 9

*Bryant, Mrs.* : on realists and idealists, 76-7

Bullying : treatment of, 243-5

Bureaucracy : evils of, 130-1

*Butler, S.* : on ‘compounding for sins,’ 94

### C ADET CORPS, 9

Capacity and duty, 54

Capacity and morality, 2-3

„ and teaching, 3-4

Capriciousness in governing children, 137

Cardinal virtues, 78-9

*Castiglione* : on nature of virtue, 73

„ : on training in virtue, 36-7 ; 39

Change of habitudes, 28-30 ; 35

- { Character and habits, 23-4  
   ,, : good, 13; 17-19  
   ,, : training of through government, 159  
 Characteristics of moral instruction, 87  
 Charity and justice, 96-7  
 Chattering: treatment of, 239  
 Childhood and virtue, 97-8  
 Children and motives, 19  
   ,, and wrong acts, 70  
   ,, : differences in, 18-9; 149-51  
   ,, : free development of, 17-8  
   ,, : influence of surroundings on, 7-8  
   ,, : relations to world, 14-7  
   ,, : temptations of, 94-5  
 Choice of means, 61  
*Church Catechism*: on duties to self, 78  
   ,, : on duty in life, 125  
 Classification of duties, 78  
   ,, of virtues, 77-8  
 Coercive punishment, 250-1  
 Comfort in school, 196-7; 222  
 Common life: educative effect of, 119-23  
 Community: nature of, 124-9  
 Competition in school, 32  
 Compulsory games, 191-2  
 Conduct and conscience, 99-101  
   ,, : realisation of ideas of, 83  
 Conflict of ends, 61-4  
   ,, of moral maxims, 64-6  
 Conscience and conduct, 99-101  
   ,, and frustrated intentions, 100-1  
   ,, and future acts, 99-100  
   ,, and habitude, 112  
   ,, and past acts, 101  
   ,, and prejudice, 105-6  
   ,, and self-complacency, 105-6  
 Conscience and will, 111-2  
   ,, : appeals to, 117-8  
   ,, : development of, 111-5  
   ,, : education of, 110-118  
   ,, : emotional aspect, 103-4  
   ,, : exercise of, 99-101; 103  
   ,, : inner and outer, 105  
   ,, : mistakes of, 105  
   ,, : sensitiveness of, 110-1  
   ,, : validity of, 105-7  
 Constraint and duty, 41-4  
   ,, and freedom, 48-54  
   ,, in home and school, 43-4  
   ,, : justification of, 44-8  
   ,, : nature of, 41-3  
   ,, : positive and negative, 58-9  
 Copying: treatment of, 240-3  
 Corporal punishment: power to inflict, 184-6  
   ,, : use of, 247  
 Courage, 91-2  
*Cousin, V.*: on duty, 54  
*Crabbe*: on 'the tyrant-boy,' 147-8  
 Cultivation of wisdom, 83-7
- DAY SCHOOLS: GAMES**  
   in, 192-3  
 Day schools: house system in, 192-3  
   ,, : relation to home, 180-1  
 Deliberation and impulse, 113-4  
 Detention, 240  
 Deterrent punishment, 235-6  
 Development of conscience, 111-5  
 Diagram representing relations of government discipline and influence, 156



*Dickens*: on children and injustice, 137  
 Difficulty of life, 82  
 Direction in moral instruction, 85-6  
 Disciplinarian: the overwhelming, 145-6  
 Disciplinary use of fear, 140; 171-3  
 Discipline: aim of, 19  
 „ and duty, 54-5  
 „ and organization, 180  
 „ and supervision, 151-152  
 „ as personal relation, 143-4  
 „ : effect on self-assertion, 123  
 „ : function of, 142  
 „ : relations in, 168-9  
 „ : relation to government, 142; 153-5; 156  
 „ : relation to influence, 155-6  
 „ : variation with children, 148-151  
 Disobedience: treatment of, 238  
 Double personality, 20  
 Duties as stimulus, 234  
 „ : classification of, 78  
 „ of parents, 217-20  
 „ of school, 206-17  
 Duty and capacity, 54  
 „ and constraint, 41-4  
 „ and discipline, 54-5  
 „ and habitudes, 38-9  
 „ and inclination, 62-4; 224-225  
 „ and life, 56-61  
 „ and pleasure, 63-4  
 „ and relations to parents, 39-41  
 „ and virtue, 68-9  
 „ as inward force, 54-6  
 „ : decision of, 61-6  
 „ : development of, 60-1  
 „ : origin of, 39-41  
 „ : standard of, 59-61

**E** DUCATION AND INDIVIDUALITY, 17-20  
 Education and morality, 1-7  
 „ in family, 202-4  
 „ of conscience, 110-8  
 Educative effect of common life, 119-23  
*Eliot, G.*: on embodied ideas, 75  
 „ : on meaning and doing, 100  
 Embodiment of purpose, 74-7  
*Emile* (Rousseau's) at fifteen years old, 46  
 „ „ at twelve years old, 45  
 Emotion and conscience, 103-4  
 Employment after school, 215-7  
 Emulation defined, 32  
 Ends: conflict of, 61-4  
 Errors of conscience, 105-6  
 Erudition and thought, 177  
*Esprit de corps*, 199-201  
 Ethical analysis of conduct, 86  
*Ethos* of school, 197-9  
 Eton Workhouse school, 11  
*Eucken*: on aim of education, 65  
 „ : on child and responsibility, 55  
 Experience and wisdom, 83  
 Expiation of offences, 249-51

**F**ACTORY AS AN ORGANIZED community, 52-3; 127-9  
 Family education, 202-4  
 „ : formative of habitudes, 30  
 Fear: appeal to, 140; 171-3  
 Feeling: relations of, 14-5  
 Fidgeting: treatment of, 239  
 Field Clubs, 215  
 Foolhardiness and courage, 92  
 Fortitude and courage, 91  
 Freedom and human constraint, 50-4  
 „ and physical constraint, 49-50  
 „ and purpose, 49; 53

Freedom and society, 52-4  
 „ : nature of, 48-54

## GAMES AND HOUSE system, 192-3

Games : compulsory, 191-2  
 „ : organization of, 191-3  
 Generosity and justice, 97  
*Geöcze, Mde de* : on influence of  
 school-mates, 121-2  
*Gladstone, W. E.* : on duty, 57  
 God : omniscience of, 95  
 Good character, development of,  
 13 ; 17-9

Government and age of pupils,  
 161

„ and discipline, 139  
 „ and sex of pupils,  
 160-1

„ and social position  
 of pupils, 161-2

„ and training of  
 character, 159

„ as formative of  
 habits, 158

: difficulties of, 169-  
 170

„ : evils of too strict,  
 143-4 ; 167-8

„ : failure of, 170-1

„ : functions of, 157-9

„ : laxity in, 163-4

„ : need of, 139 ; 157

„ : reasonable, 166-7

„ : relation to discip-  
 line, 142 ; 153-5 ;  
 156

„ : relation to pupils,  
 160-2

„ : relation to teacher,  
 159-60

„ : rigidity in, 164-8

„ : teacher's standard  
 of, 162-3

Greek conception of *aidōs*, 90

„ „ of *aretē*, 68

*Grenfell, A. G.* : system of 'Stars  
 and Stripes,' 229-32

Group-consciousness, 121-3  
 Growth of virtues and vices, 71  
 Guidance : moral, 115-7

## HABITS AND CHARAC- ter, 23-4

Habits and government, 158

„ and habitudes, 24-5

„ : origin of, 21-2

„ : place in life, 22-3

Habitude and conscience, 112

„ and duty, 38-9

Habitudes and family, 30

„ and lessons, 33-5

„ and life, 25-7

„ and purpose, 37

„ and school games, 33

„ and virtue, 69-71 ;  
 81-2

„ : change of, 28-30 ;  
 35

„ : danger of, 27

„ in school life, 30-7

„ : relation to habits,  
 24-5

„ : strength of, 25-7

Head-teacher and assistants,  
 181-6

„ : appeals to, 182-4

„ : functions of, 131-  
 132

„ : influence on  
 school tone,  
 144-5 ; 152

Heaven, 224-5

*Heracitus* : on wisdom, 82

*Herbart* : on education and mor-  
 ality, 1

*Herodotus* : on force of custom,  
 108

Heroism, 60

Hero-worship, 75-6

History and morality, 5

Holidays of boarding-house  
 pupils, 222-3

Home : character of, 8-9

„ : discontent with school,  
 202-4

Home: failure to understand school, 205-6  
 „ : influence of, 7-10  
 „ : relation to school, 10 ; 202-23  
 House-master and boys' leisure, 195  
 'House' system in day schools, 192-3  
 'Hudibras': quotation from, 94  
 Human relations, 15-7

**I**DEALISM IN YOUTH, 76-7  
 Ideas as purposes, 75-7  
 Ideas of conduct: realisation of, 83  
 Idleness: treatment of, 55-6 ; 236-9  
*Idylls of the King*: passage from, 16  
 Ignorance and culpability, 113-114  
 Impositions, 236 ; 237-9  
 Impulse and deliberation, 113-4  
 Inattention: treatment of, 240  
 Inclination and duty, 62-4 ; 224-225  
 Incompatibility between home and school, 205-6  
 Individual and society, 52-4  
 „ : influence on school tone, 148  
 Influence of home, 7-10  
 „ of school, 10-12  
 „ : relation to discipline, 155-6  
 Insight: moral, 114-5  
 Instruction and tone, 10-12  
 „ : moral, 83-91  
 Intelligence and conduct, 80-3  
 „ of teacher, 177  
 „ : relations of, 14-5  
 Intending and doing, 80-1  
 Intention and act, 248  
 Intercourse between teachers and parents, 207-9  
 Interference of parents with school, 204-5 ; 218-9

**J**ESUIT SYSTEM OF  
 'sides,' 232-3  
 Judgment of others, 59-60  
 Justice, 95-7  
 Justification of constraint, 44-8

**K**NOWLEDGE of Teacher, 177

**L**ABOUR OF MARKING, 228

Laxity in government, 163-4  
 Laws of community: nature of, 126-7  
 Leisure-time in boarding schools, 193-6  
 „ in day schools, 213-5  
 Lending libraries, 215  
 Letters from parents to teachers, 219  
 „ from teachers to parents, 209  
 Life and duty, 56-61  
 „ and habits, 22-3  
 „ and habitudes, 25-7  
 „ and morality, 1-3  
 „ : difficulty of, 82  
 Literature and morality, 5-6  
 Local Authorities: functions of, 130-1  
 Luxury during holidays, 222-3  
 „ in school, 197

**M**ANLINESS, 91-2  
 Marks, 226-9

Martinet government: evils of, 143-4 ; 167-8  
 Master and future pursuits of pupils, 215-7  
 „ and prefects, 175-6  
 „ and pupil: relation of, 171-2 ; 173-6  
 Materialism, 71-4  
 Mathematics and morality, 4-5  
 Maxims: conflict of, 64-6  
 Means: choice of, 61

Method : necessary to teacher, 179

*Milton* : on compulsion, 4

Mistakes of conscience, 105-6

Mohammedan paradise, 225

Monitors in elementary schools, 187-8

Moral development : order of, 75-6

„ guidance, 115-7

„ ideas : extension of, 115

„ insight, 109-10 ; 114-5

„ instruction, 83-91

„ thoughtfulness, 27 ; 113-4

„ training : aim of, 12-14

Morality and capacity, 2-3

„ and education, 1-7

„ and history, 5

„ and life, 1-3

„ and literature, 5-6

„ and mathematics, 4-5

„ and religion, 87-8 ; 115

„ and school, 7

„ and teaching, 3-7

„ : progress in, 109-10

„ : teaching of, 83-91

Motive and act, 248

*Mulcaster* : on public nature of education, 120-1

Museums, 215

Mutual help in work, 241

**N**ATURAL HISTORY SOCIETIES, 215

Negation of habitudes, 28-30 ; 35

Negative commands, 58-9

Neglect : parental, 203-4

*Newbolt* : on life and rewards, 228

Nirvana, 224

Non-human relations, 15-7

**O**BBLIGATIONS AND rights, 123-4

Occupation of leisure in boarding schools, 193-6.

„ of leisure in day schools, 213-5

Offences : kinds of, 236

Officers : disciplinary, 181-91

Offices as stimulus, 234

Omniscience of God, 95

Order and age of pupils, 161

„ and sex of pupils, 160-1

„ and social position of pupils, 161-2

„ : laxity in, 163-4

„ : need of, 158

„ : reasonable, 166-7

„ : rigidity in, 164-8

„ : standards of, 159-68

Organization and discipline, 180

Origin of duty, 39-41

„ of habits, 21-2

Outer conscience, 105

**P**AIN : APPEALS TO, 245-7

Parental interference in school, 204-5

Parental neglect, 203-4

Parents and authority of teacher, 217-8 ; 219-20

„ and education, 9

„ : intercourse of teachers with, 207-9

„ : interference with work of school, 218-9

„ : letters to, 209

„ : letters to teachers, 219

„ : loyalty to teachers, 219-20

„ : physical care of children, 220

„ : visits to boarding schools, 221

Patriotism in school and house, 199-201

Penny dreadfuls, 214

Personality, 13-4

„ : double, 20

Photographic Societies, 215

Physical care of children, 220

*Plato* : on enchanting the soul, 149

„ : on will and capacity, 1

Pleasure and duty, 63-4 ; 224-5



'Pluck,' 92  
 Precept : moral, 86  
 Prefects and boys' leisure, 195  
   " and master, 175-6  
   " : appointment of, 188-9  
   " : duties of, 190-1  
   " : in boarding schools, 188-91  
   " : in day schools, 186-7  
   " : in preparatory schools, 188  
 Prejudice and conscience, 105-6  
 Principles of school training, 37  
 Prizes, 233-4  
 Progress in apprehension of moral law, 109-10  
 Prohibitions, 58-9  
 Promotion, 234  
 Proverb, Arabic, 135  
*Proverbs* : on vanity of pleasure, 72-3  
 Prudence, 46 ; 79-80  
 Punishment : abolition of, 252  
   " : abuse of, 238  
   " : coercive, 251-2  
   " : corporal : power to inflict, 184-6  
   " : corporal : use of, 247  
   " : disciplinary, 173  
   " : evils of, 141  
   " : failures of, 235  
   " : functions of, 140-1 235-6  
   " : kinds of, 245-7  
   " : need of, 140-1  
 Punishments : unjustifiable, 141-142  
 Pupil and master : relation of, 171-2 ; 173-6  
 Purpose and freedom, 49 ; 53  
   " and habitude, 37  
   " and school training, 36-37  
   " and virtue, 71-7  
   " : embodiment of, 74-7  
   " in school : unity of, 130  
 Purposes : spiritual and material, 73-4

**R**ASH ACTION, 111-2  
 Realism in youth, 76-7  
 Recklessness and courage, 92  
 Recollectedness, 118  
 Reformatory punishment, 235  
 Relations of child to world : objective side, 15-7  
 Relations of child to world : subjective side, 14-5  
 Religion and conscience, 115  
   " " morality, 87-8  
 Religious guilds, 9  
 Remorse, 101-2 ; 249  
 Repentance, 101-2 ; 249  
   " and punishment, 245-246  
 Reports on children, 209-12 ; 221  
 Reserve of teacher, 178  
 Retributive punishment, 235-6  
 Reverence, 88-91  
 Rewards, 233-4  
 Riches and wisdom, 73  
 Rights and obligations, 123-4  
 Rigidity in government, 164-8  
 'Romans and Carthaginians,' 232-3  
*Rousseau* : on aim of life, 45  
   " : on children's impulses, 45  
   " : on contemporary education, 44  
   " : on habit, 23  
   " : on human development, 45  
   " : on love of childhood, 44  
   " : on man's freedom, 47 ; 50  
   " : on nature of happiness, 45  
   " : on obedience in childhood, 45  
   " : on punishment of children, 45  
   " : on relation of child to nature, 46  
   " : on social relations, 46 ; 46-7 ; 50  
*Rugby* : prefects at, 189

- Ruskin* : on advancement in life, 73  
 „ : on essentials of education, 88  
 „ : on object of education, 74-5

# ST. GEORGE'S CLUB, 215

- St. Paul* : on charity, 97  
 School and family, 119-20  
 School and future pursuits of pupils, 215-17  
 „ „ habitudes, 30-7  
 „ „ moral purpose, 7  
 „ „ moral training, 55  
 „ „ teaching, 6-7  
 „ as a community, 125 ; 129-133  
 „ as self-governing, 142 ; 144-5  
 „ -cap, 199  
 „ : duties of, 206-17  
 „ : failure to meet home demands, 205-6  
 „ -feeling and house-feeling, 200-1  
 „ government : functions of, 157-9  
 „ habitudes, 32-5  
 „ : influence of, 10-2  
 „ laws : basis of, 134-5  
 „ „ : breadth of, 138  
 „ „ : characteristics of, 133-8  
 „ „ : enforcement of, 138-42  
 „ „ : justice of, 137  
 „ „ : kinds of, 133  
 „ „ : nature of, 127  
 „ „ : publicity of, 138  
 „ „ : reasonableness of, 135-6  
 „ „ : recognition of, 132-3 ; 136  
 „ organization, 129-30  
 „ : relation to home, 10 ; 202-23  
 „ tone, 143-8 ; 197-201

- School tone and individuals, 146-8  
 „ „ : improvement of, 199  
 „ „ : variations of, 198  
 „ tradition, 143 ; 147  
 „ training and purpose, 36-7  
 „ : unity of purpose, 130  
 Schoolmaster : qualities of, 177-9  
 „ : skilful, 129-30  
 Schools : day and boarding, 180-1  
 Scouts' patrols, 9 ; 215  
*Séailles* : on love of truth, 90-1  
 „ : on relation of duty to child, 54  
 Self-assertion of childhood, 122-123  
 Self-complacency and conscience, 105-6  
 Selfishness and justice, 96  
 Self-knowledge, 90  
 Sensationalism, 72-4  
 Sensitiveness : moral, 110-1  
 Sentimentalism, 104  
*Shakespeare* : on truth to self, 96  
 Shame : appeal to, 116-7 ; 245-7  
 'Sides,' 232-3  
*Sidgwick, A.* : on moral instruction, 84-5  
 Sin : dealings with, 116-8 ; 175 ; 246-7  
*Smith, H. Bompas* : on insufficiency of punishment, 247  
*Smith, Sydney* : on meaning of Education, 134-5  
 „ „ : on need of discipline, 145  
 „ „ : on obedience, 135  
 Societies for leisure pursuits, 215  
 Society and the individual, 52-4  
 Solecisms : social, 103-4  
 Sound-mindedness, 93-5  
 Spartan boy and theft, 107-8  
*Spencer, H.* : on educative value of science, 89  
 „ : on method of teaching, 89

*Spiller, G.* : on morals and teaching, 4

Spoilt child, 48

'Stars and Stripes,' 229-32

Stimulus of marks, 228-9

*Stevenson, R. L.* : on aspirations, 76

„ : on courage and intelligence, 80

„ : on desire and curiosity, 85

„ : on devotion to business, 72  
on effect of years, 94

„ : on inspiration of *The Revenge*, 87

„ : on prudence, 46

„ : on serviceable life, 91

„ : on the weak brother, 47

Strength of habitudes, 25-7

„ of will, 62-3

Suggestion and command, 59

Supervision and discipline, 151-152

Sympathy : as basis of school law, 134-5

**TALKATIVENESS** : treatment of, 239

Tasks as Punishments, 237-9

Teacher and future pursuits of pupils, 215-7

„ and pupil : relations of, 171-2 ; 173-6

„ : intercourse with parents, 207-9

„ : letters to parents, 209

„ qualities of, 177-9

Teaching and capacity, 3-4

„ „ morality, 3-7

„ „ schools, 6-7

Teaching : need for natural aptitude, 170-1

„ of morality, 83-91

Temperance, 92-5

*Temple, Dr.* : as governor, 137

Temptation, 93-4

*Tennyson* : passage from *Idylls of the King*, 16

Text-books : change of, 212

Theft in ancient Sparta and in modern states, 107-8

Thoughtfulness, 113-4

*Thring* : on dealing with sins, 116

„ : on external interference, 131

Tone and Instruction, 10-2

„ in school, 143-8 ; 197-201

Tradition : school, 143 ; 147

Training of conscience, 111

Treatment of idleness, 55-6

*Tufnell* : report on Workhouse schools, 11-2

'Tyrant boy,' 147-8

**UNITY OF PURPOSE IN**  
school, 130

**VALHALLA**, 224

Validity of conscience, 105-7

Variations in conceptions of duty, 107-10

„ in treatment of children, 137

*Vergerius* : definition of emulation, 32

Vices : growth of, 71

Vicious acts, 69-70

Virtue : analysis of, 77-9

„ and childhood, 97-8

„ „ duty, 68-9

„ „ habitudes, 69-71 ; 81-2

„ „ purpose, 71-7

„ : nature of, 67-8

Virtues : cardinal, 74-9  
       : classification of, 77-8  
 Virtuous acts, 84-79  
 Visits of parents to boarding  
   schools, 529

## WILL AND CONSCIENCE.

Will : relations of, 14-5  
       : strength of, 62-3  
 Will : in religious education,  
   88

Wimbor Workhouse school, 11-2  
 Wisdom, 74-81  
       and experience, 83  
       and riches, 73  
       : cultivation of, 82-7  
*Wisdom of Solomon* : on the car-  
   dinal virtues, 74-9  
 Wise action, 141-2  
*Worldwell* : on qualities of  
   life, 88  
 World : relations of child to,  
   14-7  
 Wrong acts of children, 70



1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 84

## Education, etc.

**Principles and Methods of Teaching.** By J. WELTON, M.A., Professor of Education in the University of Leeds. Present Price, 4s. 6d.

CONTENTS.—General Function of Teaching—Material of Instruction—Form of Instruction—The Teaching of English: Preparatory, Reading, Literature, Composition and Grammar, Summary—Music—History—Geography—Natural History—Mathematics—Form—Needlework.

"A well-written and full presentation of the best educational methods of the time. Not only to college student, but to skilled and experienced practitioner, we commend this suggestive and very helpful volume."—*Schoolmaster*.

**The Teaching of Foreign Languages.** A Supplement to *Principles and Methods of Teaching*. By F. B. KIRKMAN, B.A. 1s.

**Principles and Methods of Moral Training with special reference to School Discipline.** By Professor JAMES WELTON, M.A., and F. G. BLANDFORD, M.A., Lecturer in Education at the Cambridge University Training College.

"A succinct and well-reasoned exposition, both theoretical and practical, of the ethics of school discipline."—*Scotsman*.

**Principles and Methods of Physical Education and Hygiene.** By W. P. WELPTON, B.Sc., Master of Method in the University of Leeds. With a Short Sketch of the History of Physical Education by Professor WELTON. 4s. 6d.

"A comprehensive scientific text-book."—*The Times*.

**School Hygiene.** By R. A. LYSTER, M.D., B.Sc., D.P.H., Chief Medical Officer to the Education Committee of the Hampshire County Council. *Second Edition*. 3s. 6d.

"The best book of its kind."—*British Medical Journal*.

**School Organisation.** By S. E. BRAY, M.A., Inspector of Schools to the London County Council. 2s.

"We can heartily recommend the treatise."—*Journal of Education*.

**Voice Training in Speech and Song.** By H. H. HULBERT, M.A., M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P., Lecturer on Voice Production to the London County Council, etc. 1s. 6d.

"It will pay any teacher to get this book and read it carefully."—*Schoolmaster*.

**The Science of Speech.** An Elementary Manual of English Phonetics for Teachers. By B. DUMVILLE, M.A. 2s. 6d.

"A concise, accurate, and interesting little manual written by one who is evidently a master of the subject of phonetics, and knows how to communicate information."—*Nature*.

## Mathematics and Mechanics.

**Algebra, The Tutorial.** ADVANCED COURSE. By WM. BRIGGS, LL.D., M.A., B.Sc., and G. H. BRYAN, Sc.D., F.R.S. 6s. 6d.

A higher text-book of Algebra in which the more elementary properties of quadratic equations and progressions are assumed.

"It is throughout an admirable work."—*Journal of Education*.

**Algebra, The New Matriculation.** With a Section on Graphs. By R. DEAKIN, M.A., late Headmaster of Stourbridge Grammar School. *Fourth Edition*. 3s. 6d.

"The scope and material of this book are comprehensive and full. Clearness of idea and accuracy of work are insisted on."—*Schoolmaster*.

**Arithmetic, The Tutorial.** By W. P. WORKMAN, M.A., B.Sc. *Third Edition*. (With or without Answers.) 4s. 6d.

A higher text-book of Arithmetic containing a very thorough treatment of Arithmetical theory, with numerous typical examples.

"Takes first place among our text-books in Arithmetic."—*Schoolmaster*.

**Arithmetic, The School.** An edition of the *Tutorial Arithmetic* for school use. By W. P. WORKMAN, M.A., B.Sc. *Second Edition*. (With or without Answers.) In one vol., 3s. 6d. Part I., 2s. Part II., 2s.

"The best Arithmetic for schools on the market."—*Mathematical Gazette*.

**Arithmetic, The Junior.** Adapted from the *Tutorial Arithmetic* by R. H. CHOPE, B.A. (With or without Answers.) 2s. 6d.

"Excellent."—*Educational Times*.

**Arithmetic, Clive's New Shilling.** Edited by WM. BRIGGS, LL.D., M.A., B.Sc. 1s. With Answers, 1s. 3d. ANSWERS, 6d.

"These exercises are well chosen and progressive."—*Schoolmaster*.

**Arithmetic, The Primary.** Edited by WM. BRIGGS, LL.D., M.A., B.Sc., F.R.A.S. An Introductory Course of Arithmetical Exercises. In Three Parts. Parts I. and II., each 6d. Part III., 9d. With Answers, each Part 1d. extra.

"Thoroughly suited for use in elementary schools generally."—*School Guardian*.

**Astronomy, Elementary Mathematical.** By C. W. C. BARLOW, M.A., B.Sc., and G. H. BRYAN, Sc.D., M.A., F.R.S. 6s. 6d.

**Coordinate Geometry.** By J. H. GRACE, M.A., F.R.S., and F. ROSENBERG, M.A., B.Sc. 4s. 6d.

An elementary treatment of the straight line, circle, and conic.

**Dynamics, The Tutorial.** By WM. BRIGGS, LL.D., M.A., B.Sc., and G. H. BRYAN, Sc.D., F.R.S. *Second Edition*. 3s. 6d.

## Mathematics and Mechanics—continued.

**Euclid.** By RUPERT DEAKIN, M.A. With an Introductory Course of Drawing and Problems in Practical Geometry. Books I., II., 1s. Books I.-IV., 2s. 6d. Books V., VI., XI., 1s. 6d.

**Geometry, Theoretical and Practical.** By W. P. WORKMAN, M.A., B.Sc., and A. G. CRACKNELL, M.A., B.Sc., F.C.P.

PART I. Contains the matter of Euclid, I., III. (1-34), IV. (1-9). 2s. 6d.

PART II. Euclid, II., IV. (10-16), VI. 2s.

PART III. Contains the matter of Euclid XI. 1s. 6d.

This work is also published in two volumes under the titles :—  
**Matriculation Geometry** (containing the matter of Euclid I.-IV.). 2s. 6d. **Intermediate Geometry** (containing the matter of Euclid VI., XI.). 2s. 6d.

"One of the best books on modern lines."—*Oxford Magazine.* (Part I.)

"Sound and sensible throughout."—*Nature.* (Part II.)

"The three parts now issued form an excellent work."—*School World.*

**The School Geometry.** Being an edition of *Geometry, Theoretical and Practical*, Parts I. and II., specially adapted for ordinary school use. In one vol., 3s. 6d.

PART I. Containing the matter of Euclid I., III. (1-34), IV. (1-9). 2s.

PART II. Containing the matter of Euclid II., III. (35-37), IV. (10-16), and VI. 2s.

This book is so arranged that it can be used side by side in class with *Geometry, Theoretical and Practical*, if desired.

**Introduction to the School Geometry.** 1s.

Specially written to meet the requirements of the First and Second Stages of Geometry outlined in the Board of Education's Circular 711.

**Graphs :** The Graphical Representation of Algebraic Functions. By G. H. FRENCH, M.A., and G. OSBORN, M.A., Mathematical Masters of the Leys School, Cambridge. *Second Edition.* 1s. 6d.

**Graphs, Matriculation.** (Contained in *The New Matriculation Algebra.*) By C. H. FRENCH, M.A., and G. OSBORN, M.A. 1s.

**Hydrostatics, Intermediate.** By WM. BRIGGS, LL.D., M.A., B.Sc., F.R.A.S., and G. H. BRYAN, Sc.D., F.R.S. 3s. 6d.

**Hydrostatics, The Matriculation.** (Contained in *Intermediate Hydrostatics.*) By Dr. BRIGGS and Dr. BRYAN. 2s.

**Mechanics, The Matriculation.** By Dr. WM. BRIGGS and Dr. G. H. BRYAN. *Second Edition.* 3s. 6d.

"It is a good book—clear, concise, and accurate."—*Journal of Education.*



## Mathematics and Mechanics—continued.

**The Right Line and Circle (Coordinate Geometry).** By Dr. BRIGGS and Dr. BRYAN. *Third Edition.* 3s. 6d.

**Statics, The Tutorial.** By Dr. WM. BRIGGS and Dr. G. H. BRYAN. *Third Edition.* 3s. 6d.

**Tables, Clive's Mathematical.** Edited by A. G. CRACKNELL, M.A., B.Sc. 1s. 6d.

**Trigonometry, The Tutorial.** By WM. BRIGGS, LL.D., M.A., B.Sc., and G. H. BRYAN, Sc.D., F.R.S. *Second Edition.* 3s. 6d.

## Biology.

**Botany for Matriculation.\*** By Professor F. CAVERS, D.Sc. 5s. 6d. Also in Two Parts. Part I. 3s. 6d. Part II. 2s. 6d.

This book covers the requirements of the London University Matriculation Syllabus in Botany for 1910 and subsequent years.

"It would not be easy to get a more comprehensive account of the most important facts relating to plant life and the structural details of the commoner flowering plants than this excellent manual contains."—*Education*.

**Plant Biology.\*** An elementary Course of Botany on modern lines. By F. Cavers, D.Sc., F.L.S. 3s. 6d.

"The freshness of treatment, the provision of exact instruction for practical work really worth doing, and the consistent recognition that a plant is a living thing, should secure for Professor Cavers' book an instant welcome."—*School World*.

**Plants, Life Histories of Common.\*** An Introductory Course of Botany based on the study of types by both outdoor and indoor experiment. By F. CAVERS, D.Sc., F.L.S. 3s.

"The author is to be congratulated on the excellent features of his book, which may be summarised as a clear diction, a logical sequence, and a recognition of the essentials."—*Nature*.

**Botany, A Text-Book of.** By J. M. LOWSON, B.Sc., F.L.S. *Fourth Edition.* 6s. 6d.

"It represents the nearest approach to the ideal botanical text-book that has yet been produced."—*Pharmaceutical Journal*.

**Zoology, A Text-Book of.** By H. G. WELLS, B.Sc., and A. M. DAVIES, D.Sc. *Fifth Edition.* 6s. 6d.

"It is one of the most reliable and useful text-books published."—*Naturalist's Quarterly Review*.

---

\* A set of 41 microscopic slides specially designed by Professor CAVERS for use with his books is supplied at £1 5s. net.

## Physics.

**The Tutorial Physics.** By R. WALLACE STEWART, D.Sc., E. CATCHPOOL, B.Sc., C. J. L. WAGSTAFF, M.A., W. R. BOWER, A.R.C.Sc., and J. SATTERLY, B.A., B.Sc. In 6 Vols.

**I. Sound, Text-Book of.** By E. CATCHPOOL, B.Sc. *Fifth Edition, Revised and Enlarged.* 4s. 6d.

"A full, philosophical, and decidedly original treatment of this branch of physics."—*Educational Times*.

**II. Heat, Higher Text-Book of.** By R. W. STEWART, D.Sc. *Second Edition.* 6s. 6d.

"Clear, concise, well arranged, and well illustrated."—*Journal of Education*.

**III. Light, Text-Book of.** By R. W. STEWART, D.Sc. *Fourth Edition, Revised and Enlarged.* 4s. 6d.

"A very full and able treatment of the elements of Geometrical Optics."—*Educational News*.

**IV. Magnetism and Electricity, Higher Text-Book of.** By R. W. STEWART, D.Sc. *Second Edition.* 6s. 6d.

"The text is exceedingly lucid and painstaking in the endeavour to give the student a sound knowledge of physics."—*Nature*.

**V. Properties of Matter.** By C. J. L. WAGSTAFF, M.A. 3s. 6d.

"Very interesting sections are those on moments of inertia from an elementary point of view, Boys' modification of Cavendish's experiment, surface tension, and capillarity."—*School*.

**VI. Practical Physics.** By W. R. BOWER, A.R.C.S., and J. SATTERLY, B.A., B.Sc. 4s. 6d.

"Great pains have evidently been taken to secure efficiency, and the result is a text-book which merits great praise."—*Nature*.

**The New Matriculation Heat: The New Matriculation Light: The New Matriculation Sound.** By R. W. STEWART, D.Sc. 2s. 6d. each volume.

"The treatment is lucid and concise, and thoroughly in accordance with the most recent methods of teaching elementary physics. An outstanding feature of these books is the inclusion of a number of experiments which may be performed with the most simple and inexpensive apparatus, and from which satisfactory results may be obtained."—*Nature*.

**Electricity, Technical.** By Professor H. T. DAVIDGE, B.Sc., M.I.E.E., and R. W. HUTCHINSON, B.Sc. *2nd Ed.* 4s. 6d.

"A most desirable combination of sound instruction in scientific principles and engineering practice."—*Educational News*.

**Magnetism and Electricity, School.** By R. H. JUDE, D.Sc. 3s. 6d.

"A useful text-book that seems much sounder as regards fundamental conceptions than most elementary works on electricity."—*Oxford Magazine*.

## Chemistry, etc.

**The Tutorial Chemistry.** By G. H. BAILEY, D.Sc., Ph.D. Edited by WM. BRIGGS, LL.D., M.A., B.Sc., F.C.S.

Part I. Non-Metals. *Fourth Edition.* 3s. 6d.

Part II. Metals and Physical Chemistry. *Sec. Ed.* 4s. 6d.

"The leading truths and laws of chemistry are here expounded in a most masterly manner."—*Chemical News*.

**The New Matriculation Chemistry.\*** By G. H. BAILEY, D.Sc.

Edited by WM. BRIGGS, LL.D. *Fourth Edition.* 5s. 6d.

**Chemical Analysis, Qualitative and Quantitative.** By WM. BRIGGS, LL.D., M.A., B.Sc., F.C.S., and R. W. STEWART, D.Sc. *Fourth Edition.* 3s. 6d.

**The Junior Chemistry.** By R. H. ADIE, M.A., B.Sc., Lecturer in Chemistry, St. John's College, Cambridge. 2s. 6d.

This is a course of combined theoretical and practical work covering the requirements of the Oxford and Cambridge Junior Locals. Its method of treatment differs from that of most modern books of this standard, inasmuch as it aims at bringing the pupil, *from the outset*, into touch with fundamental principles.

"A useful and practical course, constructed on thoroughly scientific principles."—*Oxford Magazine*.

**The Elements of Organic Chemistry.** By E. I. LEWIS, B.A., B.Sc., Science Master at Oundle School. 2s. 6d.

The fundamental principles of the Chemistry of Carbon Compounds developed from and illustrated by the behaviour of the Ethyl, Methyl, Phenyl, and Benzyl compounds mainly.

"A useful book containing many well selected typical experiments. The directions are clearly and carefully given."—*Secondary Education*.

**Systematic Practical Organic Chemistry.** By G. M. NORMAN, B.Sc., F.C.S. 1s. 6d.

**Perspective Drawing, The Theory and Practice of.** By S. POLAK, Art Master. 5s.

A complete course of instruction covering the requirements of the Board of Education Syllabus in Perspective Drawing.

**Science German Course.** By C. W. PAGET MOFFATT, M.A., M.B., B.C. 3s. 6d.

"Provides a convenient means of obtaining sufficient acquaintance with the German language to read simple scientific descriptions in it with intelligence."—*Nature*.

---

\* Sets of apparatus and reagents are supplied specially designed for use with this book—Set A, 13s. 6d. ; Set B, £2.

## French.

**Junior French Course.** By E. WEEKLEY, M.A., Professor of French at University College, Nottingham, and Examiner in the University of London. *Second Edition.* 2s. 6d.

"Distinctly an advance on similar courses."—*Journal of Education.*

**The Matriculation French Course.** By E. WEEKLEY, M.A., Examiner in French in the University of London. *Third Edition, Enlarged.* 3s. 6d.

"The rules are well expressed, the exercises appropriate, and the matter accurate and well arranged."—*Guardian.*

**French Accidence, The Tutorial.** By ERNEST WEEKLEY, M.A. With Exercises, Passages for Translation into French, and a Chapter on Elementary Syntax. *Third Edition.* 3s. 6d.

"We can heartily recommend it."—*Schoolmaster.*

**French Syntax, The Tutorial.** By ERNEST WEEKLEY, M.A., and A. J. WYATT, M.A. With Exercises. 3s. 6d.

"It is a decidedly good book."—*Guardian.*

**French Grammar, The Tutorial.** Containing the *Accidence* and the *Syntax* in One Volume. *Second Edition.* 4s. 6d. Also the Exercises on the *Accidence*, 1s. 6d. ; on the *Syntax*, 1s.

**French Prose Composition.** By E. WEEKLEY, M.A. With Notes and Vocabulary. *Third Edition, Enlarged.* 3s. 6d.

"The arrangement is lucid, the rules clearly expressed, the suggestions really helpful, and the examples carefully chosen."—*Educational Times.*

**Junior French Reader.** By E. WEEKLEY, M.A. With Notes and Vocabulary. *Second Edition.* 1s. 6d.

"A very useful first reader with good vocabulary and sensible notes."—*Schoolmaster.*

**French Prose Reader.** By S. BARLET, B. ès Sc., and W. F. MASOM, M.A., Examiner in the University of London. With Notes and Vocabulary. 2s. 6d.

"Admirably chosen extracts."—*School Government Chronicle.*

**The Matriculation French Reader.** Containing Prose, Verse, Notes, and Vocabulary. By J. A. PERRET, Examiner in French in the University of London. 2s. 6d.

"We can recommend this book without reserve."—*School World.*

**Advanced French Reader.** Edited by S. BARLET, B. ès Sc., and W. F. MASOM, M.A. *Second Edition.* 2s. 6d.

"Chosen from a large range of good modern authors."—*Schoolmaster.*

**Higher French Reader.** Edited by E. WEEKLEY, M.A. 3s. 6d.

"The passages are well chosen, interesting in themselves, and representative of the best contemporary stylists."—*Journal of Education.*



## English Classics.

- Chaucer.—*Canterbury Tales*. By A. J. WYATT, M.A. With Glossary. Prologue. 1s. Knight's Tale, Nun's Priest's Tale, Man of Law's Tale, Squire's Tale. Each with Prologue, 2s. 6d.
- Johnson.—*Life of Milton*. By S. E. GOGGIN, M.A. 1s. 6d.
- Johnson.—*Rasselas*. By A. J. F. COLLINS, M.A. 1s. 6d.
- Langland.—*Piers Plowman*. Prologue and Passus I.-VII. By J. F. DAVIS, D.Lit., M.A. 4s. 6d.
- Milton.—*Early Poems, Comus, Lycidas*. By S. E. GOGGIN, M.A., and A. F. WATT, M.A. 2s. 6d. *Areopagitica*. 1s. 6d. *Comus*. 1s.
- Milton.—*Paradise Lost, Books I., II.* By A. F. WATT, M.A. 1s. 6d. *Books IV., V.* By S. E. GOGGIN, M.A. 1s. 6d.
- Milton.—*Paradise Regained*. By A. J. WYATT, M.A. 2s. 6d.
- Milton.—*Samson Agonistes*. By A. J. WYATT, M.A. 2s. 6d.
- Milton.—*Sonnets*. By W. F. MASOM, M.A. 1s. 6d.
- More.—*Utopia*. By R. R. RUSK, Ph.D. 2s.
- Pope.—*Rape of the Lock*. By A. F. WATT, M.A. 1s. 6d.

Shakespeare :—

As You Like It. By A. R.

WEEKES, B.A. 2s.

Coriolanus. By S. E. GOGGIN,

M.A. 2s.

Hamlet. By S. E. GOGGIN,

M.A. 2s.

Julius Caesar. By A. F.

WATT, M.A. 2s.

Merchant of Venice. By S. E.

GOGGIN, M.A. 2s.

Midsummer Night's Dream.

By A. F. WATT, M.A. 2s.

Richard II. By A. F. WATT,

M.A. 2s.

The Tempest. By A. R.

WEEKES, B.A. 2s.

Shakespeare. By Prof. W. J. ROLFE, D.Litt. In 40 volumes.

2s. a Volume.

King John

Midsummer Night's  
Dream

Much A-do About Nothing  
Tempest

2s. 6d. a Volume.

All's Well that Ends Well

Antony and Cleopatra

As You Like It

Comedy of Errors

Coriolanus

Cymbeline

Hamlet

Henry IV. Part I.

Henry IV. Part II.

Henry V.

Henry VI. Parts I.-III.

Henry VIII.

Julius Caesar

King Lear

Love's Labour's Lost

Macbeth

Measure for Measure

Merchant of Venice

Merry Wives of Windsor

Othello

Pericles

Richard II.

Richard III.

Romeo and Juliet

Sonnets

The Taming of the Shrew

The Two Noble Kinsmen

Timon of Athens

Titus Andronicus

Troilus and Cressida

Twelfth Night

Two Gentlemen of Verona

Venus and Adonis

Winter's Tale

Shelley.—*Adonais*. By A. R. WEEKES, B.A. 1s. 6d.

Spenser.—*Faerie Queene, Book I.* By W. H. HILL, M.A. 2s. 6d.

## English Language and Literature.

**The English Language: Its History and Structure.** By W. H. LOW, M.A. With TEST QUESTIONS. *Sixth Edition, Revised.* 3s. 6d.

"A clear workmanlike history of the English language done on sound principles."  
—*Saturday Review*.

**The Matriculation English Course.** By W. H. LOW, M.A., and JOHN BRIGGS, M.A., F.Z.S. *Third Edition.* 3s. 6d.

CONTENTS.—Historical Sketch—Sounds and Symbols—Outlines of Accidence and Syntax—Common Errors—Analysis—Parsing—The Word, the Sentence, the Paragraph—Punctuation—Rules for Composition—Simple Narrative—Compound Narrative—Descriptive Composition—The Abstract Theme—The Essay—Paraphrasing—Précis-Writing—Style and Diction—Prosody—Index.

"The matter is clearly arranged, concisely and intelligently put, and marked by accurate scholarship and common-sense."—*Guardian*.

**English Literature, The Tutorial History of.** By A. J. WYATT, M.A. *Second Edition.* 2s. 6d.

"This is undoubtedly the best school history of literature that has yet come under our notice."—*Guardian*.

"The scheme of the book is clear, proportional, and scientific."—*Academy*.

"A sound and scholarly work."—*St. James' Gazette*.

**English Literature, The Intermediate Text-Book of.** By W. H. LOW, M.A., and A. J. WYATT, M.A. 6s. 6d.

"Really judicious in the selection of the details given."—*Saturday Review*.

"Well-informed and clearly written."—*Journal of Education*.

"The historical part is concise and clear, but the criticism is even more valuable, and a number of illustrative extracts contribute a most useful feature to the volume."—*School World*.

**An Anthology of English Verse.** With Introduction and Glossary. By A. J. WYATT, M.A., and S. E. GOGGIN, M.A. 2s.

For use in Training Colleges and Secondary Schools. The extracts have been selected as representative of English verse from Wyatt to the present time (exclusive of drama).

"We look upon this collection as one of the best of its kind."—*Teachers' Aid*.

**Précis-Writing, A Text-Book of.** By T. C. JACKSON, B.A., LL.B., and JOHN BRIGGS, M.A., F.Z.S. 2s. 6d.

In writing this text-book, the authors have aimed at increasing the educational value of Précis-Writing by giving a more systematic and a less technical treatment to the subject than is usual.

"Admirably clear and businesslike."—*Guardian*.

"Thoroughly practical, and on right lines educationally."—*School World*.

## Philosophy.

**Ethics, Manual of.** By J. S. MACKENZIE, Litt.D., M.A., formerly Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. 6s. 6d.

"In writing this book Mr. Mackenzie has produced an earnest and striking contribution to the ethical literature of the time."—*Mind*.

**Logic, A Manual of.** By J. WELTON, M.A., Professor of Education, University of Leeds. 2 vols. Vol. I., 8s. 6d. ; Vol. II., 6s. 6d.

Vol. I. contains the whole of Deductive Logic, except Fallacies, which are treated, with Inductive Fallacies, in Vol. II.

"A clear and compendious summary of the views of various thinkers on important and doubtful points."—*Journal of Education*.

**Psychology, The Groundwork of.** By G. F. STOUT, M.A., LL.D., Fellow of the British Academy, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of St. Andrews. 4s. 6d.

"All students of philosophy, both beginners and those who would describe themselves as 'advanced,' will do well to 'read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest' this book."—*Oxford Magazine*.

**Psychology, A Manual of.** By G. F. STOUT, M.A., LL.D. 8s. 6d.

"There is a refreshing absence of sketchiness about the book, and a clear desire manifested to help the student in the subject."—*Saturday Review*.

## Modern History and Constitution.

**The Tutorial History of England. (To 1901.)** By C. S. FEARENSIDE, M.A. 4s. 6d.

"An excellent text-book for the upper forms of a school."—*Journal of Education*.

**Matriculation Modern History.** Being the History of England 1485-1901, with some reference to the Contemporary History of Europe and Colonial Developments. By C. S. FEARENSIDE, M.A. 3s. 6d.

"A work that gives evidence of scholarship and clever adaptability to a special purpose."—*Guardian*.

**Groundwork of English History.** By M. E. CARTER. 2s.

"It presents the salient facts of English History in a readable but definite form unencumbered with irrelevant detail."—*Schoolmaster*.

**European History, Main Landmarks of.** By F. N. DIXON, B.A. *Second Edition.* 2s.

"A capable sketch in which historical movements are indicated accurately and with vigour."—*Guardian*.

**Citizenship, The Elements of the Duties and Rights of.** By W. D. ASTON, B.A., LL.B. *Third Edition.* 1s. 6d.

**Government of the United Kingdom.** By A. E. HOGAN, LL.D. 2s. 6d.

CONTENTS.—Introduction — Legislature — Executive — Judicial System—Local Government—Imperial Government.

## Geography.

**Text-Book of Geography.** By G. C. FRY, M.Sc., F.I.C., Science Master at West Buckland, North Devon. 4s. 6d.

This book is intended for use in the upper forms of schools and by candidates for London University Matriculation, the Oxford and Cambridge Locals, and other Examinations of similar standard.

It deals with both General and Regional Geography. In Regional Geography the natural features are first dealt with and then the political facts that are the outcome of these features.

"It is one of the most scientific and rational text-books yet published."—*Educational News*.

"Mr. Fry brings out the fascination of the broad view of Geography."—*Literary World*.

## Roman and Greek History.

**The Tutorial History of Rome.** (To 14 A.D.) By A. H. ALLCROFT, M.A., and W. F. MASOM, M.A. With Maps. *Third Edition, Revised and in part Rewritten.* 3s. 6d.

"It is well and clearly written."—*Saturday Review*.

"A distinctly good book, full, clear, and accurate."—*Guardian*.

**The Tutorial History of Greece.** (To 323 B.C.) By Prof. W. J. WOODHOUSE, M.A. 4s. 6d.

Prof. Woodhouse is exceptionally well qualified to write a history of Greece, and he has done it well."—*School World*.

**A Longer History of Rome.** By A. H. ALLCROFT, M.A., and others (each volume containing an account of the Literature of the Period)—

390—202 B.C. 3s. 6d.

78—31 B.C. 3s. 6d.

202—133 B.C. 3s. 6d.

44 B.C.—138 A.D. 3s. 6d.

133—78 B.C. 3s. 6d.

"Written in a clear and direct style. Its authors show a thorough acquaintance with their authorities, and have also used the works of modern historians to good effect."—*Journal of Education*.

**A Longer History of Greece.** By A. H. ALLCROFT, M.A. (each volume containing an account of the Literature of the Period)—

To 495 B.C. 3s. 6d.

404—362 B.C. 3s. 6d.

495—431 B.C. 3s. 6d.

362—323 B.C. 3s. 6d.

440—404 B.C. 3s. 6d.

Sicily, 491—289 B.C. 3s. 6d.

"The authors have apparently spared no pains to make their work at once comprehensive and readable."—*Schoolmaster*.



## Latin and Greek.

### GRAMMARS AND READERS.

**Junior Latin Course.** By B. J. HAYES, M.A. 2s. 6d.

"A good practical guide. The principles are sound, and the rules are clearly stated."—*Educational Times*.

**The Tutorial Latin Grammar.** By B. J. HAYES, M.A., and W. F. MASOM, M.A. *Fourth Edition*. 3s. 6d.

"Accurate and full without being overloaded with detail."—*Schoolmaster*.

**Latin Composition.** With copious Exercises and easy continuous Passages. By A. H. ALLCROFT, M.A., and J. H. HAYDON, M.A. *Sixth Edition, Enlarged*. 2s. 6d.

"Simplicity of statement and arrangement, apt examples illustrating each rule, exceptions to these adroitly stated just at the proper place and time, are among some of the striking characteristics of this excellent book."—*Schoolmaster*.

**Junior Latin Reader.** By E. J. G. FORSE, M.A. 1s. 6d.

**Matriculation Selections from Latin Authors.** With Introduction (History and Antiquities), Notes, and Vocabulary. By A. F. WATT, M.A., and B. J. HAYES, M.A. 2s. 6d.

Provides practice in reading Latin in preparation for Examinations for which no classics are prescribed.

"It is quite an interesting selection, and well done."—*School World*.

"The selection is a good one, and the notes are brief and to the purpose."—*Journal of Education*.

**Matriculation Latin Construing Book.** By A. F. WATT, M.A., and B. J. HAYES, M.A. 2s.

A guide to the construing of the Latin period and its translation into English.

"One of the most useful text-books of this very practical Tutorial Series."—*School Guardian*.

**The Tutorial Latin Reader.** With VOCABULARY. 2s. 6d.

"A soundly practical work."—*Guardian*.

**Advanced Latin Unseens.** Being a Higher Latin Reader. Edited by H. J. MAIDMENT, M.A., and T. R. MILLS, M.A. 3s. 6d.

"Contains some good passages, which have been selected from a wider field than that previously explored by similar manuals."—*Cambridge Review*.

**The Tutorial Latin Dictionary.** By F. G. PLAISTOWE, M.A., late Fellow of Queens' College, Cambridge. 6s. 6d.

"A sound school dictionary."—*Speaker*.

**Advanced Greek Unseens.** *Second Edition, Enlarged*. 3s. 6d.

**The Tutorial Greek Reader.** With VOCABULARIES. By A. WAUGH YOUNG, M.A. *Third Edition, Enlarged*. 2s. 6d.

## EDITIONS OF LATIN AND GREEK CLASSICS.

*The Text is in all cases accompanied by Introduction and Notes; books marked (\*) contain also an alphabetical Lexicon.*

*The Vocabularies are in order of the text and are preceded by Test Papers.*

|                          | Text. | Voc. |                                | Text. | Voc. |
|--------------------------|-------|------|--------------------------------|-------|------|
| Acts of Apostles.        | ...   | 1/0  | DEMOSTHENES—                   |       |      |
| ÆSCHYLUS—                |       |      | Androtion.                     | 4/6   | ...  |
| Eumenides.               | 3/6   | 1/0  | EURIPIDES—                     |       |      |
| Persæ.                   | 3/6   | ...  | Alcestis.                      | 1/6   | 1/0  |
| Prometheus Vincetus.     | 2/6   | 1/0  | Andromache.                    | 3/6   | ...  |
| Septem contra Thebas.    | 3/6   | 1/0  | Bacchæ.                        | 3/6   | 1/0  |
| ARISTOPHANES—            |       |      | Hecuba.                        | 3/6   | ...  |
| Ranae.                   | 3/6   | ...  | Hippolytus.                    | 3/6   | 1/0  |
| CAESAR—                  |       |      | Iphigenia in Tauris.           | 3/6   | 1/0  |
| Civil War, Book 1.       | 1/6   | ...  | Medea.                         | 3/6   | ...  |
| Civil War, Book 3.       | 2/6   | 1/0  | HERODOTUS—                     |       |      |
| Gallie War, Books 1-7.   |       |      | Book 3.                        | 4/6   | 1/0  |
| (each)                   | 1/6   | 1/0  | Book 4, Ch. 1-144.             | 4/6   | 1/0  |
| Gallie War, Book 1,      |       |      | Book 6.                        | 2/6   | 1/0  |
| Ch. 1 to 29.             | 1/6   | ...  | Book 8.                        | 3/6   | ...  |
| The Invasion of Britain. | 1/6   | 1/0  | HOMER—                         |       |      |
| Gallie War, Book 7, Ch.  |       |      | Iliad, Book 6.                 | ...   | 1/0  |
| 1 to 68.                 | 1/6   | ...  | Iliad, Book 24.                | 3/6   | ...  |
| CICERO—                  |       |      | Odyssey, Books 9, 10.          | 2/6   | ...  |
| Ad Atticum, Book 4.      | 3/6   | ...  | Odyssey, Books 11, 12.         | 2/6   | ...  |
| De Amicitia.             | *1/6  | 1/0  | Odyssey, Books 13, 14.         | 2/6   | ...  |
| De Finibus, Book 1.      | 2/6   | ...  | Odyssey, Book 17.              | 1/6   | 1/0  |
| De Finibus, Book 2.      | 3/6   | ...  | HORACE—                        |       |      |
| De Officiis, Book 3.     | 3/6   | 1/0  | Epistles (including <i>Ars</i> |       |      |
| De Senectute.            | *1/6  | 1/0  | <i>Poetica</i> ).              | 4/6   | ...  |
| In Catilinam 1.-IV.      | 2/6   | ...  | Epistles (excluding <i>Ars</i> |       |      |
| „ I., III. (each)        | 1/6   | 1/0  | <i>Poetica</i> ).              | ...   | 1/-  |
| Philippic II.            | 2/6   | 1/0  | Epodes.                        | 1/6   | ...  |
| Pro Archia.              | 1/6   | 1/0  | Odes, Books 1-4.               | *3/6  | ...  |
| Pro Balbo.               | ...   | 1/0  | Separately, each Book          |       |      |
| Pro Cluentio.            | 3/6   | 1/0  | (*2, 3, 4).                    | 1/6   | 1/0  |
| Pro Lege Manilia.        | 2/6   | 1/0  | Satires.                       | 4/6   | 1/0  |
| Pro Marcello.            | 1/6   | 1/0  | ISOCRATES—                     |       |      |
| Pro Milone.              | 3/6   | 1/0  | De Bigis.                      | 2/6   | ...  |
| Pro Plancio.             | 3/6   | 1/0  |                                |       |      |
| Pro Roscio Amerino       | 2/6   | 1/0  |                                |       |      |
| CURTIIUS—                |       |      |                                |       |      |
| Book 9, Ch. 6-end.       | 1/6   | ...  |                                |       |      |

## Editions of Latin and Greek Classics—continued.

|                              | Text.      | Voc. |                           | Text.      | Voc. |
|------------------------------|------------|------|---------------------------|------------|------|
| <b>JUVENAL—</b>              |            |      | <b>SALLUST—</b>           |            |      |
| Satires 1, 3, 10, 11.        | 3/6        | ...  | Catiline.                 | 1/6        | 1/0  |
| Satires 1, 3, 4.             | 3/6        | ...  | <b>SOPHOCLES—</b>         |            |      |
| Satires 8, 10, 13.           | 2/6        | ...  | Ajax.                     | 3/6        | 1/0  |
| Satires 11, 13, 14.          | 3/6        | ...  | Antigone.                 | 2/6        | 1/0  |
| <b>LIVY—</b>                 |            |      | Electra.                  | 3/6        | 1/0  |
| Book 1.                      | 2/6        | 1/0  | <b>TACITUS—</b>           |            |      |
| Books 3, 6, 9. (each)        | 3/6        | 1/0  | Agricola.                 | 2/6        | 1/0  |
| Book 5.                      | 2/6        | 1/0  | Annals, Book 1.           | 2/6        | 1/0  |
| Book 9, Ch. 1-19.            | 1/6        | ...  | Annals, Book 2.           | 2/6        | ...  |
| Book 21, Ch. 1-30.           | 1/6        | ...  | Germania.                 | 2/6        | 1/0  |
| Books 21, 22. (each)         | 2/6        | 1/6  | Histories, Books 1, 3.    | (each) 3/6 | 1/0  |
| <b>LUCIAN—</b>               |            |      | <b>TERENCE—</b>           |            |      |
| Charon and Piscator.         | 3/6        | 1/0  | Adelphi.                  | 3/6        | ...  |
| <b>LYSIAS—</b>               |            |      | <b>THUCYDIDES—</b>        |            |      |
| Eratosthenes.                | 2/6        | ...  | Book 7.                   | 3/6        | ...  |
| Eratosth. and Agoratus.      | ...        | 1/0  | <b>VERGIL—</b>            |            |      |
| <b>NEPOS—</b>                |            |      | Aeneid, Books 1-8. (each) | *1/6       | 1/0  |
| Hannibal, Cato, Atticus.     | 1/0        | ...  | Books 7-10.               | 3/6        | ...  |
| <b>OVID—</b>                 |            |      | Book 9.                   | *1/6       | ...  |
| Fasti, Books 3, 4.           | 2/6        | 1/0  | Books 9, 10.              | ...        | 1/0  |
| Fasti, Books 5, 6.           | 3/6        | 1/0  | Book 10.                  | *1/6       | ...  |
| Heroides, 1-10.              | 3/6        | 1/0  | Book 11.                  | *1/6       | 1/0  |
| Heroides, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 12. | ...        | 1/6  | Book 12.                  | 1/6        | ...  |
| Heroides, 1, 5, 12.          | 1/6        | ...  | Eclogues.                 | 3/6        | 1/0  |
| Metamorphoses, Book 1,       |            |      | Georgics, Books 1 and 2.  | 3/6        | 1/0  |
| lines 1-150; Book 3,         |            |      | Georgics, Books 1 and 4.  | 3/6        | 1/0  |
| lines 1-250, 511-733;        |            |      | Georgics, Book 4.         |            |      |
| Book 5, lines 385-550.       | (each) 1/6 | ...  | (separately)              | 1/6        | ...  |
| Book 11.                     | ...        | 1/0  | <b>XENOPHON—</b>          |            |      |
| Book 11, lines 410-748.      | 1/6        | ...  | Anabasis, Book 1.         | 1/6        | 1/0  |
| Books 13, 14. (each)         | 1/6        | 1/0  | Anabasis, Book 4.         | 1/6        | ...  |
| Tristia, Books 1, 3. (each)  | 1/6        | 1/0  | Cyropaedeia, Book 1.      | 1/6        | 1/0  |
| <b>PLATO—</b>                |            |      | Cyropaedeia, Book 5.      | ...        | 1/0  |
| Apology.                     | 3/6        | 1/0  | Hellenica, Books 3, 4.    | (each) 1/6 | ...  |
| Crito.                       | 2/6        | 1/0  | Memorabilia, Book 1.      | 3/6        | 1/0  |
| Euthyphro and Mene-          |            |      | Oeconomicus.              | 4/6        | 1/0  |
| xenus.                       | 4/6        | 1/0  | „ Ch. 1-10.               | 1/6        | ...  |
| Ion, Laches. (each)          | 3/6        | 1/0  |                           |            |      |
| Phaedo.                      | 3/6        | ...  |                           |            |      |

*A detailed catalogue of the above can be obtained on application.*

## The University Tutorial Series.

General Editor: WM. BRIGGS, LL.D., D.C.L., M.A., B.Sc.,  
Principal of University Correspondence College.

The object of the UNIVERSITY TUTORIAL SERIES is to provide candidates for examinations and learners generally with text-books which shall convey in the simplest form sound instruction in accordance with the latest results of scholarship and scientific research. Important points are fully and clearly treated, and care has been taken not to introduce details which are likely to perplex the beginner.

The Publisher will be happy to entertain applications from Teachers for Specimen Copies of books mentioned in this List.

### SOME PRESS OPINIONS.

"This series is successful in hitting its mark and supplying much help to students in places where a guiding hand is sorely needed."—*Journal of Education*.

"Many editors of more pretentious books might study the methods of the 'University Tutorial Series' with profit."—*Guardian*.

"The 'University Tutorial Series' is favourably known for its practical and workmanlike methods."—*Public Schools Year Book*.

"The series is eminently successful."—*Spectator*.

"The classical texts in this series are edited by men who are thoroughly masters of their craft."—*Saturday Review*.

"The competent manner in which the volumes of this series are edited is now well known and generally recognised."—*Educational Times*.

"This useful series of text-books."—*Nature*.

"Any books published in this series are admirably adapted for the needs of the large class of students for whom they are intended."—*Cambridge Review*.

"Clearness in statement and orderliness in arrangement characterise the publications of the University Tutorial Press."—*Oxford Magazine*.

"All books which issue from the 'University Tutorial Press' are both scholarly and practical."—*Westminster Review*.

"The merit of this series of publications consists in the workmanlike execution of an orderly practical plan."—*School Government Chronicle*.


"The books of the 'University Tutorial Series' have deservedly won a high reputation for sound scholarship, clear and orderly arrangement and presentation, and practical and up-to-date methods."—*Bookman*.

"The more we see of these excellent manuals the more highly do we think of them."—*Schoolmaster*.

"Such text-books are immeasurably superior to the heavy tomes, overburdened with extraneous matter, with which boys of a previous generation were familiar."—*School Guardian*.







W464P

Welton

Principles and methods of  
moral training, with special  
reference to school discipline

Date Due

[illegible]



